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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
In the present work an attempt has been made to assess the history, 
poUtical philosophy and socio-poUtical conditions and civihzation trends 
right from the prophet period till now. The object of this worlc focuses on 
bringing into light major political systems of Muslims that emerged and 
operated at various periods of time and special emphasis has been given to 
modern Muslim experimentations and various methods techniques ad ways 
necessitated by the requirements of time and place. Many books and 
articles have been written on political systems of Islam and Muslims but no 
substantial and cohesive effort had been made to bring out the relevance 
and application of the that discussions 'political system of Islam to modern 
times' which has been done in this work. 
This work is divided into seen chapters followed by a bibliography 
and glossary. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of the political 
system of the Prophet's period and the evolution of the Islamic state 
through a number of the Prophetic measures like the system of the 
'mu'akhat (brotherhood) and the Kitab (document) and the making of the 
'ummah' (Muslim community) etc: It also discusses the politico-juridical 
systems during the Caliphs's period and explains the concepts of Khalifa 
and the Caliphate and Ideal Khalifat, encompassing the experimentations of 
the umavid and Abbasid dynasties with special reference to their state-
building measure and thought making provisions and resolutions such the 
rise of three tier system of governance which is generally classified as the 
central, provincial and local governments. 
The second chapter deals with the discussion of the tradition 
philosophy and politics in Islam. This chapter is divided into three parts: 
1. Early Islamic philosophers of the East, like Farabi, 
Avicena and Al-Ghazzal; 
2. Islamic philosophers in the Western lands of Islam 
like Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Khaldun. 
3. Later Islamic Philosophers like Khwaja Nasir al-Din 
al-Tusi and Nizamul-Mulk. This chapter explained the 
political thought of these philosophers and their salient 
features; for example: The principles of political 
philosophy of Farabi in Madina-e-Fadilah and 
Madinah-e-Jahi 1 ah that is partly followed from plato 
and Aristotle, while political philosophy of Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna) is also described against his historical 
backdrop because he was a great scholar who earned 
some experiences in the period of his administration 
working as a Wazir in Hamedan (Iran). Al- Ghazzali's 
concepts of political philosophy is also discussed 
within the prescribed framework although he is 
generally considers a mystic and theologian. 
The part two of this chapter is concerned with the governance of 
the sohtary propounded by Ibn Bajjah as well as the ideas of Ibn Tufayl 
and his common points which he shares with Ibn Bajjah, Finally it gives a 
perspective of Ibn Khaldun's political philosophy and his concepts of 
al-asabiya (group feeling) ands the transformation of the caliphate into 
Royal authority which are corner stones of his political philosophy. At last 
in the part three theory of philosopher/Wazir and political philosophy of 
Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Nizamul-Mulk with referenceto his book 
(Siasat Namah) is discussed, as Nizamul-Mulk was longtime a powerful 
Wazir in the Seljugi period. 
The third chapter deals with medieval experiment of political 
systems of Muslim dynasties in the three dynasties: the Ottoman, the 
Safavid and the Mughal main points of the discussion in this chapter are: 
The Ottoman Sultanate, empire, and Ottoman kings and their ranks. The 
'ulama' and Ottoman ruling elite and administration. It also deals with the 
Safavid. Iran and political development their period specially their 
relationship with 'ulama' and elite group. Last parties devoted to Mughal 
Empire and their experiments that led to the creation of medieval state with 
special emphasis on the powers Mughal kings and their status as well as the 
Mughal rulers' relations with the 'ulama'. 
The fourth chapter gives a detailed account of the modern 
experiments in Muslim world. In this chapter are have chosen four 
countries of four parts of Islamic world. These are Egypt as a country that 
has experienced more than five thousand years political experiment. About 
Egypt we specially discussed the period of Nassir and Sadat and 
concentrated on the Mubark's period and the political development in his 
period and his legitimacy. Then we have chosen Turkey as base of 
Ottoman power in medieval times and it's changing from the Caliphate to 
nation-State in modern times under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, his 
reforms, innovation and abolitions. The second Turkish republic and its 
political development have also been discussed the part three of this 
chapter is about Malaysia whose main titles discussed are: 
Constitutional monarchy, political development, relation with the 
west and Muslim countries and the future of Malaysia in the post Muhatir 
Mohammad period. 
The last part of the chapter four is about Tajikistan as a new 
emerging country after Cold War and abolition of Soviet Union. The main 
features that we discussed about it are: political system of Tajikistan, a 
series changes to the election code by the Tajik Parliament, and 
development of the political system. 
The fifth chapter throws sufficient light on the Iranian political 
system in modem times especially theory of Wilayat-i-Faqih of Imam 
Khomeini. Moreover, the role of the 'ulama' in the political arena in Iran 
from the 1880 - 1979 (year of revolution) is shown. 
The sixth chapter gives a vivid account of the development of 
modern political system in Muslim countries, like, Pakistan, Indonesia and 
Arab world. The main things discussed about Pakistan are as follows: 
political background, role of Mohammad Ali Jinah (Father of Pakistan) in 
the creation of Pakistan and its emergence as a Muslim State, Pakistan's 
nuclear, political parties and leaders of Pakistan, Islamic power groups 
future political system of Pakistan and the public opinion and status of 
press in Pakistan. About Indonesia which is the most popular Muslim 
country, we have discussed several special features such as political history 
of Indonesia and political views of Sukarno and his successor suharto, 
political transition in post-suharto period, structural changes of the political 
development, the press and its role in modern Indonesia, the role of 
television and recent political situation development problems and reforms 
needs. 
The last part of chapter sixth gives as account about the Arab 
World and its definition, Syria and Arab World, Iraq and Arab World, 
Saddam's Aggressive Arab Nationalism, the Israeli-Arab Wars, Saudi 
Arabia and its political system and its relations with USA. Finally in this 
chapter a discussion is devoted to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and its 
absolute monarchy and political development and ruling families of UAE. 
Moreover we have also thrown a glance on the efforts of Yasser Arafat as a 
Arab-Palestinian politician as well as two organizations in Arab World; 
League of Arab States and Gulf co-operation (GCC) and their political role 
in the Arab World. 
The last i.e. the Seventh Chapter deals with Conclusion and 
Suggestions to show some pattern of political systems and experiments that 
were made in the Muslim World. 
In the end it can be said with some degree of satisfaction that 
varied political experimentations and statecraft developments have been 
analyzed in this work. Through them more suitable future political system 
could be discovered by the contemporary or future Muslim generation, or 
at least a glance in these experiments might give an idea to analytical 
researcher and greater scholar to fmd out a political system that might meet 
the requirements of the Muslim World. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the present work an attempt has been made to assess the history, 
political philosophy and socio-political conditions and civilization trends 
right from the prophet period till now. The object of this work focuses on 
bringing into light major political systems of Muslims that emerged and 
operated at various periods of time and special emphasis has been given to 
modern Muslim experimentations and various methods techniques ad ways 
necessitated by the requirements of time and place. Many books and 
articles have been written on political systems of Islam and Muslims but no 
substantial and cohesive effort had been made to bring out the relevance 
and application of the that discussions 'political system of Islam to modem 
times' which has been done in this work. 
This work is divided into seen chapters followed by a bibliography 
and glossary. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of the political 
system of the Prophet's period and the evolution of the Islamic state 
through a number of the Prophetic measures like the system of the 
'mu'akhat (brotherhood) and the Kitab (document) and the making of the 
'ummah' (Muslim community) etc: It also discusses the politico-juridical 
systems during the Caliphs's period and explains the concepts of Khalifa 
and the Caliphate and Ideal Khalifat, encompassing the experimentations of 
the umavid and Abbasid dynasties with special reference to their state-
building measure and thought making provisions and resolutions such the 
rise of three tier system of governance which is generally classified as the 
central, provincial and local governments. 
The second chapter deals with the discussion of the tradition 
philosophy and politics in Islam. This chapter is divided into three parts: 
1. Early Islamic philosophers of the East, like Farabi, 
Avicena and Al-Ghazzal; 
2. Islamic philosophers in the Western lands of Islam 
like Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Khaldun. 
3. Later Islamic Philosophers like Khwaja Nasir al-Din 
al-Tusi and Nizamul-Mulk. This chapter explained the 
political thought of these philosophers and their salient 
features; for example: The principles of political 
philosophy of Farabi in Madina-e-Fadilah and 
Madinah-e-Jahilah that is partly followed from plato 
and Aristotle, while political philosophy of Ibn Sina 
(Avicenna) is also described against his historical 
backdrop because he was a great scholar who earned 
some experiences in the period of his administration 
working as a Wazir in Hamedan (Iran). Al- Ghazzali's 
concepts of political philosophy is also discussed 
within the prescribed framework ahhough he is 
generally considers a mystic and theologian. 
The part two of this chapter is concerned with the governance of 
the sohtary propounded by Ibn Bajjah as well as the ideas of Ibn Tufayl 
and his common points which he shares with Ibn Bajjah, Finally it gives a 
perspective of Ibn Khaldun's political philosophy and his concepts of 
al-asabiya (group feeling) ands the transformation of the caliphate into 
Royal authority which are corner stones of his political philosophy. At last 
in the part three theoiy of philosopher/Wazir and political philosophy of 
Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Nizamul-Mulk with referenceto his book 
(Siasat Namah) is discussed, as Nizamul-Mulk was longtime a powerful 
Wazir in the Seljugi period. 
The third chapter deals with medieval experiment of political 
systems of Muslim dynasties in the three dynasties: the Ottoman, the 
Safavid and the Mughal main points of the discussion in this chapter are: 
The Ottoman Sultanate, empire, and Ottoman kings and their ranks. The 
'ulama' and Ottoman ruling elite and administration. It also deals with the 
Safavid. Iran and political development their period specially their 
relationship with 'ulama' and elite group. Last parties devoted to Mughal 
Empire and their experiments that led to the creation of medieval state with 
special emphasis on the powers Mughal kings and their status as well as the 
Mughal rulers' relations with the 'ulama'. 
The fourth chapter gives a detailed account of the modem 
experiments in Muslim world. In this chapter are have chosen four 
countries of four parts of Islamic world. These are Egypt as a country that 
has experienced more than five thousand years political experiment. About 
Egypt we specially discussed the period of Nassir and Sadat and 
concentrated on the Mubark's period and the political development in his 
period and his legitimacy. Then we have chosen Turkey as base of 
Ottoman power in medieval times and it's changing from the Caliphate to 
nation-State in modern times under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, his 
reforms, innovation and abolitions. The second Turkish republic and its 
political development have also been discussed the part three of this 
chapter is about Malaysia whose main titles discussed are: 
Constitutional monarchy, political development, relation with the 
west and Muslim countries and the future of Malaysia in the post Muhatir 
Mohammad period. 
The last part of the chapter four is about Tajikistan as a new 
emerging country after Cold War and abolition of Soviet Union. The main 
features that we discussed about it are: political system of Tajikistan, a 
series changes to the election code by the Tajik Parliament, and 
development of the political system. 
The fifth chapter throws sufficient light on the Iranian political 
system in modem times especially theory of Wilayat-i-Faqih of Imam 
Khomeini. Moreover, the role of the 'ulama' in the political arena in Iran 
from the 1880 - 1979 (year of revolution) is shown. 
The sixth chapter gives a vivid account of the development of 
modern political system in Muslim countries, like, Pakistan, Indonesia and 
Arab world. The main things discussed about Pakistan are as follows: 
political background, role of Mohammad Ali Jinah (Father of Pakistan) in 
the creation of Pakistan and its emergence as a Muslim State, Pakistan's 
nuclear, political parties and leaders of Pakistan, Islamic power groups 
future political system of Pakistan and the public opinion and status of 
press in Pakistan. About Indonesia which is the most popular Muslim 
country, we have discussed several special features such as political history 
of Indonesia and political views of Sukarno and his successor suharto, 
political transition in post-suharto period, structural changes of the political 
development, the press and its role in modern Indonesia, the role of 
television and recent political situation development problems and reforms 
needs. 
The last part of chapter sixth gives as account about the Arab 
World and its definition, Syria and Arab World, Iraq and Arab World, 
Saddam's Aggressive Arab Nationalism, the Israeli-Arab Wars, Saudi 
Arabia and its political system and its relations with USA. Finally in this 
chapter a discussion is devoted to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and its 
absolute monarchy and political development and ruling families of UAE. 
Moreover we have also thrown a glance on the efforts of Yasser Arafat as a 
Arab-Palestinian politician as well as two organizations in Arab World; 
League of Arab States and Gulf co-operation (GCC) and their political role 
in the Arab World. 
The last i.e. the Seventh Chapter deals with Conclusion and 
Suggestions to show some pattern of political systems and experiments that 
were made in the Muslim World. 
In the end it can be said with some degree of satisfaction that 
varied political experimentations and statecraft developments have been 
analyzed in this work. Through them more suitable future political system 
could be discovered by the contemporary or future Muslim generation, or 
at least a glance in these experiments might give an idea to analytical 
researcher and greater scholar to fmd out a political system that might meet 
the requirements of the Muslim World. 
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CHAPTER I 
1.1 THE PROPHETS' PERIOD: 
With the revelation of the Quran, Islam came to the World and 
Mohammad became the prophet. The prophet had initially to convert the 
people of Makkah. Makkah was a busy and wealthy commercial town 
almost monopolizing the enterpot trade between the Indian Ocean and 
the Mediterranean trading centers. This was mainly due to its location 
on the international trade route from the South to the North, which 
included the route from Africa. The prophet Muhammad's great-
grandfather, Hashim, who gave his name to the clan, died in Syria while 
on a trade expedition. 
Makkah, where Muhammad was bom in 571, was the proud heart 
of a fiercely interned Arab tribal society. Arab prided on their ancestry 
(nasab). For them the Arab was the noblest of nations (afkhar al-
umam). Among the Arabs the Quraysh considered themselves the 
aristocrats. The Quraysh, was divided into numerous competing clans, 
dominated Makkah. Exclusive tribal codes, animistic practices, female 
infanticide, worship of some 360 competing idols, were the 
characteristics of society. This was the society The Prophet was set to 
change . 
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In the summer of 622 The Prophet left Makkah and arrived in 
Madinah, a journey that was to change the history of the World. It was 
called the hijrah or migration, and Marks the beginning of the Muslim 
calendar. His party of migrants was called muhajirs (refugees), the 
natives of Madinah ansars (helpers). It was an act that has been 
suggestive to Muslims throughout histoiy, the transition from dar-al-
harb, the land of war, to dar-al-Islam, land of Islam, or peace. 
In Makkah the Prophet had propagated a new message, 
triumphant over a conversion one moment, concerned over a failure 
another, always under pressure. In Madinah he arrived as ruler, laying 
the foundations of a nascent state and religion. He now began to 
establish his community. One of the first tasks was to provide the 
charter of Madinah- a sort of Magna Carta - which announced the rights 
and obligations of all citizens, Jews and Muslims . 
1.1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE: 
(a) The system of the mu'akhat: 
Mu'akhat was the first clear manifestation of the organization of 
Islam' ummah (community) on the basis of a definite ideology and a 
distinct political philosophy. Till then, the Arabs recognised blood as the 
only bond that determined their social or community relationship. 
Sociologically, a people grown and brought up in a tribal system could 
not behave otherwise. But The Prophet brought about such a tremendous 
change in their out look that affinity of faith replaced all other ties of 
blood, halif (confedation, association), Jiwar (protection) and wila 
(clientship) which had their roots in tribal traditions of the Arabs. The 
Islamic ummah was organized on the basis of ideology throwing into 
shade all considerations of blood-relationship. This was absolutely new 
experiment having a revolutionary impact on the Arab Sociology and its 
•J 
success, thought in a rudimentary form, as demonstrated at mecca . 
According to Ibn-Ishaq and other early historians, when a substantial 
number of the Meccans accepted Islam, The Prophet established The 
System of the Mu'akhat, two Muslims were paired together and 
declared as brothers. Thus Talhah b. 'Ubaydullah and al-Zubayr b. al-
Awwam were declared as brothers while the prophet bracketed himself 
with 'Ali b. Abi Talib as his religious brother . This system replaced the 
family ties to such an extent that the two Islamic or religious brothers 
could inherit each other's property, regardless of any blood 
relationship^. The mu'akhat was aimed at bringing about a change in the 
sociological consciousness of the early converts. It forged divergent 
social groups and warring individuals into a new community^. 
After the migration of the Prophet to Mdeina the Mu'akhat 
assumed a new dimension. It was then effected between the muhajirs 
and The ansar in the early days of Safar 1 A.H./ Aug. 623 A.D. As is 
well- known, the muhajirs had come empty handed from Mecca. The 
ansar provided their immigrant brothers with board and loading''. 
(b) The Kitab (document) system: 
The mu'akhat was followed by the Kitab (document) of the 
Prophet which bound the whole populace of Medina, whether Muslim or 
non-Muslim, into a political and social organisation^. 
The Kitab^ or 'The constitution of Medina', was promulgated just 
after the migration of the Prophet to Medina. The constitution asserts 
that "This is a writing (Kitab) of Muhammad, The prophet, between the 
behevers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yasrib and these who follow 
them and are thus attached to them and who wage holy war with 
them"'. The people referred to in this document i.e. The Muhajir and the 
ansar, were declared a united 'ummah, distinct from the rest of the 
mankind". It was a community of Allah ('ummat Allah) in which the 
right to rule belonged to Allah and, in His name, to Muhammad, His 
Prophet. 
(c) The 'ummah'; 
The 'um^mah is basically a Quranic term and it occurs fifty one 
times in the Quran and its plural 'umam thirteen times . It is "The 
community formed by those who accept the messenger and his 
message . In the same connotation the term 'ummah has been used at 
least in 303 traditions of the prophet' . The view that the non-Muslims, 
The jews and the Pagans of Medinah were not excluded from the 
'ummah is not only against the spirit of the document but quite contrary 
to the very concept of the 'ummah based on religion. Declares the 
immigrant and the ansar Muslims alone as the 'ummah wahidah (one 
community), distinct from the rest of the mankind. All facts taken 
together, it becomes abundantly clear that the Muslims of the city-State 
of Medina alone were included in the 'ummah. All the non-Muslims, 
pagans, Jews, or for that matter. Christians of Medina were given the 
status of the ZimmisCprotected people), or at the most that of halifs, 
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though the idea is not given a theoretical expression, but it is impHed in 
their relationship with the Muslims and Islamic state'^. 
In 6 A.H./628 A.D. The famous treaty of al-Hudaybiyah, was 
negotiated. On the face of it, the treaty was a military and a political 
triumph for the Meccans but Soon it was apparent that they were 
struggling to hold their feet to the ground which was slipping under 
them. The treaty showed that the leadership was confused, and their 
rank and file were broken and frustrated. It was, in fact a diplomatic 
defeat for the Meccans who had unwittingly accorded an equal status to 
Medina. After al-Hudaybiah, all factors seem to have combined to 
contribute to the downfall of Mecca, which eventually took place early 
in 630 A.D. when the Prophet entered the city as its conquery. Even a 
synoptic view of the political developments, particularly the armed 
encounters between Mecca and Medina, would show that while Mecca 
was losing ground day by day, Medina was gradually emerging as a 
centralized political authority'^. 
The Islamic state was expanding, though slowly but steadily, in 
all directions of the city-state'^. The 9^ ^ year after the hijrah (April-May 
630 to April-May 631 A.D.) is generally called by the historians as the 
year of deputations from every nook and comer of the Arabian 
Peninsula visited the prophet. On the other hand that year was infact the 
highest watermark in the formation of the Islamic 'ummah as well as the 
establishment of the Islamic state. Almost all tribes of Arabia, big or 
small, urban or Bedouin, hastened to join it'^. The whole of the Arabian 
Peninsula, from the Syrian borders in the north to the last comer of al-
Yaman in the South and from the Shores of the Red Sea in the west to 
the Persian Gulf and the Iranian confines in the east, not only had 
recognized the political sovereignty of the Islamic state, but also had 
been integrated with the Islamic 'ummah based on Islam. The faith of 
the Prophet Muhammad'^. 
Our prophet Mohammad tolerated and stood against all opposed 
groups. He immigrated (Hijrah) to Medina and he founded the state due 
to the condition of that time. So he tried to lead the state wisely. The 
religion and the state were united and there was separation between 
them and it was an appropriate deed for prophet Mohammad to establish 
the state. He was realistic in his outlook about human beings that man 
has both spiritual as well as physical entity and man is considered as an 
individual and a social being. 
1.2 THE CALIPHS^ PERIOD: 
(a) Theology and the Caliphate: 
Islamic theologians had to reconcile their irreligious views to the 
change circumstances of the time and the accept accomplished facts. 
The Hanafi School of Theology was evolved to recognize a khalifa on 
one of the following bases: 
(1) Khalifa by general consent and election 
(2) Khalifa by nomination 
(3) Khalifa by being in power 
This school argued that without a leader, it would be impossible to 
defend Islam from external invasion or save it from internal anarchy. 
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The Shia rejected this theory, and asserted that since the Khalifa (or 
Imam) is appointed by Divine will and has nothing to do with the will of 
humanity, and as the last Imam has disappeared and is out of sight, in 
his absence any man can govern the country, though he would not be 
considered as the spiritual leader. The Mujtahids, or chief theologians, 
would act on behalf of the man as authorities on religion . 
Actually it is an internal religion and not so important for our 
discussion that we concentrate on it. 
(b) Khalifa: 
Khalifa means "representative". Man according to Islam, is the 
representative of Allah on earth. His vice-gerent; that is to say, by 
virtue of the powers delegated to him by Allah, and within the limits 
prescribed, he is required to exercise Divine authority. 
To illustrate what this means, let us take the case of an estate of 
yours which someone else has been appointed to administer on your 
behalf. Four conditions invariably obtain: First, the real ownership of the 
estate remains vested in you and not in the administrator; secondly, he 
administers your property directly in accordance with your instructions; 
Thirdly, he exercises his authority within the limits prescribed by you; 
and fourthly, in the administration of the trust he executes your will and 
fulfils your intensions and not his own. Any representative who does not 
fulfil these four conditions will be abusing his authority and breaking 
the covenant which was implied in the concept of "representation". 
This is exactly what Islam means when it affirms that man is the 
representative (Khalifa) of Allah on earth. Hence, these four conditions 
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are also involved in the concept of Khalifa. The state that is established 
in accordance with this political theory will in fact be a Caliphate under 
the Sovereignty of Allah . 
1.2.1 The Caliphate: 
The early Caliphs could be described by either one of these three 
titles - Khalifah, Amir ul-Mu'minin, and Imam. Each was a title one of 
and the same personage, but Khalifah emphasized his relation to the 
Messenger of the faith, 'The Apostle of God' and put forward this 
apostolic succession as a claim for the obedience of the faithful the 
second title, "Amir ul-Mu'minin', asserted more distinctively the 
authority of the ruler as supreme war lord and head of the civil 
administration; the third, 'Imam', emphasized rather the religious 
activity of the head of the state as performing a certain definite religious 
function. This last title Imam - is the favourite designation for the head 
of the church among the Shiahs'. They lay special emphasize on the 
sacrosanct character of the successors of the prophet, to whom they 
gradually attribute mysterious and almost supernatural powers, until, as 
at present, they came to believe in a hidden Imam who, unseen by men, 
guides and directs the faithfiil upon earth. Though the doctrine of the 
Imam was. of no less importance in Sunni theology, and though Imam 
was an official description of the Sunni khalifa, it was not so favourite a 
designation with the Sunnis as with the shias, and it was probably under 
the influence of Shiah opinion that the Abbasid Caliph, al Ma'mun (813-
833), was the first to put the title 'Imam' on his coins and inscriptions. 
The coins of his predecessors had generally borne the title 'Amir ul-
Mu'minin'. It was also no doubt owing to the hierafic character that the 
institution of the caliphate assumed under the Abbasids, that this 
ecclesiastical title 'Imam' came to be inserted of the coins of al-
Ma'mun, and in this practice he was followed by succeeding Abbasids. 
Some differentiation between these various appellations may be 
recognized in cases where pretenders have arrogated to themselves one 
or other of the three, e.g. it was not until Abu'1-'Abbas as-Saffah 
(afterwards the first caliph of the Abbasid dynasty) had broken out into 
open revolt that he assumed the title of Amir ul-Mu'minin; his brother, 
Ibrahim, who had been regarded as leader of the Abbasid Party before 
him, was known only as the Imam. Similarly, at a later period, in 
western Aftrica, when the Shiah movement had won a large number of 
adherents from among the Berbers, their leaders were styled Imam, and 
it was not until 'Ubaydullah, the ancestor of the Fatimid Caliphs, was 
proclaimed Khalifah in Qayrawan in the year 909, that he assumed the 
title of Amir ul- Muminin. The later title emphasized the aspect of 
secular authority, whereas that of Imam indicates rather the status of the 
ruler in the religious order . 
1.2.2 Ideal Caliphs (11/632-41/661): 
We have here an exemplification of the ancient Arab custom, in 
accordance with which when the chief of a tribe died, his office passed 
to that member of the tribe who enjoyed the greatest infiuence, the 
leading members of the tribe selecting to fill the vacant place someone 
among themselves who was respected on account of age, or influence, 
or for his good services to the common wheals there was no 
complicated or formal method of election, nor within such small social 
groups would any elaborate procedure be necessary, and when the 
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choice of a successor had been made, those present swore allegiance to 
him, one after another, clasping him by the hand^^ 
AbuBakr was sixty years of age when he was elected to succeed 
the prophet, and he enjoyed the dignity for two years only (11/632-
13/634). According to the tradition recorded by Muslim historians, 
AbuBakr nominated' Umar as his successor. But actually during the 
caliphate of AbuBakr, 'Umar had been the virtual ruler, and he assumed 
the functions of head of the state immediately after Abu Bakr's death 
without any formality "^^ . This again was quite in accordance with 
primitive Arab custom, when the prominent position of any particular 
individual clearly marked him out as the ultimate successor of the head 
of the tribes but though no formalities might be necessary, it was 
virtually by election that such a man would take a place of the dead 
chief, and the rest of the tribe would express their assent by swearing 
allegiance to him^^ 
In Umar's time (13/634-23/644) Iraq, Persia and Egypt were 
added to the Muslim domain. The battle of Qadsiya, fought in 635 
against the Persians was of the most critical battles in history because it 
would reverberate up to the present . Khalid wrote to the chiefs of 
Persia: 
"In the name of God, the Merciful and the compassionate from 
Khalid ibn al-walid to the border - chiefs (marzuban) of Persia. 
Become Muslim and be saved, if not accept protection from us 
and pay the jizya. If not, I shall come against you with men who love 
death as you love to drink wine . 
Uqbah ibn Nafi, sweeping victoriously westwards along the North 
African coast- the area Arabs would call the Maghreb, the west- stopped 
where the land ended. Galloping into the Atlantic brandished his sword. 
But the Islamic World was changing rapidly. Wealth and numbers 
that were difficult to conceive in the early days now multiplied to boggle 
the imagination. At Ajnadayn Muslims faced an enemy of 100,000 and 
at Qadsiya 120,000. At Yarmuk the deed enemy alone numbered 
140,000 and with conquest came vast booty. At Qadsiya, the Persian 
capital, the total booty was estimated at 9 billion dinars. Each soldier 
received 12000 dinars. Soon even privates owned one to ten servants 
each. After Qadsiya, within three years of the prophet' death. The 
problems and scope of Islam had changed . 
Al Tabari records: 'Umar said to Salman: 'Am I a king or a 
Caliph?' and Salman answered" 'If you have levied from the lands of 
the Muslims one dirham, or more, or less, and applied it unlawfully, you 
are a king, not a Caliph'. And' Umar Wepst . In 23/644 a Christian 
Persian slave assassinated him in the Mosque. 
Uthman, who succeeded Umar (23/644-35/656), was in a sense a 
victim of these. He was finding it difficult to cope with the changing 
world and its scale. In the summer of (35/656) he was killed by rebels 
from the garrison town of Fustat in Egypt and Kufa in Iraq. Caught 
between an unresponsive government and eager newcomers, veterans 
who had settled in Iraq and Egypt went to Medinah to complain to the 
third Caliph, and, finding him unresponsive, murdered him, unleashing 
-in 
the first civil war . 
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The death of Uthman showed that Medinah could not remain the 
capital of the Muslim lands. It was in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq that Arab 
manpower and fiscal revenues were now concentrated and the three 
contending parties in the civil war all represented centers outside. 
Arabia. Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet was based in Kufa, 
one of the two garrison cities of Iraq^ . (35/656 - 40/661). 
Ali, says about his acceptance of the Caliphate: "Behold, by him 
who split the grain (to grow) and created living beings, if people had not 
come to me and supporters had not exhausted the argument and if there 
had been no pledge of Allah with the learned to the effect that they shold 
not acquiesce in the gluttony of the oppressor and the hunger of the 
oppressed I would have cast the rope of caliphate on its own shoulders . 
The moral authority of Ali, as the rightflil caliph, challenged and 
confronted the material power and wealth of his rival Muawiyah. The 
governor of Syria. All's governor was turned back by Muawiah, at the 
borders of Syria and battle declared. At the battle of the Camel for the 
first time Muslims fought Muslims. Talha and al-Zubayr, two early 
converts supported by the prophet's youngest Aisha, were based in 
Basra, the second garrison city of Iraq . At the battle or the camel, it 
was over 10,000 Muslims lay dead on the battlefield. A year later, in 
(36/657), All's army of 70,000 faced Muawiah's of 90,000. The 
numbers were swollen by non-combatants . 
Those who remembered the times of the Prophet were horrified. 
New wealth, new sects and old tribal rivalries were tearing society apart. 
Abdullah bin Sabah had declared that Ali was God, much to All's 
embarrassment, while he himself was the prophet. A group calling 
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themselves the Kharijis decided to wipe the slate clean and make a fresh 
start. Not for the first time in Islamic history would an attempt be made 
to revive the time of the prophet, already seen as the Golden age. 
The Kharijis planned to kill simultaneously the three most 
important men in Islam, Ali in Kufa, Muawiah in Jerusalem and Amar 
in Fustat, of these only Ali was killed, while praying in the mosque. 
Muawiah, now adopting the precaution of living in heavily guarded 
enclosures, became the caliph of Islam and first ruler of the Umayyad 
dynasty ^ 
After the assassination of Ali, His son Hassan was elected to the 
office of the Khilafa by the people of Kufa (41/661 ). As the historical 
report suggests that when Ali was about to die, people came to him and 
asked shall we offer oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to Hassan? He replied I 
do not ask or forbid you to do so. You can see for yourself^ .^ By this 
historical report it is evident that Ali did not forbid the people the 
election of his son. So the appointment of a son or the succession of a 
son to the office of the Khilafa was not against the practice of Sahabah. 
Had the nomination or the election of a son been prohibited for the 
succession to the office of the Khilafa, Ali would not have allowed his 
followers to follow their choice, in choosing his son as the Khalifa . 
1.2.3 Political Freedom in Khalifate Rashidah period: 
There was political freedom in Khalifate Rashidah period. But it 
was not used in its real meaning; it was the people and their critical 
ideas about the ruler. It depended on the ruler's justice and interest to 
pay heed to the critical ideas of people. 
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1.3 ARAB DYNASTIES 
Umayyads and Abbasids: 
The Arabs before Islam constituted a traditional, tribal community 
led by respected patriarchs and elders. People knew each other, their 
parentage and their social ways-it was what is called a face-to-face 
society. Both in Makkah and in the deserts beyond customs were tribal. 
Like tribal societies elsewhere they were a frank, warm, earthy people. 
They had a sense of humour, the hallmark of confidence whether in an 
individual or in a society. It was society with a defined social-and on the 
peninsula, geographical-arena. Islam's success and emergence from the 
peninsula changed all that. 
Arab society now converted into the established imperial patterns 
of the defeated Byzantines and sasanids. These two empires, the most 
powerful of the age, were characterized by an arrogant bureaucracy, 
powerful armies and the total power of the rulers. Within a century Arab 
rule would be identified by these very characteristics. The Islamic ideal 
and the actual position of the Muslims, inheritors of these complex 
systems, now fluctuated. Henceforth each generation would need to 
redefine itself anew in relations to the ideal . 
I.3.I UMAYYADS (Banu Umayyah) (41/661-132/750): 
The dynasty of caliphs which, from its center in Syria, ruled the 
whole of the Arab Islamic territories from 41/661 to 132/750. All of the 
caliphs during this period are descendants of Umayya b. 'Abd shams a 
pre-Islamic notable of the tribe of Kuraysh of Mecca, but they represent 
two distinct lines within the clan of Umayya: The first three caliphs, 
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descended from Abu Sujfyan b. Harb, are referred to as sufyanids: The 
remaining eleven, descendants of Marwan b. al-Hakam b. Abil- 'As, as 
Marwanids. For convenience, a list of the Umayyad caliphs and the 
dates generally given for their caliphate is provided below; 
1. 41-60/661-80 Mu'awiya I b. Abi Sufyan 
2. 60-64/680-3 Yazid I b. Muawiya I 
3. 64-683 Mu'awiya II b. yazid I 
4. 64-5/684-5 Marwan I b. al- Hakam 
5. 65-86/685-705 'Abd al. Malik b. Marwan I 
6. 85-96/705-15 al-walid I b. 'Abd al-Malik. 
7. 96-99/715-17 Sulayman b'Abd al-Malik 
8. 99-101/717-20 'Umar II b. 'Abnd al- 'Aziz 
9. 101 - 105/720-4 yazid II b. 'Abd al-Malik 
10. 105-125/724-43 Hisham b. 'Abd al-Malik 
11. 125-126/743 - 4 al - walid II b. yazid II 
12. 126/744 yazid III b. al-walid I 
13. 126/744 Ibrahim b. al-wallid I 
14. 127-32/744-50 Marwan II b. Muhammad b. Marwan I^^ 
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1.3.1 Muawiyah (41/661-60/689) The Founder of Umavids: 
Muawiyah became the first Khalifah of the Umavi family, after 
the assassination of Ali, in Kufah in Ramadan 40/660. In the preceding 
years the MusHm ummah was poHtically divided into two groups: 
Supporters of Muawiyah elected him as their Khalifah in Balka in 
Palestine on 36/656, and the shi'ah supporters elected Hasan to the 
office his father''^ . The Islamic state was practically divided into two 
Khalifa's for the first time in the history of Islam. The Western part that 
included Syria, Palestine and Egypt owed allegiance to Muawiyah, 
while the eastern world remained faithful to Hassan under two 
independent rulers of Islam. In order to solve this statement Hassan after 
period of six month made a compromise with muawiyah and abdicated 
Khalifah in his favour in Rabi I 41/661. With this Muawiyah became the 
Khalifah of the whole Islamic world '. It seems that there were two 
important events that happened during the umayyads period were: 1. 
Peace with Al-Hassan and 2. War with Husain. 
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1.3.3 Al-Hasan b. Ali's surrender of power to Muawiyah: (May 7, 
661-April 25, 662): 
Among the events of the year 41 was al-Hassan b. 'Ah's 
surrender of Power to Muawiyah, the letters entry into al- Kufa, and the 
rendering of allegiance to Muawiyah as Caliph by the people of al-
Kufah, when the people of Iraq acknowledged al-Hasan b. Ali as 
Caliph, he began to impose conditions on them, (saying), "you must be 
totally obedient, make peace with whom I make peace, and fight whom I 
fight." The people of Iraq had misgivings about their situation when he 
imposed these conditions upon them, and they said, "This is no master 
for us since he does not want to fight". So shortly after they 
acknowledged him, al-Hassan was stabbed (and wounded, but) not 
fatally. His dislike for them increased, and he grew more afraid of them. 
He corresponded with Muawiyah and sent conditions to him saying, 
"Grant me this and I shall be totally obedient, provided that you fulfill 
(this conditions) for me". Al-Hassan's scroll came into Muawiyah's 
hand. Muawiyah, however, had previously sent al-Hassan a blank scroll 
sealed at the bottom and had written to him, "put whatever condition 
you wish (to make) on this scroll which I have sealed at the bottom and 
it will be yours. "When the scroll reached al-Hassan, he doubled the 
conditions which he had asked of Muawiyah previously and kept it with 
him. Muawiyah meanwhile kept the scroll of al-Hassan which contained 
the requests the latter had sent him. 
When Mu'awiyah and al-Hassan met, al-Hassan asked him to 
grant him the conditions made by him in the document which 
Mu'awiyah had sealed at the bottom. But Mu'dwiyah reftised and said. I 
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grant you the requests you made originally in your letter to me, for I had 
done so already when I received your letter. "Al-Hassan replied, " (But) 
I had conditions when I received your letter, and you agreed to fulfill 
them". Since they argued over them, non of al-Hassans conditions were 
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met . 
Peace was concluded between al-Hassan and Muawiyah in 
Rabi'II 41 (August 4-September I, 661) and Muawiyah entered al-Kufa 
at the beginning of Jumada I (September 2, 661). Yet another account 
claims that he entered it in the month of Rabi 11. This is what al-waqidi 
says: 
In this year 'All's sons, al-Hassan and al-Husayn, left al-Kufa for 
al-Madinah'^l 
At Muawifa's death, his son and successor, Yazid (60/680-
64/683), fought against Meccan rivals led by 'Abdullah b. al-zubayr. 
'All's son Husayn attempted to move from Medinah to Kufa to take up 
the leadership of his followers, (according to Kufa's invitations), but his 
small party was intercepted at Karbala (in Iraq) and destroyed. At the 
time the episode had few repercussions, but Husaya's death gradually 
assumed. The significance of Martyrdom '*. Today Husayn's Shrine 
Karbala is one of the great pilgrimage sites of the Muslim worlds. Along 
with the defeat of his father, Husayn's death of the hands of the 
Umayyad divides Muslims more than any dispute over law or theology 
or any antipathy between tribes, races, and linguistic groups. Ali is the 
ancestor of Shi'ism Husayn is its martyr'*^ 
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In the meantime, the Kharijits who had repudiated 'Ali after the 
battle of Siffm also rebelled. The Kharijits formed small bands, usually 
of between thirty and a hundred men. Each group was at once a terrorist 
band and a fanatical religious sect. They were held together by the 
conviction that they were the only true Muslims, and that their rebellions 
had profound religious justification. A group of Kharijits, called al 
Najdar, controlled a good part of Arabia including Bahrain, Oman, 
Hadhramaut, and Yemen before they were finally crushed. There 
Kharijits bands were most likely formed by uprooted individuals 
looking for communal affiliation through sectarian movements . 
The administrative and military dimensions of later Umayyad 
statism were backed b, a new ideological policy, whereas the early 
caliphate had been a series of individual reigns deeply dependent upon 
the Personal religious or patriarchal qualities of the Caliphs, now the 
state as an institution was made the focus of ideological loyalty. In the 
reign of 'Abd al-Malik, for the first time the caliphate began to mint its 
own coins in place of Byzantine and Sasanian money. The new system 
did away with Christian and Zoroastrian Symbolism, and introduced 
gold and silver coins with Arabic script to symbolize the sovereignty of 
the state-and its independence form, and superiority to-the previous 
empires. The state also symbolized its sovereignty by undertaking 
monumental constructions .^ 
The umayyads borrowed Greek motifs and even Greek builders 
and artists to decorate their mosques, and took Sasanian designs and 
decorations for their places. Yet in borrowing the ideas of the previous 
empires, the umayyads transformed the traditional motifs and provided 
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old forms with a new content. The state's ideology derived from the 
previous empires, but its expression was characteristically Islamic. 
1.3.4 The fall of Umayyads (127-32/744-50): 
In 127/744, a group of Syrian Soldiers killed the Caliph al-walid 
II and enthroned their own candidate, Yazid III, thereby unleashing the 
third civil war. Refusing to acknowledge the new regime, Marwan, the 
Umayyad governor of Jazira-Amienia-Azarbayjan, marched on Syria 
with his own troops, defeated his rivals, and had himself proclaimed 
Caliph. He now had to conquer Iraq and to subdue the Kharijites, who 
were rebelling everywhere and whose Arabian adherents were about to 
spill into the Fertile Crescent when he crushed them in 130/748. An 
Abbasid- Shiite uprising in Khurasan was also launched in 131/747, led 
by one Abu Muslim. This revolt had long been planned and unlike the 
Kharijites, it could not be stopped: in 132/750 the Khurasanis inflicted 
adhesive defeat of a Marwan II in Iraq. They proceeded to enthrone a 
Hashemite, a member of the prophet's family; but contrary to what 
many had expected, they did not choose a member of its Alid branch, 
but himself with the local rulers and aristocrats: These were to be a new 
elite . 
1.3.5 ABBASIDS (Banulabbas) (132/750 - 656/1258): 
The dynasty of the caliphs ruled from 132/750 to 656/1258. The 
dynasty takes its name from its ancestor, al-'Abbas b. 'Abd al- Muttalib 
b. Hashim, the uncle of the Prophet. 
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The story of the origin and nature of the movement that overthrew 
the Umayyad caUphate and established the 'Abbasid dynasty in its place 
was for long known only in the much-revised version put about when 
the dynasty had already attained power, and with it, respectability . 
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According to others, the second Caliph, al-Iiakim I, was descended directly from al-Rishid in the following 
manner: al-Hikim b. 'All b. Abl Bakr b. al-Husayn b. al-Rishid. 
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1.3.6 THE 'ABBASID CALIPHS, OF EGYPT 
A.H. A.D. 
132 . Abu 'l-'Abbas al-Saffah . . . . 750 
136 al-Mansur . . . 754 
158 al-Mahdi. . . . 775 
169 al-HJdi . . . . 78J 
170 Harun al-RashId . . . 786 
193 al-Amiti . . . . 809 
198 al-Ma'mun. . . 813 
218 al-Mu'tajim . . 833 
227 al-Wathik . . . 842 
232 al-Mutawakkil 847 
247 al-Muntajir . . 861 
248 al-Musta'in . . 862 
252 al-Mu'tazz.. . 866 
255 al-Muhtadi. . . 869 
356 al-Mu'tamid. .870 
279 . . . . al'Mu'taiJid . . 892 
289 ^ . . . al-Muktafi.. . 902 
295 . . . al-Muktadir . . 908 
320 al-KShir. . . .932 
AH- A.D. 
322 al-Ra(JI . . . ,934 
329 al-Muttakl. . .940 
333 al-Mustakfi . . 944 
334 • al-MutI' . . . . 946 
363 al-T5'i' . . • . 974 
381. . al-Kadir . . . . 991 
422 al-Kj'im. . . 1031 
467 al-MuktafI. . 1075 
487 al-Mustafhir . 1094 
512 al-Mustarshid 1118 
529 al-R5shid . . 1135 
530 al-Muktafl. . X136 
555 al-Mustandjid ri6o 
566 al-Musta(Ji' . 1170 
575 al-Najir . . . 1180 
622 al-?ahir . . . 1225 
623 al-Mustanf ir. 1226 
640-656 al-Musta'simi242-i258 
659 
660 
701 
740 
741 
753 
763 
779 
779 
785 
788 
791 
808 
816 
«45 
855 
859 
884 
903 
9H 
922-923 
A.D. 
al-Mustan$ir billah Abu '1-Kasim Ahmad 1261 
al-I:ieikim bi-Amr Allah Abu l-'Abbis Ahmad 1261 
al-Mustakfl billSh Abu 'l-Rabl' Sulaymin 1302 
al-WitfjjIf billah Aba Isijalf Ibrahim 1340 
al-Iilakim bi-Amr AUSh Abu 'l-'Abbis A^mad :34i 
al-Mu'ta(Jid billih Abu '1-Fatb Abu Bakr , 1352 
al-Mutawakkil <ala 'lUh Abu 'Abd AlUfa Hufiammad 1362 
al-Mu'tajim (al-llasta'sim) bilUh AbO Ya^yS Zakariyya' 1377 
al-Mutawakkil <ala*'lUh (second time) i377 
al-WagiiV biUih *Umar • . . 1383 
al-MuHa$im billSh (second time) 1386 
al-Mutawakkil 'ah 'USh (third time) 1389 
al-Musta'in billah Abu'I-Fsujl al-'Abbis . . . . . ' . . . 1406 
al-Mu'taiJid billah Abu 'i-FatJ^ Diwud 1414 
al-Mustakfi billSh Abu '1-RabI' SulaymSn i44i 
al-Isi'im bi-Amr AIM Abu l-BaV5' IJamza i45i 
al-Mustaii^id bilia Abu 'l-Matasin Yusnf i455 
al-Mutawakkil 'ak 'Uih Abu 'l-'Izz 'Abd al-'AzIz i479 
al-Mustamsik biUa Abu 'l-^abr Ya'lfflb i497 
al-Mutawakkil 'al* "llih Muiiammad . 1508-9 
al-Mustamsik billih (second time; as representative of his son al-Mutawakkil) 15:6-17 
The foundation of the Abbasid dynasty- Abul Abbas al-Saffah 
(132/750-136/754) was proclauiied Caliph of the new dynasty at Kufa. 
There he ascended the pulpit and ended his attack on the Umayyad 
dynasty, exclaiming; "I am the Great Avenger and my name is Saffah": 
The first care of the new Caliph was to exterminate, under 
circumstances of almost incredible cruelty, the numerous members of 
The Umayyad dynasty. One prince of the family, born under a lucky 
star, escaped and, after wandering in North Africa, was invited to reign 
in Spain, where he founded a dynasty of considerable importance. 
Rising in central Asia. The Slaughter of the Umayyad party in Khurasan 
led to serious troubles at Bukhara, where, in (132/750), the Arab 
garrison mutinied and was joined by the people of Sughdiana and 
Samarkand. Ziad bin Salih, the governor, however, aided by the local 
chief, and termed the Bukhara-Khudah, put down this rebellion, 
inflicting heavy losses on the rebels^ .^ 
The Persian ousted the Arabs. - Under the new dynasty the more 
civilized Persians seized the power and ousted the Arabs. Apart from the 
marked mistrust felt for them by the Abbasids Caliphs. The Arabs 
looked down on education as being unworthy of men who could boast a 
noble ancestry . 
1.3.7 The Foundation of Baghdad (146/762): 
The foundation of Baghdad, (146/762): Mansur who fully realized 
the wisdom of removing his army from kufa and Basra, which were 
centers of Arab intrigue and disloyalty, chose a site some twenty miles 
up-stream from the Sasanian capital of Madain and founded Baghdad on 
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the right bank of Tigris. On the opposite side of the river he built 
separate cantonments for the Khurasan troops and for the Yemen and 
Modhar Arabs '^^ . 
The umayyads are celebrated only by their monuments; they did 
not Survive long enough to leave their stamp upon either the 
historiographical or the literary traditions of Islam. The Abbasids, 
however, had the opportunity to design their own history. Their capital 
lies irretrievably buried beneath modem Baghdad and their Chief 
physical monument is the empty ruins of the grandiose and sour city of 
Samarra, to which they were forced to retreat in the ninth century with 
their Turkish guardsmen. We see all of early Islam as far back as the 
prophet himself through their eyes. Whatever the monuments say, it is to 
the Abbasids that the glory of the Islamic tradition belongs and nowhere 
more engagingly than in the celebrated thousand and One nights, in 
which the early Abbasids move through an Arthurian haze of benevolent 
wealth and easy but enlightened learning. 
There is romance in the portrait, surely, and a great deal of 
accumulated nostalgia for a remote and vanished past, but there is truth 
there as well. Islam was at the height of its political power, and the reach 
of the Caliph would never extend further, there was wealth and luxury in 
the early Abbasid Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid and his immediate 
successors, but there was something more, and non of Islam's provincial 
pretenders to the glory of Baghdad ever quite achieved it: The coming 
together of Muslim, Christian and Jew in a brief but glorious exploration 
of what they saw, then and there and never perhaps again, as their 
common intellectual heritage . 
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Early medieval Baghdad was not an Utopian republic of letters, 
Surely, but despite the occasional charges of heresy or the frequent one 
of temerarious innovation, a number of Muslim Scholars joined with 
equally daring Jewish and Christian contemporaries in the catholic 
atmosphere of tenth and eleventh century Baghdad and followed where 
the Greeks had led and not merely as slavish imitators. In mathematics, 
astronomy, optics, medicine, and metaphysics, Muslim scholars were 
Masters and not merely disciples. Without benefit of endowment or 
even a great deal of encouragement, they constructed intellectual 
edifices as elegant and impressive as the scrolled domes and glittering 
tiled minarets that rise above the rooftops of Cairo or Isfahan. They are 
most impressive; perhaps, if we look upon them as important stops in a 
continuing intellectual guest and not, like their architectural counter 
parts, as mere monuments and mausoleums . 
Notable a new capital, Baghdad, was started by Al-Mansur; it cost 
about 5 million dirhams, took four years to build and involved 100,000 
architects, craftsmen and labourers. The Caliph became a mystical, 
semi-divine figure shrouded in court etiquette and lost in bureaucratic 
procedure. 
The rule of Haroon-ur-Rashid (170/786 - 193/809). Caliph of the 
thousand and one nights is famous for its wealth and color: 
A goodly place, a goodly time, 
For it was in the golden prime 
Of good Haroun Alrashid 
Sang Tennyson in the Recollections of the Arabian nights. (It is 
Haroon's rule which provides material to Karl Wittaogel) 57 
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1.3.8 ABBASID ADMINISTRATION; 
(a) The Central Government 
(b) Provincial Government 
(c) Local Government 
(a) The Central Government; 
The creation of Baghdad was part of the 'Abbasid strategy to cope 
with the problems that had destroyed the Umayyad dynasty by building 
effective governing institutions, and mobilizing adequate political 
support from Arab Muslims, converts, and from the non-Muslim 
communities that paid the empire's taxes. The new dynasty had to 
secure the loyalty and obedience of its subjects for a rebel regime and 
justify itself in Muslim, terms. 
To deal with these problems the new dynasty returned to the 
principles of 'Umar II. The Abbasids swept away Arab caste supremacy 
and accepted the universal equality of Muslims. They did away with the 
anachronism of the Arab "nation in arms", and hackly embraced all 
Muslims as their supporters. Arab caste supremacy had lost its political 
meaning, and only a coalition regime, uniting Arab and non-Arab 
elements, could govern a Middle Eastern empire. The propagation of 
Arabic as a lingua Franca, the spread of Islam and the conversion of at 
least some proportion of the population, the tremendous expansion of 
commercial activities, and the economic and demographic upheavals 
that set people free from their old lives and launched them so new 
careers in new cities such as Baghdad made possible an empire-wide 
recruitment of Personal and of political support for the new regime. 
Under the ' Abbasids the empire no longer belonged to the Arabs, though 
they had conquered its territories, but to all these peoples who would 
share in Islam and in the emerging networks of political and cultural 
loyalties that defined a new cosmopolitan middle eastern society . 
The new regime organized new armies and fresh administrative 
cadres. The openness of the 'Abbasid regime was particularly evident in 
administration. Many of the Scribes in the expanding 'Abbasid 
bureaucracy were Persian from Khurasan. Nestorian Christians were 
powerfully represented, probably because they made up a large 
proportion of the population of Iraq. Jews were active in tax and 
banking activities. Shi'i families were also prominent, and Arabs did not 
altogether lose their important place. The 'Abbasid dynasty was Arab; 
The 'Abbasid armies were composed of Arabs, and the judicial and legal 
life of Baghdad and other important cities was in Arab hands. The 
prominence of Arabs, however, was no longer a prescriptive right, but 
was dependant upon loyalty to the dynasty^ . The office of the Wazir 
was developed to coordinate, supervise and check on the operations of 
the bureaucracy. Wazir was the title originally applied to the secretaries 
or administrators who were close assistant of the Caliphs and whose 
powers varied according to the wishes of their patrons. Not until the 
middle of the ninth century did the Wazir become the Chief of 
administration, with the combined duties of controlling the bureaucracy, 
nominating provincial officials, and sitting on the Mazalim court. 
The elaborate central government was the nerve centre of the 
empire, and from Baghdad the Caliphs maintained communicadons with 
the provinces. But despite the propensifies of the Central administrafion. 
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the provinces were not all governed in a bureaucratic manner. The 
degree of control ran from highly centralized administrations to loosely 
held suzerainty. The empire was tolerant and inclusive rather than 
monolithic^* .^ 
(b) Provincial Government: 
The directly controlled provinces were Iraq, Mesopotamia, Egypt, 
Syria, Western Iran and Khuzistan- the provinces physically closest to 
the capital. Khurasan was sometimes, but not always, included in this 
group. These provinces were organized to maximize the obedience of 
officials to the will of the central government and to assure the 
remittance of tax revenues from the provinces to the center. Governors' 
appointments were limited to a very short term so that their careers 
would be entirely at the mercy of the caliphs. They were rapidly rotated 
to prevent them from developing local support they might use against 
the central government. In addition, the powers of provincial 
government were often divided among several officials. The governor 
was usually the military commander, and a different man was appointed 
by the central treasury to be in charge of taxation and financial affairs; 
yet another official headed the judiciary. Those officials checked each 
other's powers and all officials were subject to the supervision of the 
barid. In later period governorships were often awarded in payment of 
polifical debts to warlords, generals, and members of the royal family 
who had acquiesced in the accession of Caliph or in his succession 
plans, and Calips had to give these appointees wide latitude in the 
administrafion of their provinces. In such cases, frequent rotation and 
the separation of civil and military functions might be waived. For 
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example, until the middle of the ninth century, Armenia and Tabaristan 
had Arab governors who overawed the local rulers and collected tribute. 
These governors had no direct administrative contact with the subject 
people; the actual collection of taxes was in local hands. In other cases, 
the caliphate merely confirmed local dynasties as "governors of the 
caliphs". Kurasan, was directly ruled by Caliphal appointees, came 
under the control of the Tahirid family '. 
(c) Local Government: 
Local government was similarly varied. Iraq was divided into a 
hierarchy of districts, called Kura, tassuj, and rustaq. The rustaq was the 
bottom unit in the hierarchy and consisted of a market and 
administrative town surrounded by number villages. The same hierarchy 
and even the same names were used in parts of Khurasan and Western 
Iran. In Egypt the structure of administration was similar. 
Local government was organized for taxation. Surveys were taken 
in the villages to determine the amount of land under cultivation. The 
crops grown and their expected yield and the information was passed up 
to the central administration. The taxes for whole regions would be 
estimated, the sums divided up for each district, and the demand notices 
sent out describing the responsibilities of each subdivision . 
Any way for 500 years following the disintegration of the 
Abbasid empire, Islam as a religious and cultural system came to 
dominate a far larger share of the eastern hemisphere than any rival 
civilization . 
i.3.9 Abbasid's Dictatorship: 
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Throughout the Islamic pohtical history, it had been poHtical 
dictatorship of Khahfat's systems and particularly Abbasid's Khalifate 
which was block for the long time in the formation of republication 
theories in the Islamic political history. In the Khalifate period and also 
after that, the domination of dictatorship in the Islamic world caused the 
existence of religion to be influenced by the political ideas. 
Asharis insight which under the influence of political powers 
64 betrayed the Islamic ideas 
Socio-political activities in Khalifate and Umavids andAbbasids 
there has not been any special and main changes form the Khilafate 
Rashidah up to Umavids and Abbasids and also to other kingdoms and 
half-kingdoms.Human rights in that period was not the same as it is 
now. Nowadays human rights is considered as freedom, equality and 
cooperation. Forexample the Bei'ah in Khalifate Rashidah, Abbasids and 
Umavids was used concerning inthat period's meaning. It had never 
been used in the meaning, which it is used nowadays . 
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2.0 THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHERS OF ISLAM MAY 
BE DIVIDED TO TWO GROUPS: 
1. Early Islamic Philosophers in the East, who are super headed 
by Al-Kindi (185/801 - 252/866) the besides of several other are 
generally have been included in first Muslim generation of Philosophers 
such as Al-Farabi (257/870 - 339/950), Muhammad Ibn Zakariyya' al-
Razi (250/864 - 313/925 or 320/932), Al-Amiri (d 381/992), Brethren 
of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa'), Ibn Sina (370/980 - 428/1037), Ibn 
Miskawayh (d 421/1030) and Al-GhazzaH (450/1058 -505/1111). They 
in fact laid the foundation of Islamic philosophy in the East on which 
the great edifice was built by other philosophers. 
2. Islamic Philosophers in the western lands of Islam are Ibn 
Masarrah who bom in Cordova (Cordaba) in 269/883, and Ibn Bajjah (d. 
533/1139) and Ibn Tufayal (d 581/1185-6) and Ibn Rushd (b. 520/1126) 
and Ibn Sab'in (b.614/1217) and Ibn Khaldun who was bom in Tunis in 
(732/1332) and died in Cairo in (808/1406).* 
2.1 Alfarabi (257/870 - 339/950): 
Abu Nasr Muhammad Ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzlugh Farabi, who was 
known among later Islamic Philosophers as the Second Teacher (al-
mu'allim al-thani) and the philosopher of Muslims (Faylasuf al-
Muslimin), not only is the founder of logic in Islamic Philosophy but 
also is considered by many to be the founder of Islamic Philosophy 
itself. Little is known of his life and even his ethnic background has 
been disputed among traditional authorities. Ibn Nadim in his a)-Fihrist, 
which is the first work to mention Farabi, considers him to be of Persian 
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origin . In contrast, Ibn Khallikan in his Wafayat al-A'yan considers 
him to be of Turkish descent^. In any case, he was bom in Farab in the 
Khurasan of that day around 257/870 in a cHmate of Persianate culture. 
As an already mature scholar, he came to Baghdad, where he studied 
logic with the Christian scholar Yuhanna ibn Haylan and with Ibn Bishr 
Matta, who was a translator of Aristotle into Arabic. Some time before 
330/942, Farabi left Baghdad for Syria, where he traveled to Aleppo and 
possibly also went to Egypt, eventually settled in Damascus, where he 
died in 339/950 and buried there. 
He was a truly encyclopedic figure, at once master of many 
languages, logic, political philosophy, ethics, and metaphysics, as well 
as music. Some hundred works have been mentioned in divers' sources 
as having been composed by him. Many of these treatises are now lost, 
but a number of important ones have been discovered recently so that 
our view of his philosophy has been modified in recent years. His work 
includes several commentaries upon the logical works of Aristotle, as 
well as his own logical writings, which together from a major part of his 
intellectual output. They also include a number of foundational texts on 
political philosophy and ethics, chief among them Mabadi Ara-I Ahl al-
Madinat al-Fadliha (Principles of the Opinion of the People of the 
Virtuous city), perhaps his greatest work, and al-Siyasat al-Madaniyyah 
(Politics of the city) and Tahsil al-Sa'adah^ 
The fact that Al-Farabi's popular and political works have been 
accessible long before the present work should not be allowed to 
obscure the fact that it is here that he gives an account of the Theoretical 
foundation on the basis of which those other works should be 
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understood, and of the philosophic principles that are applied in the 
other works. Although not wholly erroneous, the generally accepted 
view of Al-Farabi's thought and of the philosophic tradition he founded 
must be seen in the new perspective provided by the philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle . 
(a) Farabi^s Political Philosophy: 
We come now to Farabi's practical philosophy. In his Ethics and 
politics we are brought into a somewhat closer relation to the life and 
belief of the Muslims. One or two general points of view may be 
brought forward. 
Just as logic has to give an account of the principles of 
knowledge. So Ethics have to deal with the fiindamental rules of 
conduct, although in the latter, somewhat more value is attached to 
practice and experience than in the theory of knowledge. In the 
treatment of this subject Farabi agrees sometimes with Plato, and 
sometimes with Aristotle; but occasionally, in a mystic and ascetic 
fashion, he goes further than either of them. Even in the Ethics little 
regard is give to actual moral conditions; but in his politics Farabi 
withdraws still farther from real life. In his oriental way of looking at 
things, the ideal republic of plato merges into 'The philosopher as ruler'. 
Men having been brought together by a natural want, submit themselves 
to the will of a single Person, in whom the state, be it good or bad, is so 
to speak, embodied. A state therefore is bad, if the head of it is, as 
regards the principles of the Good, either ignorant or in error, or quite 
depraved^. On the other hand the good or excellent state has only one 
type, that namely, in which the philosopher is ruler. And Farabi endows 
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his 'prince' with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is plato 
in the mental of the Prophet Muhammad. 
In the description of rulers' representative of the ideal prince-for 
they may be more than one existing together and prince and minister 
may divide governing virtue and wisdom between them, we come nearer 
the Muslim political theory of that day. But the expressions are wrapped 
in obscurity: The lineage, for example, which is proper for a prince, and 
his duty of taking the lead in the holy war, - are not clearly specifically 
signified. All indeed is left floating in philosophic mist . Morality 
reaches perfection only in a state which at the same time forms a 
religious community. Not only does the condition of the state determine 
the temporal lot of its citizens, but also their future destiny. The souls of 
citizens in an "ignorant" State are devoid of reason, and return to the 
elements as sensible forms, in order to be united anew with other beings, 
- men or lower animals. In states which are "in error", and in those 
which are "depraved", the leader alone is responsible, and punishment 
awaits him in the world beyond; but the souls which have been led into 
error share the fate of the ignorant. On the other hand, if the good and 
'knowing' souls only maintain their ground, they enter the world of pure 
Spirit: and the higher the stage of knowledge to which they have 
attained in this life, the higher will their position be after death in the 
order of the all, and the more intense their blessed delight . 
(b) The types of regimes in Farabi's thought: 
Farabi divides them into three broad types: 
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(1) The regimes whose citizens have had no occasion to 
acquire any knowledge at all about divine and natural beings or about 
perfection and happiness. These are the "ignorant" regimes at (Madina 
al-jahilah). 
(2) The regimes whose citizens possess the knowledge of these 
things but do not act according to their requirements. These are the 
"wicked" or "immoral" regimes. Their citizens have the same views as 
these of the virtuous regimes, yet their desires do not serve the rational 
part in them but turn them away to pursue the lower ends pursued in 
ignorant regimes. 
(3) The regimes whose citizens have acquired certain opinions 
about these things, but false or corrupt opinions, that is, opinions that 
claim to be about divine and natural brings and about true happiness, 
while in fact they are not. The similitudes presented to such citizens are 
consequently, false and corrupt, and so also are the activities prescribed 
for them. These are the regimes that have been led astray or the erring 
regimes. The citizens of such regimes do not possess true knowledge or 
correct similitudes and they, too, pursue the lower ends of the ignorant 
regimes. The regimes in error may have been founded as such. This is 
the case with the regimes "whose supreme rule was one who was under 
an illusion that he was receiving revelations without having done so, and 
with regard to which he had employed misrepresentation, deceptions, 
and delusions. But they may also have been originally virtuous regimes 
that had been changed. Through the introduction of false or corrupt 
views and practices. 
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All these types of regimes are opposed to the virtuous regimes 
because they lack its guiding principle, which is true knowledge and 
virtue or the formation or character leading to activities conducive to 
true happiness. Instead, the character of citizens is formed with a view to 
attaining one or more of the lower ends, these ends are given by Farabi 
as Six, and each of the general types mentioned above can be subdivided 
according to the end that dominates in it: 
(1) The regime of necessity in which the aim of the citizens is 
confined to the bare necessities of life; 
(2) The vile regime (oligarchy) in which the ultimate aim of the 
citizens is wealth and prosperity for their own sakes; 
(3) The base regime is the purpose of whose citizens is the enjoyment 
of the sensory or imaginary pleasures; 
(4) The regime of honor (timocracy) whose citizens aim at being 
honored. Praised, and glorified by others; 
(5) The regime of domination (tyranny) whose citizens aim at 
overpowering and subjecting others; 
(6) The regime of corporate association (democracy) the main 
purpose of whose citizens is being free to do what they wish . 
The political thought of Farabi was not helpful and to the point 
for the religious beliefs. It was considered as a political idea and nothing 
else. It was neither useful to any Califs nor the base of any Khalifate. 
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2.1.1 IBN SINA (370/980 - 428/1037): 
The most famous and influential of Persian philosophers and 
scientists, Abu 'Ali al-Husayn ibn 'Abdallah ibn sina (Avicenna), 
known by the later Islamic philosophers as al-Shaykli al-Ra 'is and 
Hujjat al-Haqq, and in circles involved with his philosophy as simply 
Shaykh, was born in 370/980 in Afshanah, a village outside Bukhara. In 
387/997, The Samanid ruler of Bukhara gave him access to the royal 
library, which enabled him to further his mastery of the various 
sciences, especially philosophy and medicine. In 391/1001, at the age of 
twenty-one, he composed the first book of which we have any 
knowledge. He began a life of wandering from one Persian court to 
another, usually acting as court physician to the various Buyahid rulers 
of the central regions of Persia. He journeyed from Jurjan (Gurgan) to 
Rayy and then to Hamedan, where he remained several years as court 
Physian and Wazir^. Inevitably, Avicenna became also Sams-al-
dawla's Wazir and acted in this capacity (with an occasional conflict 
with amir' troops) until the latter's death in 412/1021. The new amir, 
sama' al-dawla, asked Avicenna to stay on as wazir, but "Avicenna saw 
fit not to remain in the same state nor to resume the same duties, and 
trusted that the prudent thing to do, would be to hide in anticipation of 
an opportunity to leave that region". He secretly corresponded with the 
kakuyid 'Ala' al-dawla in Isfahan about this matter. The Buyid court in 
Hamadan, and especially Taj-al-Mulk, the Kurdish wazir, suspected 
Avicenna of treachery because of these moves, and they arrested and 
imprisoned him in a castle outside of Hamadan called Fardajan. 
Avicenna remained in prison for four months until 'Ala-al-dawlah 
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marched toward Hamadan and ended Sama-al-dawla's rule there. 
Released from Prison in the wake of these developments, Avicenna was 
again offered an administrative position in Hamadan, but he declined. 
Some time later he decided to move to Isfahan and he left Hamadan 
with his brother; Juzjani, and two slaves, dressed like Sufis. And finally 
settled in Isfahan. He accompanied his master in most of his campaigns 
and trips, and indeed it was during one such trip to Hamadan that he 
died, in 428/1037, and he was buried in Hamadan'^. 
2.1,2 Political Philosophy of Avicenna: 
The concept of divine providence relates Avicenna's metaphysics 
to his political philosophy. This Political philosophy, essentially 
farabian, rests on the theory of Prophet hood and revelation. The law, 
revealed through prophets, is not only necessary for the existence of 
human society, but for the very survival of man. It consists of the truth 
of theoretical and practical philosophy, conveyed, however, in language 
which the vast, non-philosopher, majority of humanity can understand. 
This is the language of the particular example, instead of the abstract 
universal concept, of the image and the symbol. Without prophets and 
the law they reveal the good order will not be realized in the terrestrial 
world of men. The existence of the law-revealing prophet is the 
necessary consequence of Good's knowledge of the good order, an 
expression of His providence. 
The appearance of prophets on the historical scene, however, is 
very infrequent. This has practical implications regarding the setting 
down of institutions and traditions to ensure the continuance of the good 
order once the prophet is gone. But the infrequency of the appearance of 
prophets has a metaphysical side, a metaphysical explanation involving 
Avicenna's doctrine of the human soul. This soul, individual and 
immaterial emanates from the celestial intelligences. It is created with 
the body, but not imprinted in it. Its association with the body is 
conditioned by the material compositions that receive it. These 
compositions vary and their variance detemiines the quality of the souls 
that are created with them. The bodily composition that induces. The 
reception of a prophetic soul, which is the highest quality of human 
souls, occurs very infrequently, Avicenna tells us. This soul is endowed 
with exceptional cognitive powers. Some prophetic souls receive 
symbolic knowledge directly from the celestial souls. Other (of a still 
higher rank) receives from the Active Intellect all or most of the 
intelligible instantaneously. These intelligible are then conveyed in the 
language of imagery, example, and symbol understood by all . 
In the hierarchy of existents, the prophet stands highest in the 
world of generation and corruption. In Avicenna's cosmology he is, in 
effect, link between the celestial and terrestrial worlds. It is perhaps no 
accident that Avicenna concludes the Metaphysics, which is the last part 
of the encyclopedic Sefa (Shefa)- with the following words: "If one 
combines with justice speculative wisdom, he is the happy man. Who 
ever, in addition to this wins the prophetic qualities becomes almost a 
human god". 
2.1.3 Al-Ghazzali (450/1058 - 505/1111): 
Abu Hamid Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali was bom at 
Tus, a city in BLhurasan in Persia. 
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If we wish to place al-Ghazzali within a history of Islamic 
Philosophy we must make some preliminary remarks. The most obvious 
starting point is that al-Ghazzali did not consider himself a philosopher, 
nor liked to be considered as such -yet it is interesting that the Christian 
thinkers of the Middle Ages, reading his book Magasid al- Falasifah 
("The Aims of Philosophers"),a reasoned and objective exposition of the 
main philosophical topics of his time looked on him as a Faylasuf like 
Ibn Sina or Ibn Rushd. It not only means that al-Ghazzali studied and 
assimilated philosophy deeply, being aware of its theoretical glamour 
and its structural strength, but also it leads us to believe that philosophy 
must have had at least an indirect influence on even on his mystical 
thought. Although, al-Ghazzali, who was essentially a theologian, a 
mystic and a jurist, sharply criticized philosophy, trying to demonstrate 
its contradictions, it would be misleading not to recognize that his 
mysticism and theology are not simply practical and religious doctrines 
but have a noticeable theoretical depth . 
2.1.4 Al-Ghazzali's Political Attitude: 
In 478/1085 al-Ghazzali joined the court of Nizam al-Mulk, all 
powerful vazier of the Seljuq Sultan Malikshah, and became a close 
friend of the vazier. After a few years,al-Ghazzali was an intellectual of 
the court, if not a courtier. Occupying this position, he learnt about the 
corruption and immorality of power, the compromises of orthodox 
Fuqha'and 'ulama' with depraved kings and amirs, and his political 
ideas matured . 
Al-Ghazzali professed a sincere loyalty to the Caliphate, 
recognizing the legitimacy of 'Abbasid rule. Anyway, he argued that 
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caliphs and sultans had to co-operate to bring peace and safety to the 
Muslim empire. The caliphs, who were given complete religious 
authority, had to receive the oath of allegiance from the Sultans, on 
whom Supreme political authority rested. The Sultan had not only the 
duty to defend the Caliphate but also to repress any possible 
revolutionary tendency. Above all, al Ghazzali's political attitude was 
inspired by a sort of quietism, because he stigmatized any revolt, even 
against an oppressive and evil monarch. This attitude is induced by a 
particular meaning of the relation between the outward and inner world. 
In fact political quietism is functional to the renaissance of religious 
sciences. Nobody and surely not a scholar or a mystic-can look after his 
or her conscience if the outside world is troubled by wars and injustice. 
The reform of the heart needs social peace and harmony, even though 
this silence has to be paid for with an autocratic power. The wise person 
may, however, close the windows of the world to open the door of 
soul . 
Obviously, it can be argued that this quietism was justified by fear 
and dislike of Tsma'ili Shi'ism which, at the end of the fifth/eleventh 
century, seemed still very strong in Fatimid Cairo and indeed was 
vigorously spreading throughout the Middle East after Hassan Sabbah 
founded at Alamut a Batini state of warrior monks improperly known as 
"Assassis". The great Nizam al-Mulk was fmally killed by an assassin in 
485/1092. It is true that al-Ghazzali viewed Isma'ilism as a real danger 
for orthodox Islam, both politically and dogmatically. So he devoted 
many works to the confections of Isma'ilism and dedicated to the new 
Caliph al-Mustazhir'^ 
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2.2 Islamic Philosophers in the Western Lands of Islam: 
Ibn Baiiah (500/1099 - 533/1139): 
Abu-Bakr Muhammad ibn yahya Ibn al-Sayigh, an Islamic 
Philosopher, known to the medieval scholastics as Avempas. During his 
brief life he endured the tribulations occasioned by the Christian 
"reconquest" of Andalusia. It is known that he wrote several 
commentaries on Aristotle's treatises and that he was very learned in 
Medicine, mathematics, and astronomy. Ibn Bajjah opposed his own 
hypotheses to Ptolemy's system. 
Ibn Bajjah's philosophical works have remained incomplete, 
notably the treatise that gained him his reputation, Tadbir al-
mutawahhid ("The rule of the solitary"). For a considerable length or 
time this treatise was known only through a detailed analysis of it in 
Hebrew by Moses of Narbonne in this commentary on the Hayy ibn 
yaqzan of Ibn Tufayl, the pupil of Ibn Bajjah . 
Ibn Bajjah exercised upon Islamic philosophy in Spain a 
completely different orientation than did Ghazzali'^. 
2.2.1 The Governance of the Solitary of Ibn Bajjah: 
Ibn Bajjah was a close reader of Plato's Republic, of Aristotle's 
Nicoachaean Ethics and of al-Farabi's Syntheses of the metaphysics of 
Neo-PIatonism with an Islamicized version of Platonic Politics and 
Aristotelian ethics. He knows that the human being is a social, indeed a 
civil being by nature and that happiness is the life in accordance with the 
virtues. He also knows that the virtues are socially and civilly instilled, 
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and that the mediation of imagination is crucial in the implementation 
of social policies by which moral virtues are inculcated and intellectual 
virtues rotered. Yet, like plato and Aristotle, Ibn Bajjah is rather 
alienated from the society in which he lives. He is hardly prepared to be 
its apologist. Like al-Farabi, Ibn Bajjah knows that a state might not 
always be fortunate enough to find and adequately empower its true 
philosophical ruler. There is an irony here, of course, like that of the 
stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who also felt powerless. For Ibn Bajjah 
was a vazier, as Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander and closest friend 
of Antipater, Alexander's regent; and plato was born into the highest 
ruling circles of Athens. Yet it is characteristic of Politics, in 
Machiavelli's and not in Plato's ideal Sense, that even those who are 
placed structurally in the seats of authority may lack authority to alter 
the structures in which they sit. Clearly Ibn Bajjah was in no position to 
implement the rule of philosophy, which he, like plato, saw as the ideal. 
And while al-Farabi could rationalize the myths and rituals, laws and 
institutions of the prophet and his followers as symbols mediating the 
way to realities best known by the philosophers, it would take a special 
gift of insensitivity for a philosopher at the seat of power to identify a 
regime like that of the Almoravids, or their Almohad successors, among 
whom Ibn Tufayl served as a faithful expression of the platonic ideal 
rather than an unhappy recurrence of all that was ugliest in, say, Plato's 
Syracusan disaster. Ibn Bajja Pours his doubts into a reflective 
meditation, the regime of the solitary .^ 
We can say the political philosophy of Ibn Bajjah in brief, as following: 
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(i) He accepted al-Farabi's division of the state into perfect and 
imperfect. 
(ii) He agreed witii al-Farabi that different individuals of a nation 
possessed different dispositions. Some of them will rule and 
some others will be ruled. 
(iii) The penetrative philosopher should keep aloof from the people 
in certain circumstances even though avoidance of People is 
undesirable. 
(iv) The penetrative philosopher should migrate to those countries 
where he finds knowledge. 
(v) There are two alternative functions of the state: 
(a) It should estimate the deeds of the subjects in order to guide 
them to reach their intended goals and not any other ends. It is 
for a sovereign ruler in the ideal state. 
(b) It should devise means for the achievement of particular ends 
just as a rider as a preliminary exercise acquires control over 
the bridle in order to become expert in riding. It is for the 
Of) 
administrator of the state which is not ideal . 
2.2.2 IbnTufavl(d.580/1185): 
Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Malik, is another Islamic 
Philosopher, known to medieval scholastic as Abubacer. Bom in the 
first decade of the sixth/twelfth century at Wadi Ash (Cadiz), north-east 
of Granada. He moved in court circles and became secretary to the 
governor of Granada and then to the governor of Ceuta and Tangier, a 
59 
son of 'Abd al-Mu'min, the military lieutenant and successor of the 
charismatic Ibn Tumart, who founded the Almohad dynasty in Spain 
and north Africa. Ibn Tufayl served as Court physician to the Almohad 
Caliph Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (ruled 558/1163 - 580/1184) and possibly as 
a qadi in his regime. He is even named in one source, improbably, as a 
vazier. The ruler genuinely enjoyed his company, spending hours, 
sometimes days, in conversation with him . 
Ibn Tufayal acted as a kind of culture minister, seeking out and 
bringing to court many men of erudition and science, including the 
young Ibn Rushd (Averroes) . 
2.2.3 Political Philosophy of Ibn Tufayl: 
Of the four Muslim Philosophers, along with Aristotle, al-Farabi 
receives the most deprecating polemic and harshest criticism from Ibn 
Tufayl. Ibn Tufal's criticism of al-Farabi's notion of happiness does not 
seem to be warranted. Al-Farabi did not contend that human happiness 
is only attainable in this world. From the virtuous city and other works 
one can clearly infer that the second Master irrevocably considered 
genuine and lasting happiness as of the afterlife. Hence, happiness in 
this life is partial and temporary, and leads necessarily to happiness in 
the next. Realization of complete and permanent happiness is only 
possible in the life after this. Likewise, those who are not ignorant but 
lead a corrupt life are unhappy not only in this world, but also in the 
other. Ibn Tufayl is equally unjustified in attacking al-Farabi's view of 
prophecy, we are not even sure whether Ibn Tufal himself would have 
wanted to construe prophecy as a miracle incomprehensible by human 
categories. For one thing, with his Aristotelian background al-Farabi 
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would not and could not accept miracles; always tried to seek causal 
factors behind appearances^^ 
The key to the task of reconciliation was philosophical fable Hayy 
Ibn Yaqzan. The story of a self-taught philosopher of perfect 
intelligence, growing up on an equatorial island without parents, 
language or culture, who discovers for himself all phases of knowledge, 
from the technical and physical to the spiritual truths underlying 
scriptural religions^''. 
Hayy ibn Yaqzan, like any fiction, is a thought experiment. It 
builds on the famous floating man thought experiment of Avicenna. 
The social critique, which complements Ibn Tufayl's irenic 
message, is not left implicit. It is spelled out in passages describing the 
encounters between the perfect Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and the members of a 
society governed under a prophetically revealed religion that is (in Ibn 
Tufayl's Phrase) a "Thinly veiled" generic counterpart of Islam . 
2.2.4 Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Bajjah: 
No doubt, in several of his ideas Ibn Tufal shows clear debt to Ibn 
Bajjah. But it would be wrong to suppose that Hayy ibn Yaqzan is 
nothing but an enlarged edition of Ibn Bajjah's work. They have points 
of agreement as well as points of difference, as we shall presently see: 
Hayy ibn Yaqzan is in the form of a story, while Tadbir al 
motawahid (Hermit's Guide) is an ordinary philosophical treatise. 
The object of Ibn Bajjah is collective rather than individualistic. 
He wants to realize an ideal state or society within the society, and tells 
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us how the sohtary individual or individuals, as citizens of that Ideal 
state should behave. Ibn TufayPs point of view is individualistic. He is 
concerned with the mystic Ideal- The programme for the Salvation of 
each individual. 
But inspite of these fundamental differences Ibn Tufayl shows 
agreement with Ibn Sajjah in several points: 
Both believe that the highest truths should be concealed from the 
masses. According to Ibn Bajjah, gnosis should be pursued as if it is 
something to be ashamed of 
Both of them recommend a kind of seclusion from the society and 
favour association with kindred soul's only . 
2.2.5 Ibn Khalidun (732/1332 - 808/1406); 
Abu Zayd 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami was bom in 
Tunis in 732/1332 and died in Cairo in 808/1406 after having, five years 
earlier, met Timur (Tomerlane) outside the walls of Damascus. A 
contemporary of the Merinids in Morocco, the Banu 'Abd al-Wadid in 
the central Maghreb (Algeria), the Hafsids in Ifriqiya (Tunsia), The 
Nasirids in Grandda and the Mamluks in Egypt, he was acquainted with 
all these regimes and lived in their respective courts. His different jobs 
within the sphere of these political powers gave him a valuable asset: 
They allowed him to experience the political game in the Muslim West 
and have direct contact with the tribal world in north-western Africa. 
From these two sets of experiences he drew theoretical consequences of 
tremendous importance broadly outline in his Muqaddimah 
("Prolegomena"). Two predominant events affected his life during the 
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first period: The Black Death (748-9/1348-9) which had taken most of 
his teachers and particularly his own parents; and the assassination of 
his friend and competitor Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib in 774/1347^^. 
He began his political and public activities in Tunis before he 
even reached the age of twenty with his appointment to the office of 
seal-bearer and secretary by the Hafsid Sultan, Abu Ishaq of Tunis . 
(a) Political philosophy of Ibn Khaldun: 
While Ibn Khaldun bases his analysis of human nature and human 
society on natural laws and on purely socio-economic and political 
factors, from time to time he has to revert to orthodox religious 
doctrines and dogmas and have recourse to rationalizations. 
A very obvious example of such complexities is clearly 
discernible in the dilemma that emerges in the contradiction between his 
socio-political theory based upon the concepts of al-'asabiyah (group 
feeling) and al-mulk (royal authority), and the idea of al-mustabid 
(despot), the autocrat capable of utilizing the former force for the later 
purpose, on the one hand, and on the other hand, his admission that "The 
lawgiver (Muhammad) censured group feeling and urged (us) to reject it 
and to leave it alone". And that "God said: "Most noble among you in 
God's (eyes) is he who fears God mosf' . 
Here we are confronted by the same age-old problem that all 
social thinkers have had to face throughout the history of human 
civilization. The civilizing religious or social reformation of human 
society resisted by the individuals or group's desire to dominate other 
individuals and groups; The moral and spiritual imperative of an 
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altruistic conscience opposed by the driving force of egocentric 
impulses; the natural realization of the socio-biological need of the trend 
toward homonymy in direct conflict with realization retarding, self-
centered trend toward increased autonomy, democracy denied by 
despotism; piety rejected by autocracy; human community fragmented 
by partisanship; society sundered by dissensions and discord of rival 
group feelings in short, a soul-searching issue; a soul-searching quest for 
an answer to the question of the stakes involved in the human situation 
of morality being in the balance against expediency. Are the former 
illusory and only the latter real? And, how much justification is there for 
expecting the former to effectively counter the latter? 
Both by very definition and by nature, demonstrated and 
confirmed by historical experience, group feelings and royal authority, 
each one of these tends to make the group and the autocrat, respectively, 
a law unto oneself Such tendencies, obviously, always run athwart 
every attempt at some form of comprehensive, universal legislation-
moral, religious and divine or social, secular and human-That is based 
upon some comprehensive and universally applicable principles of 
equity, justice and good conscience, principles that direct both 
individuals and groups towards what present-day psychologists may 
describe as "Super-ordinate goals" and determine appropriate 
legislation^^. 
He says also: "The restraining influence among Bedouin tribes 
comes from their shaykhs or leaders - their defense and protection are 
successful only if they are a closely-knit group of common descent; 
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compassion and affection for one's blood relations and relatives exist in 
human nature as something God put into the hearts of men'^'. 
The closing remarks of this section are significant in the sense 
that al-'asabiyah' (group feeling) is proposed as the pivot of all forms of 
human activity and authority not only of al-mulk (royal authority) or 
autocracy, but of prophecy and apostleship as well: 
"If this is true with regard to the place where one lives, which is 
in constant need of defence and military protection, it is equally true 
with regard to every other human activity, such as prophecy, the 
establishment of royal authority, or propaganda (for a cause). Nothing 
can be achieved in these matters without fighting for it. And for fighting 
one cannot do without group feeling. This should be taken as the 
guiding principle of our later exposition. "God gives success" . 
Once united under the leadership of a group having an 'asabiyyah 
with a religious message (da'wah), they are able to assault the central 
government. Thus the death of the state is imminent and a new dynasty 
takes over'^ "'. 
Ibn Khaldun dismisses the Ideal City of al-farabi a a simple 
hypothesis not worth discussing. The rational government (Siyasah 
'aqliyyah) is based on a law consisting of a mixture of the divinely 
revealed prophetic law and the ordinances of the ruler . 
To be sure, this firm opposition to the political philosophy of the 
Falasifah can be expected from such an empiricist who is more 
interested in political reality as it was and as it is than in what it ought to 
ideally or in the future, theoretically however, the religious government 
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(Siyasah Shariyyah) is far more comprehensive than both rational 
politics and political utopianism (Siyasah madaniyyah) "because the 
lawgiver knows the ultimate interest of the people and is concerned with 
the salvation of man in the other world". The fact that such regimes 
based on principles derived from the divinely revealed law were 
supposed to have gone with the prophet and his guided Caliphs means 
they were the last ideals which were as non-existent for him as the 
Virtuous city of the Philosophers. Thus Ibn Khaldun's political 
philosophy is more concerned with what he calls the second type of 
rational politics (since the first type had gone with the pre-Islamic 
Persians) where public interest is secondary to the ruler's concern and is 
practiced by both Muslims and non-Muslims, except that the Muslim 
regimes mix it with religious laws "as mush as they are able to" . 
(b) The transformation of the Caliphate into royal authority; 
He says in his Muqaddimah: "It should be known that royal 
authority is the natural goal of group feeling. It results from group 
feeling, not by choice but through necessity and the order of existence. 
All religious laws and practices and everything that the masses are 
expected to do requires group feeling. Only with help of group feeling 
can a claim be successfully pressed. Group feeling is necessary to the 
Muslim community. It existence enables (The community) to fulfil what 
God expects of it. It is said in the Sahih (al-Bukhari), "God sent no 
prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his people". Still, we find 
that the lawgiver (Muhammad) censured group feeling and urged (us) to 
reject it and to leave it alone. We also find that (The Lawgiver 
Muhammad) censured royal authority and its representatives. He blamed 
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them because of their enjoyment of good fortune, their senseless waste, 
and their deviations from the path of God. He recommended friendship 
among all Muslims and warned against discord and dissension'^ .^ 
The contradictions that begin to unfold and emerge in these 
opening paragraphs of Ibn Khaldun's discussion of "The transformation 
of the Caliphate into royal authority", constitute, in the context of the 
moral and religious values that he mentions, a crucial stage in his thesis 
relating to the concepts of al-'asabiyyah (group feeling) and al-mulk 
(royal authority) . 
Anyway if the social group feeling will be on cause of God it will 
be very good, and that group feeling with a religious message (da'wah), 
they are able to assault the central government. And the royal authority 
whom that goes on the God's path also would be recognized . 
Then Ibn Khaldun mentions about the historical trend of 
transformation of the Caliphate into royal authority and says: "when 
'Umar b. al-Khattab went to Syria and was met by Mu'awiyah in full 
royal splendor as exhibited both in the number (of Mu'awihah's retinue) 
and his equipment, he disapproved of it and said: "Are these royal 
Persian manners (Kisrawiyah), O, Muawiyah?" Mu'awiyah replied: "O 
commander of the faithful, I am in a border region facing the enemy. It 
is necessary for us to vie with (The enemy) in military equipment". 
Umar was silent and did not consider Mu'awiyah to be wrong^^.Then 
came the later Umayyads. As far as their worldly purposes and 
intentions were concerned, they acted as the nature of royal authority 
required. They forgot the deliberate planning and the reliance upon the 
truth that had guided the activities of their predecessors. This caused the 
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people to censure their actions and to accept the Abbasid propaganda in 
the place of (The Umayyads'). Thus, the Abbasids took over the 
government. The probity of the Abbasids was outstanding. They used 
their royal authority to further, as far as possible, the different aspects 
and ways of the truth; they remained Caliphs in name, because the Arab 
group feeling continued to exist. In these two stages Caliphate and royal 
authority existed side by side. Then, with the disappearance of Arab 
group feeling and the annihilation of the (Arab) race and complete 
destruction of (Arabism), The Caliphate lost its identity. The form of 
government remained royal authority, pure and simple. This was the 
case, for instance, with non-Arab rulers in the East. They showed 
obedience to the Caliph in order to enjoy the blessings (involved in 
that), but the royal authority belong to them with all its titles and 
attributes. The Caliph had no share in it. The same was done by the 
Zanatah rulers in the Maghrib. The Sinhajah, for instance, had such a 
relationship with the 'Ubaydid (-Fatimids), and the Maghrawah and also 
the Banu Yafran (Ifren) with Umayyad Caliphs in Spain and the 
'Ubaydid( -Fatimids) in al-Qayrawan''^. 
It is thus clear that the Caliphate at first existed without royal 
authority. Then, the characteristic traits of the Caliphate became mixed 
up and confused. Finally, when its group feeling had separated from the 
group feeling of the Caliphate, royal authority came to exist alone . 
Ibn Khaldun also gives more explanation about the Wazirate, 
Hijabah (The office of doorkeeper as political concepts and many other 
executive branches of the Administration . 
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This photo is attached on the first of translation of Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah 
by Franz Rosentai, Routiedg, London and USA 1938, V.2. 
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2.3 Later Islamic Philosophers; 
2.3.1 Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (597/1201 - 672/1274); 
Nasir al-Din Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Hasan al-
Tusi, the renowned Persian astronomer, Philosopher and Theologian, 
often referred to in general ShiT literature as Muhaqqiq-I Tusi (The 
great scholar Tusi) and in the Ismaili circles of his time as Sultan al 
du'at (King of the Preachers), was born in Tus, which is now a small 
town in the suburbs of Mashhad, Khurasan, on 11 Jamada I 597/17 
February 1201, and died in Baghdad on 18 DhuT Hijja 672/25 June 
1274. He is often considered at far with Avicenna and al-Farabi'*^ 
Central to Khwajah Nasir's ethics is his discussion of politics. He 
divides his section on "politics" in Akhlaq-i-Nasiri into two parts: The 
first segment addresses domestic issues, or a communal order on a small 
scale, dar tadbir-I manazil ("on how to run a Household") and the 
second segment covers "national" issues, or a communal order on a 
larger scale, dar siasat-i- mudun ("on the politics of cities")'*'*. 
Akhlaq-i-Nasiri which was written at the request of Nasir al-Din 
Muhtashim. Tusi composed and translated a number of books. Tusi's 
most important works on ethics, the Akhlaq-i-Nasiri and Akhlaq-i-
Muhtashami, are dedicated to Nasir al-Din''^ 
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(a) His Politics; 
The section on "the pohtics of Cities" of Akhlaq-I Nasiri is 
divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter, Khawjah Nasir provides 
an argument as to why human society is in need of civilization 
(tamaddun). Human beings need mutual co-operation in order to 
safeguard their individual and collective survival. In the second chapter, 
he discusses the centrality of mahabbat, or "group Sentiments", as the 
crucial factor in bringing a human collectivity together. The third 
chapter is devoted to a discussion of the two kinds of human society; 
Utopia (madinah-I fadilah and the anti-utopia (Madina-i ghvr-e-fadilah). 
The fourth chapter of this section has full discussion of the question of 
political power which is properly titled as "The administration of 
kingdom and the royal manners". There are two dimensions to supreme 
political authority: a "Politics of virtue" (Siasat-i fadilah) and a "politico 
of imperfection" (Siasat-i naqisah). The politics of virtue is necessary to 
guide the followers to bliss and salvation; The politics of imperfection is 
required to Punish and curtail human fallacies and short comings. The 
fifth chapter enumerates the principles and guidelines to be observed by 
those who are associated with kings. The sixth chapter is devoted to 
friendship. His purpose here is to emphasize the social and political 
significance of having a limited but closely knit circle of friends and 
acquaintances. The seventh chapter is a full treatise on the principles 
that should govern one's relations with members of various social 
classes and groups. The eight and last chapter, which is also the 
conclusion of the book, consists of a series of short aphorisms that 
khwajah Nasir attributes to plato "Do not test the learned in the 
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abundance of their learning, but judge them by how they avoid evil and 
corruption".'**^ 
(b) Philosopher/Vizier: 
Perhaps the most compelling image of Khwajah Nasir that shines 
through all his writings and activities is that of a philosopher/vizier, a 
distinctly Persian phenomenon that combined avid theoretical learning 
with a relentless penchant for practical politics''''. 
As a philosopher vizier, Khwajah Nasir is prototypical of a breed 
apart, the closest approximation to the platonic (and pre-Islamic Persian) 
ideal of the Philosopher/King. In (full) control of the center of political 
power, he was also the most erudite philosopher of his time. The 
combination of these two forces - power and knowledge - results in a 
unique "political philosophy" which is both a politically based 
philosophy and a philosophically anchored politics. The implications of 
this discourse go beyond the immediate confinement of both political 
establishment and philosophical engagement. The philosophical 
discourse of the Philosopher/vizier assumes a unique ethical grounding 
that exacts obedience from both the political and the religious figures of 
authority. The philosopher/vizier speaks from the commanding position 
of a Muslim (interpreter of the sacred) Philosopher (The possessor of 
reason, an astronomer, a physician). The philosopher/vizier, with 
khwajah Nasir as its archetypal example, thus occupies a central 
position of command and obedience in the Islamic and Persian political 
culture, instrumental in creating the material conditions for the growth 
and development of philosophy. The instrumentality of reason in pre-
modern intellectual history . 
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2.3.2 Nizam al-Mulk (408/1018 - 485/1092); 
Nizam Al-Mulk, Abu 'All Al-Hassan B. 'AH B. Ishaq Al-Tusi, 
the celebrated minister of the Saldjuqid Sultans Alp Arsalan and Malik 
Shah. According to most authorities, he was born on Friday 21 Dhu'l-
qa'dah 408/10 April 1018, though the 6'Vl2''' Century, and was 
assassinated on 10. Ramadan 485/14 October 1092. 
He wrote a book Siasat Namah (Treatise on the Art of 
Government) in his old age which won high appreciation from his royal 
master. Nizam al-Mulk, in his boyhood was at a School at Nishapur 
with Omar Khayyam and Hassan bin Sabbah. The three boys swore 
eternal friendship, agreeing that whoever of them succeeded in life 
should help the other two. Nizam al-Mulk fulfilled his obligation in the 
case of Omar Khayyam who refused the governorship of Nishapur but 
asked for a Pension which was granted. He also managed a suitable post 
for Hassan bin Sabbah, but the latter intrigued to supplant his 
benefactor, failing which he became a bitter enemy of Nizam al-Mulk'* .^ 
2.3.3 Syasat Namah; 
We have already mentioned Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, as a stateman 
and administer. It was also stated that he was the author of the book 
'Siyasat Namah or 'Treatise in the art of politics: This great work 
comprises fifty chapters, concerning royal duties, royal prerogatives and 
administration. It is written in simple language and embodies the views 
of the great administrators . 
The Sivasat Nameh, which is the exposition of his theory of 
kingship, was originally written to serve as a "Monarch's Premier". It is 
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said that in 484/1091 Sultan Maiikshah instructed some of his 
dignitaries to think over the state of affairs in his realm and write down 
the principles of conduct that were followed by monarchs in the past, 
and were required to be observed by himself The treatise of Nizam al-
Mulk among the works presented to the Sultan was the only one which 
he approved of and adopted as a guide (Imam). But it must not be 
treated as a mere handbook of day-to-day administration. Nor must it be 
regarded as containing simply practical suggestions for the improvement 
of an administrative system. It is more than that, it is, in fact, the 
expression of realistic political theory which emerges out of an actual 
political situation, and therefore, helps us to understand the stage in the 
development of Muslim polity reached in the fifth/eleventh century^ . 
As it was inconsistent with his political ends to recognize the 
Caliph as the Supreme authority, so an explicit refutation of his claims 
in this respect would have made Nizam al-Mulk unnecessarily provoke a 
controversy about the powers of the two offices. To this dilemma he 
finds a solution in what may be called in modern language the theory of 
divine -right - the theory that the king enjoys the right to rule over his 
subjects by virtue of divine appointment. This becomes obvious from 
the study of the first chapters in the Siyasat Nameh, which mainly 
explain the divine nature of this institution, and its functions ordained by 
God. He puts, in every clear words when he says: "In every age God 
selects one from amongst mankind and adorns him with princely skills, 
and entrusts him with the affairs of the world and the comfort of the 
subjects. This is the remarkably simplified hypothesis of his theory of 
Kingship he does not argue to prove it, but simply states it as a self-
evident truth. This proposition, as advanced by Nizam al-Mulk, suffers 
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the logical weakness common to all the expositions of the divine-right-
theory which set out this hypothesis as a fait accompli, to be simply 
accepted rather than to be argued. It is indeed a dogmatic belief rather 
than a rational proposion. It is, however, important for our purpose, 
because it serves to explain how Nizam al-Mulk comes (in Siyasat 
Nameh) to expound a political theory which is out and out a vindication 
of autocracy, and how he is led from the outset to reject the democratic 
principles enunciated by the advocates of the Caliphate^ . He also 
discusses in the Siyasat Nameh about the purposes of kingship in a 
political community and says:" The essential function which the king 
has to fulfill in human society is to bring order out of chaos, and to 
maintain peace and justice^^ Thus those noted above are the main 
structures of the Siyasat Nameh. 
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3.1 THE OTTOMAN, SAFAVID, AND MUGHAL EMPIRES: 
In 857/1453 a clan of Turkish wamors or ghazis conquered 
Constantinople, ended eleven centuries of Byzantine rule, and 
completed the job. The Arabs had left unfinished in the Seventh 
Century. The conquest of Constantinople (henceforth Istanbul) opened 
the door for the expansion of Islamic rule into Southern Europe. It also 
brought enormous prestige to the conquerors, the clan of Osman 
(Arabic: 'uthman), who achieved what other Muslims had tried and 
failed at for eight centuries. Their leader, Muhammad, earned the title 
"Conqueror", and the power of the Osmanli family rapidly grew. 
Muhammad's successors consolidated Osmanli rule in Anatolia and 
extended it into the Balkans. In 923/1517 Selim "The Inexorable" (or 
"the Grim" depending on which side yo were on) defeated the Egyptian 
Mamluks in Syria.Suddenly, the Ottomans, as Europeans called the 
family of Osman, had obtained for themselves an empire that was 
astonishingly similar in size and extent to the Pre-Islamic Byzantine 
empire. At the height of Ottoman power under Sulayman "The 
Lawgiver", who reigned for forty-six years from 927/1520 to 974/1566, 
the empire encircled the Black and red seas, and encompassed three 
quarters of the Mediterranean coast. The Ottomans ruled over vast 
numbers of non-Muslim subjects, and the Turkish armies were the terror 
of Europe. In 936/1529 Sulayman's forces laid siege to Vienna and 
would certainly have taken it had their troops not been so eager to get 
home before winter. 
While the Ottomans were expanding into Europe, a rival Muslim 
empire was growing in Persia. In 907/1501 the leader of a radical shi'i 
Sufi order conquered Tabriz, set himself up as ruler, and pronounced 
Twelver Shi'ism the creed of the state.Isma'il thus became the founder 
of the safavid empire and the most successful and intolerant Shi'i ruler 
since the fall of the Fatimids. Isma'il seems to have aimed at no less 
than the complete destruction of Sunni Islam, and in the territory that 
came fully under his control he was astonishingly successful. He 
enforced the ritual cursing of the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 
and 'Uthman, as usurpers, disbanded Sunni tariqas and seized their 
assets, faced Sunni 'ulama' with the choice of conversion, death, or 
exile, and imported Shi'i scholars to replace them. The almost complete 
predominance of Twelver Shi'ism in modern Iran is largely Shah 
Isma'il's doing. 
Twelver Shi'ism might have come to dominate much more of the 
Islamic world in the newly emerging Ottoman state had not stood in 
Isma'il's way. The Safavi Sufis had a significant following among the 
Turks of Anatolia, the so-called Qizil-bash ("Red Heads") who had a 
penchant for red turbans. In 917/1511 The Qizil-bash rose in rebelhon 
against the Ottomans, but three years later, in 920/1514, the Ottoman 
Sultan salim decisively defeated the safavids, ending Shi'i expansion. 
The Otomans response to the Safavid threat was to massacre the Qizil-
bash and to persecute Shi'i Muslims more generally. The result was, for 
the first time, a sharp divide between Shi'i and Sunni Islam along 
geographical lines. The split deeply affected the 'ulama; who were 
ghettoized. Consequently, Shi'i and Sunni intellectual culture moved in 
different directions. The division also had a profound effect on the 
development of popular piety. In Safavid lands the dominant religious 
form of Sunni Islam, tariqa Sufism, was replaced with popular Shi'i 
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piety, centered on the rememberance of the passion of Husayn at 
Karbala, and encouraging hatred of Sunnis . 
To the east the final piece in the puzzle was put in place by Babur, 
an ambitious and resourceful descendant of Timur. Forced out of central 
Asia by Uzbek expansion, Babur based himself in Kabul and turned his 
attention to India. In 933/1526 he decisively defeated the Muslim rulers 
of Delhi at the battle of Panipat and the Mughal empire was born. 
During the long reign of Babur's grandson Akbar (964-1014/1556-
1605) Mughal power expanded to include most of the Indian 
subcontinent. Under Akbar the Mughals came close to a policy of 
religious neutrality, making Akbar the Poster child of later advocates of 
religious tolerance and a favorite of Indian historians. Akbar abolished 
the jizyah (head tax) on non-Muslims, prohibited Hindu girls from 
converting to Islam for marriage, set aside the death penalty for 
apostasy, and patronized the building of temples. He also engaged in 
religious experimentation, establishing a sort of private court tariqah of 
his own and giving a hearing to spokesmen of every tradition, including 
Christians. Akbar's experiment with universalism did not last. His great 
grandson Aurangzeb, faced with a Hindu in Surrection in the South, 
restored the jizyah and generally adopted a hard line toward his Hindu 
subjects. Aurangzeb was the last of the great Mughal emperors. Soon 
after his reign Mughal power was on decline and very fast 
disintegrated . 
3.1.1 THE OTTOMANS; 
The word 'Ottoman' is the Europeanized form of Osman, the 
founder of the Turkish dynasty, so the Turkish tribesmen of Osman were 
called 'Osmanly'. They belong to the Kaayi clan of the Oghus Turks 
who had fled before the Mongol armies, and the name of Ottoman Turks 
is not entirely unfamiliar to the reader by now. In either ninth or tenth 
century, the Turks of central Asia were converted to Islam and in the 
eleventh century they began to push their way into south-Eastern Russia 
and Persia. In the almost continuous struggle, Turkish soldiers proved to 
be effective advanced gurds for Islam. The Turks who came into contact 
with Islam, accepted the Sunni faith and were fanatically loyal to its 
tenets and institutions . It is also said the Ottoman from-their ancestor 
Uthman (a namesake of the third ideal caliph). 
The Ottoman state has emerged as the result of an Islamic 
movement under the leadership of Ghazi Osman (699-727/1299-1326) 
the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, towards the end of the 13"' century 
at Eskisehir, located in north Western Anatolia. Early Ottoman rulers 
were fiefs of the Seljuqi monarchs whose capital was Konya. They 
derived their title of Sultan from the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo . 
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(I) The Ottoman Sultanate: 
OsmanI (699-727/1299-1326) 
Orhan (727-762/1326-1360) 
MuradI (762-702/1360-1389) 
Bayezid Yilderim (702-805/1389-1402) 
(II) The Ottoman Empire: 
1. Mehmed I (815-824/1412-1421) 
2. Murad II (824-855/1421-1451) 
3. Mehmed II (855-886/1451-1481) 
4. Bayezid II (886-918/1481-1512) 
5. Selim I (918-927/1512-1520) 
6. Suleiman (927-974/1520-1566) 
7. Selim II (974-982/1566-1574) 
8. Murad III (982-1004/1574-1595) 
9. Ahmad I (1004-1012/1595-1603) 
The Ottoman was one of the largest and longest-lived dynasties 
the world has ever seen. Starting with uthman in direct male line, 36 
Sultans ruled from 1300 to 1922.The Empire probably reached its zenith 
with Sulayman, the Magnificent, in the Sixteenth century. This was the 
greatest time of expansion. The North African conquests date from this 
period - all of North Africa, save Moraco, formed part of the empire. It 
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stretched from Budapest to Yemen, from Baghdad to Algeria. In 
936/1529 Sulayman came close to taking Vienna^. 
The heart of the Ottoman Empire was the Topkapi place in 
Istanbul. The Topkapi was for hundred years the Seat of Ottoman 
power and is now advertised as 'the largest and richest Museum in the 
world'^ 
3.1.2 Political development of the Ottoman: 
The Ottoman state first appeared on the map of world history as a 
small Emirate which straddled the uneasy border between the seljukid 
and the Byzantine Empires in North Western Anatolia. It expanded 
rapidly and during the Period (702-805/1389-1402) achieved the status 
of a major imperial power, reaching as far as the Danube in the North 
and the Euphrates in the east. The first imperial experiment was brought 
to a sudden halt when the Ottomans, failing to use the strategic 
advantage gained by their defeat of a crusader army led by the 
Hungarian King Sigismund in 799/1396 at the battle of Nigbolu 
(Nicopolis), turned their military energies instead to the ill-timed 
annexation of Muslim emirates in Anatolia. In the ensuing melee, which 
was concluded by a major Ottoman defeat at the hands of Timur in 
805/1402 at the battle or Ankara, the Ottomans' Empire in Europe and 
Asia lost its cohesion. In the Subsequent period between 805/1402 and 
816/1413, the empire was wrecked by inveterate civil war as rival 
claimants to the throne sought to rebuild the patrimonial hegemony. 
During the period of the civil war the scope of Ottoman sovereignty in 
Anatolia was severely restricted, and the centre of political power in the 
state shifted to the European province. It was during this period that 
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Edime came into its own as the empire's chief political capital. While 
the era of the civil war usually considered to be confined to the period of 
805-16/1402-13, unstable political conditions persisted until 809/1425 -
Threatening at times to restart the process of imperial disintegration. 
After 834/1430 when the Ottomans succeeded in capturing Salonica 
from the Venetians, the state entered into a renewed period of imperial 
expansion in Europe and they defeated a succession of crusader armies 
mobilized from the west. The Octtoman, by their victor, over the Polish-
Hungarian King Ladislas at the battle of varna in 848/1444, firmly 
restored the empire's dominance over the Balkan lands and brought the 
final fall of the Byzantine empire within the realm of possibility* .^ 
The Ottoman sovereign derived his imperial authority from three 
separate sources of legitimacy: from his adoption of the Islamic title 
Sultan, from the Turco-Mongol designation Khakan, and from the rank 
of Kaysar inherited from the rulers of the Eastern Roman Empire^. 
Within the short span of sixty-four years after the fall of Constantinople 
the Ottoman had added the Arab Capitals of Damascus, Cairo, Mecca 
and Medinah to their imperial Patrimony and were catapulated into a 
position as the premier Islamic Power in the world . 
3.1.3 Ottoman Knigs and their ranks; 
The Ottoman Empire was primarily an army encampment. 
Fighting was a most important business. The Sultan accompanied the 
army and he took his pay as a Janissary, his name being first on the roll. 
The Ottomans were Sunni Muslims, and as such, their government was 
limited and restricted by Islamic law; it was not a theocracy, but could 
be termed as an autocracy in which the Sultan enjoyed very vast powers. 
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However, theocratic restrictions naturally limited the power of the 
Sultan. He had to share it with Shakykh ul-Islam, the highest religious 
dignitary in the land. The Ottoman Sultan tried to use their prerogatives 
as much as they could without doing away with the Shari'ah. They 
certainly used titles: "Vicar of God on earth," "Successor of the 
prophet", "Pontiff of the Muslims", "Refuge of the world", "Shadow of 
God", and , in unbecoming modesty, "Servant of the two sanctuaries", 
(i.e. Mecca and Medina)". Later, the Ottoman Turkish Sultan adopted 
the title of the Khalifah and declared their rule as Khilafat, successor to 
the Abbasid Khalifat which continued till 1343/1924. 
3.1.4 The 'Ulama' and Ottoman rulers: 
The Ottoman rulers succeeded in absorbing 'Ulama' (Scholars) 
into the structure of the state to an unprecedented degree. The Ottoman 
system was built upon the simple Mongol distinction between the rulers 
and the ruled. In this system the 'Ulama' formed their own hierarchy 
within the ruling class and were, in formal terms, part of the Ottoman 
army. Thus the title of two chief judges of the empire was Qadi-asker, 
Judge of the army. Above the Qadi-askers, the Shaykh al-Islam 
supervised a vast religious bureaucracy and shared equal status with the 
Grand Wazir. At the highest level, along with the Shaykh al-Islam and 
the Oadi-Askers, the household of the Sultan had two official prayer 
leaders, an official religious preceptor, a head strologer, and a head 
physician. Forty-three Qadi divided into three levels served under the 
Oadi-Askers. A variety of grades of Muftis, prayer leaders, and 
preachers filled up the secondary ranks of the 'ulama'. The system was 
formally a meritocracy, and the 'ulama, were divided into twelve 
consecutive grades, with a formal system of certification marking the 
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passage from one grade to the next. The Ottomans, had successfully 
transformed the 'ulama' into a religious bureaucracy, tried, inextricably 
1 9 
to the interests of the ruling class . 
What the Ottoman 'Ulama' lost by way of independence was 
more than compensated for in wealth, power and prestige. Like the other 
members of the 'askeri class the 'ulama' paid no taxes, but they also 
enjoyed an additional unique privilege: they could pass on wealth to 
their descendants. Every other members of the army was, in formal 
terms, a slave of the ruling household and his property was subject to 
confiscation upon his death. Not so was the case of the religious 
scholars. Consequently, leading families worked hard to ensure that 
their sons entered the system. The 'ulama' also supervised and benefited 
from the income of vast religious endowments (awqaf, sing. Waqf). The 
Ottoman 'ulama' made good use of these privileges, amassing enormous 
wealth and power. At the higher echelons of the hierarchy those in 
power also contrived to keep the wealth and power in the family, so to 
speak and the most powerful 'Ulama' became, in effect a hereditary 
aristocracy' . 
3.2 THE SAFAVID: 
The safivd dynasty originated in the sufi order founded by safi al 
din (650-735/1252-1334) Shiaism was its faith and charter. The Turks, 
with Uzbegs on the eastern front, would be the constant enemies of the 
Safavid soldiers, the Qizilbash or red-heads. The Safavids wore red 
turbans with twelve folds commemonating the twelve Shiite Imams . 
In 907/1501 Shah Ismail I, was proclaimed ruler after defeating a 
Turkish army. The most important decision of the shah was to declare 
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that the official religion of the state would be Twelver- ithna ashari -
Shiaism. The Saffavid state was to be a Theocracy, Shah Ismail 
Personified the Twelfth hnam in the flash. Shah Ismail conducted a 
vigorous campaign to convert the predominantly Sunni population to 
Shiaism ^ Then Shah Ismail's Son, Shah Tahmasp, was an ascetic, and 
Tahmasp's grandson. Shah Abbas the great (997-1039/1588-1629), 
coming to the throne when he was seventeen, brought saffavid fortunes 
to their peak. By 1015/1606, he had decisively defeated the Uzbegs and 
the Ottomans . 
By the eighteenth century the Shia Ulama were beginning to 
challenge the theory of the divine right of kings, the concept that the 
Shah was the Imam incarnate, the Shadow of God, Zilallah, on earth. 
Mullah Ahmed Ardabili confronted Shah Abbas with the thesis that he 
did not rule by divine right but as a trust on behalf of the Imam. The 
ulama, he warned, would decide whether that trust was being honoured 
or not. Soon the Ulama were vigorously arguing that the Imam must be 
a genuine mujtahid, a man of learning and impeccable character. The 
ulama were bidding to take control of the Shia state which the safavid 
had created. 
Henceforth, politics would oscillate between two points, secular 
rulers jealously guiding their authority while discovering their roots in 
imperial pre-Islamic Persian hislor)- and aggressive religious scholars 
claming a share of it. Where the rulers emphasized Persian language and 
custom especially drawing on the Pahlavis - Firdausi's Shah Nama was 
a rich source- The ulama spoke of a universal Islam. I am an important 
sense the base for contemporary politics in Iran was being laid in the 
Safavid period itself . 
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A major development during the safavid reign was the end of the 
mutual toleration between Sunnis and Shias that existed from the time of 
the Mongols. 
The developments in saffavid Persia would reverberate in society 
and politics up to the present times. Persia-Iran-became the largest, most 
powerful shia state in the world, the source and inspiration of shia 
dogma, the Champion of its destiny. The saffavid period thus 
determined, as it accurately reflected, the shape of things to be in what is 
now Iran . 
What is very interesting about Safavids. It has been said, that 
Shah Abbas built a beautiful mausoleum over the tomb of the eight 
Imam Ali al-Rida in Mashhad and made a vow to walk from Isfahan on 
a pilgrimage at the completion of the edifice. He fulfilled his vow, and 
pilgrimage to Mashhad became about as important as the Pilgrimages to 
Mecca and to the tomb of Husayn at Karbala . 
When Shah Abbas died in 1039/1629, there was no worthy 
successor left, for he had killed them all . 
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3.2.2 
TheSafavidsoflRAN: 
Esmail I 
Tahmasb I 
Esmail II 
Khodabandeh 
Abbas I 
Safi 
Abbas II 
Soleiman 
Hossein 
Tahmasb II 
Abbas III 
(906-931/1500-1524) 
(931-984/1524-1576) 
(984-986/1576-1578) 
(986-996/1578-1587) 
(996-1039/1587-1629) 
(1039-1052/1629-1642) 
(1052-1078/1642-1667) 
(1078-1106/1667-1694) 
(1106-1135/1694-1722) 
(1135-1144/1722-1731) 
(1144-1149/1731-1736) 
'Ulama and the safavid empire; 
Ismail, Founder of the safavid empire, had to recruit 'ulama' from 
outside of Iran in order to build his Shi'i state. This should have proven 
a golden opportunity to exert state control over religious scholarship, but 
shi'i scholars were doctrinally well equipped to resist threats to their 
independence. To begin with they were disposed to reject the ultimate 
legitimacy of any state not led by the twelfth imam. In addition, an 
internal squabble among Shi'i 'ulama' ended up reinforcing the 
independence of scholars. Shi'i scholars were divided into two camps 
over whether rehgious authority was primarily textual (the Akhbari 
position which paralleled the Sunnis) or whether it was vested in living 
scholars called mujtahids (the Usuli position). Under the safavids the 
Usulis won out, and thought that each individual believer should submit 
to the authority of a particular living mujtahid. Twelver shi'i religious 
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authority thus reached directly to ordinary believers and bypassed the 
state. This independence was further encouraged by the rapid 
breakdown of state authority in Iran during the eighteenth century . 
The most famous scholars of safavid's period Muhammad Majlisi 
became Sheikh al-Islam of Isfahan in 1099/1687 and MuUabashi- Head 
Mullah- in 1106/1694, the same year that Shah Sultan-Hosein started his 
reign. Although he would end his days as a drunken debauch Sultan-
Hosein was initially pious, holding the Sheik in great respect. Majlisi 
was acknowledged as the foremost shi'i scholar of his time. He wrote 
more than sixty books. He initiated a campaign against Sunnis and Sufis 
which opened with an effort at their expulsion from Isfahan. Although 
missings the lessons of tolerance and gentleness, Majlisi's ideal was 
none the less the prophet: Bahar al-Anwar, accepted as his magnum 
opus, is an encyclopedic collection of hadith. Shi'i fevour brought to 
and maintained at a pich by the safavids left little room for compromise 
or compassion; by the end its intensity had drained away the vitality of 
the state"^. 
It seems that the safavids' support and recognized the 'Ulama', 
and they gave them the title of Sheik al-Islam and also 'ulama', 
recognized the safavids as a "Shodow of God". So they had not any 
challenge together and there were not any commandment each to other. 
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3.3 Mughal Emperors of Hindustan: 
1. Babar, Zahir-ad-din (932 AH / 1525 AD) 
2. Humayun, Nasir-ad-din (937/1530) 
3. Akbar, Jalal-ad-din (963 /1556) 
4. Jahangir, Nur-ad-din (1014/1605) 
5. Shah-Jahan, Shihab-ad-din (1037 / 1628) 
6. Aurangzeb, Muhyyi-ad-din (1069/1659) 
7. Bahadur Shah, Kutb-ad-din (1119/1707) 
8. Jahandar Shah, Mu'izz-ad-din (1124 / 1712) 
9. Farrukh-Siyar (1124/1713) 
10. Rafi-ad-daraj at. Shams ad-din (1131/1719) 
11. Rafi-ad-daulah Shah Jahann II (1131/1719) 
12. Muhammad Nasir ad-din (1131/1719) 
13. Ahmad (1161/1748) 
14. Alamgir II, Aziz ad-din (1167/1754) 
15. Shah-Alam, Jalal ad-din (1173 / 1759) 
16. Muhammad Akbar II (1221/1808) 
17. Bahadur Shah II (1253/1837) 
Those are the most famous of Maghal emperors and almost near non-
famous of them are estimated to nine. And also this emperor, deposed 
by the British Government on 1275 AH /1857 AD^l 
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3.3.1 The Mughal: 
The history of the Mughal Empire of Hindustan, which nominally 
extends from 932 / 1525 to 1276 / 1857, is rarely contained in much 
narrower limits. The assured domination of the Mughal Emperors begins 
with the building-up of the Empire by Akbar (963/1556-1014/1605) and 
practically ends with the death of Aurangzeb, the last autocrat of their 
line, in 1119/1707. Before Akbar there was no Mughal Empire, but only 
the attempt to create one . 
In histories that focus on Akbar's Ostentatious tolerance and 
pragmatic politics it is often forgotten that he stabilized the Mughal state 
only after decades of fighting. His most important conquests were those 
of the Rajput states in the Rajasthan desert west of Agra, for these 
Hindu warrior clans commanded the best armies in northern India. 
Mughal generals erected towers of skulIs-Timurid terror tactics-from 
thousands of slain Rajput troops who resisted Akbar's early 
25 
campaigns . 
Akbar's Rajput relations astutely recognized political reality in an 
empire in which 80 to 90per cent of the population was non-Muslim-
predominantly Hindu but also Jain, animist. Christian, Jewish and 
Zoroastrian. The Mughals were a Turco-Mongol garrison state that 
controlled the urban centres and reform and revival . 
Akbar, the Great Mughal, creating a new creed, the Din-i-ilahi; 
Ali transformed into an avatar with four arms; Duldul, the prophet's 
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mule, equated t Hanuman, the monkey god . 
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3.3.2 The Mughal Connection in Pakistan: 
Drawing genealogical lines - so to speak from Aurangzeb and 
Dara Shikoh to the leaders of Pakistan illuminates the problem further 
for us. Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, a Prime Minister of Pakistan, in a significant 
and historical manner-and despite Berkely and oxford-reflects the 
conceptual position of Dara Shikoh. Both were eclectic and syncretist. 
While Dara Shikoh wished to include Hinduism in Islam, Bhutto 
attempted a similar exercise with the dominant rival ideology of his 
time, socialism, evolving the concept of 'Islamic socialism . 
3.3.3 Mughal Kings and their powers: 
To whatever extent the Mughals dabbled in religious adventurism 
they saw themselves, and were largely seen, at least formally, as 
Champions of Islam Akbar the greatest Mughal Emperor, adopted the 
title of Jalaluddin, while Jahangir's title was Nur al-din, light of religion. 
Shah Jahan's Shihab al-din, bright star of religion, and Aurangzeb's 
Muhyi al-din, life giver of religion. Akbar's friend and publicist, Abul 
Fazal,went one step further.The Emperor Akbar was the Summation of 
the major spiritual and religious tendencies of the Islamic world. He was 
perfect man. For contemporary historians and scholars. The Mughals are 
ideal Muslim rulers. A blind eye is turned discreetly to imperial 
excesses. In fact they were autocrats and despotic ruler like their 
Ottomans and Safavid rulers. In certain respects, they may be different 
from each other but in their political philosophy and practice they all 
were autocrate Emperor. 
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3.3.4 The Mughal Rulers and ^Ulama'; 
The Mughal rulers also did their best to corral the 'ulama' into 
serving state interests, but with only partial success. Akbar tried to over 
rule the 'ulama' in the articulation and application of law, belatedly 
applying Ibn-al-Muqaffa's advice by putting himself in the place of the 
final arbiter in the interpretation of Shari 'a-Awrangzeb complied his 
own collection of judicial rulings, the Fatawa-Yi'Alamgiri, in a similar 
attempt to make an end run around 'ulama' monopoly on interpretation 
of the law. It is clear that 'ulama' were closely involved with the state, 
but some of that involvement was by way of independent critique of 
state policy, as in the case of Ahmad Sirhindi, who ended up in prison 
for his pains. As with the Safavids, the rapid decline of Mughal power in 
the eighteenth century left the 'ulama' to fent for themselves, and they 
thus entered the modern period with their own institutions and 
accustomed to independence. It was an independence that would go in 
two different directions, however. Two quite different kinds of religious 
institutions emerged. The first represented by Lucknow's Farangi 
Mahall, Concented itself with the preservation of traditional learning in 
the midst of a tumultuous environment. A second line of 'ulama', 
represent by Shah Wali Allah and his descendants, actively worked for 
the reform of Islam and the restoration of Muslim Power . 
It is no accident that the early eighteenth century produced one of 
the greatest Muslim scholars and reformers in India, Shah Wali Allah 
Dehlavi, who sounded the orthodox alarm as a result of a social 
condition of the Muslims. Contemporaneous to the Wahhabis in Arabia. 
He emphasized a reversion to pristine Islam. Rejection of Hindu 
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accretions, such as tomb worship, consulting Brahmans for omens and 
celeberating Hindu festival, was advocated by him. Pointedly, he wrote 
his major contribution to theological dialectics, Hujjat Allah al-baligha, 
in Arabic not Persian. In spite of bitter polemics by the traditional 
'ulama' he translated the Holy Quran into Persian in order that it should 
reach a wider readership; his sons translated it into Urdu. Shah Wall 
Allah's ideas were to shape the Islamic college at Deoband and 
influence Muslim of all opinions. Significantly, and logically, one of his 
heroes was the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb . 
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4.1 EGYPT 
Official Name: Arab Republic of Egypt. Arabic Jumhuriyah Misr Al-
Arabiya 
Local Name: Misr 
Population: 76,117,421 (July 2004 est.) 
Independence: 28 Februaiy 1922 (From UK) 
Status: Republic 
Chief of State: President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak (Since 14 
October 1981) 
Prime Minister: Ahmed Nazif (Since July 2004) 
Capital: Cairo 
Language: Arabic (Official) 
Religions: Sunni Muslim (C.90%), minority largely Coptic Christian 
(C.10%)^ 
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4.1.1 EGYPTIAN HISTORY, ANCIENT: 
The history of ancient Egypt stretches roughly from 3100 BC, 
when a unified kingdom embracing lower and Upper Egypt was first 
created, to 332 BC, when Alexander the Great brought the rule of the 
pharaohs to an end. In the intervening millennia, Egypt experienced 
alternate phases of strong, centralized government and periods of near 
anarchy, when competing dynasties and warlords fought for power. The 
periods marked by strong government at home and expansionist policies 
abroad are called the Old, Middle and New Kingdoms. The chaotic 
phases go by the name of Intermediate Periods (I-III). In the so-called 
Late Period, the centuries immediately before Alexamders's conquest, 
Egypt lacked central authority, and the country was easy prey for the 
great expansionist powers of the Middle East-Assyria conquered her in 
671 BC and Persia in 525 BC'. 
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4.1.2 DYNASTIES OF RULERS: ANCIENT EGYPT 
DYNASTY 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
XII 
XIII 
XIV 
XV 
XVI 
XVII 
XVIII 
XIX 
XX 
XXI 
XXII 
XXIII 
XXIV 
XXV 
XXVI 
XXVII 
XXVIII 
XXIX 
XXX 
XXXI 
PERIOD 
Early dynastic period 
Old Kingdom 
First Intermediate period 
Middle Kingdom 
Second Intermediate period 
New Kingdom 
Third Intermediate period 
Late period 
DATE BC 
C3100-2890 
C2890-2686 
C2686-2613 
C2613-2494 
C2494-2345 
C2345-2181 
C2181-2173 
C2173-2160 
C2160-2130 
C2130-2040 
C2133-1991 
1991-1786 
1786-1633 
1786-C1603 
1674-1567 
C1684-1567 
C1660-1567 
1567-1320 
1320-1200 
1200-1084 
1085-945 
945-730 
8172-730 
720-715 
751-668 
664-525 
525-404 
404-399 
399-380 
380-343 
343-332^ 
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4.1.3 HISTORY: 
Neolithic cultures on river of Nile from C.6000 BC; Pharaoh 
dynasties from c3100 BC; Egyptian power greatest during the New 
Empire period, 1576-1085 BC; became Persian Province. 6'^ -c BC; 
conquered by Alexander the Great, 4'^ -c BC; Ptolemaic Pharaohs ruled 
Egypt until 30 BC; conquered by Arabs, AD 672; Suez Canal 
constructed in 1869, revolt in 1879 put down by British in 1882; British 
protectorate from 1914; declared independence, 1922; King Farouk 
deposed by Nasser 1952; Egypt declared a republic; 1953; attack on 
Israel followed by Israeli invasion, 1967; Suez Canal remained blocked, 
1967-75; changed name to Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971; Yom Kippur 
War against Israel, 1973; Camp David peace conference with Israel, 
1978; Israel returned disputed Taba Strip, 1989; participated in Gulf 
War with US-led coalition, 1991; governed by a people's National 
Assembly, President, Prime Minister, and Council of Ministers. 
4.1.4 MONARCH: 
1922-36 Fouad I 
1936-7 Farouk Trusteeship 
1937-52 Farouk 1 
Head of state: 
1952-4 Mohammad Najib 
1954-70 Gamal Abdel Nasser 
1970-81 Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat 
1981- Mohammed Hosni Mubarak till now (February 2005/ 
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4.1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: 
Egypt is a country which inherited the legacy of five thousand 
years old civilization; it may not be the oldest civilization of the ancient 
world, but is certainly of great antiquity. The Egyptians had built 
massive structures like the Pyramdis- a major feature of ancient 
Egyptian architecture, and had developed a unique system of preserving 
mummies. Egypt also has to its credit the invention of the first solar 
calendar in the history of mankind. Ancient Egyptians laid the 
foundation for the study of arithmetic and geometry. They perfected the 
achievement of irrigation, engineering and making of potteiy, glass and 
paper. They were the first ones to have formulated a clear concept of the 
aesthetic aspect of art, besides its utilitarian purposes. More significant, 
still, were the Egyptians' contributions in the fields of religion, and 
individual and social ethics. From the land of Pharaohs, thus came the 
germ and the stimulus for numerous intellectual achievements of later 
countries\ 
The Arab conquest of Egypt in the seventh century brought Egypt 
in the fold of Arab and thereby Islam, and Egypt became heir to another 
civilization, namely. Islamic Civilization of the middle ages. The Arab 
conquest gave Egypt a new religion, i.e. Islam, and a new language, 
Arabic. Arab conquest, however, did not cut off Egypt completely from 
its pharaoh traditional culture. 
The modem history of Egypt could be traced back to the founding 
of Mohammad Ali dynasty in the earlier years of nineteenth century. 
Mohammad Ali, and Albanian soldier, was sent by port to drive out 
Napoleon who had invaded Egypt in 1213/1798. In the confusion that 
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followed the French invasion, Mohammad Ali established himself as the 
ruler of Egypt. 
It was with the French invasion of Egypt that the process of 
Egypt's modernization began. Mohammad Ali, an ambitious solider, set 
Egypt, which was still a province of Ottoman Empire, on the road of 
modernization by introducing several reforms, particularly in the fields 
of education and industrialization. 
Mohammad All's grandson, Ismail Pasha, sought to accelerate the 
pace of Modernization. Unfortunately, he conceived the process in terms 
of grand Palaces and European style buildings and spent a colossal 
amount of money in implementing his plans to raise Egypt's 
international status. The advanced nations of Europe were his ideal. His 
zeal for Europeanization was so great that at the time of the opening of 
the Suez Canal, he proudly declared that he had detached Egypt from 
Africa and attached it to Europe . Egypt thus was the first Arab state 
fully exposed to Western civilization. 
During the next few years the country became an arena of Franco-
British rivalry became an arena of Franco- British rivalry and, as a 
consequence of nationalist revoh of 1299-1300/1881-1882, Britain 
occupied Egypt. Henceforth, the power remained mainly in the hands of 
British Civilian agents, even though technically Egypt still remained 
part of the Ottoman Empire. It was only in 1333/1914, during the First 
World War, when Britain found Turkey in the opposite camp, that 
Britain declared Egypt a protectorate in order to make its position more 
firm and secure legally and administratively. 
107 
After the war, under pressure from the nationalist Wafd party, the 
British government declared on 1341/28 February 1922 that "the British 
protectorate over Egypt is tenninated and Egypt is declared an 
independent sovereign state" . However there were certain matters 
which. His Majesty's government reserved for its discretion. 
Meanwhile attempts were being made to reach a settlement on the 
"reserve subjects" which were a part of the 1341/1922 declaration. 
These attempt led to the signing of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 
1355/1936. The Treaty replaced the unilateral British declaration of 
1341/1922, but it also put some limitations on Egyptian sovereignty . 
The "indignities" that Egypt had suffered at the hands of the 
British, together with the inefficient, corrupt and feudalistic government 
that tolerated all these indignities, aroused some young army officers 
against both Britain and the ruling class at home. These young officers 
decided to put an end to the prevalent state of affairs. Egypts defeat in 
the Arab-Israeli was of 1368/1948, which these young officers attributed 
to corruption and mismanagement at home, hardened their resolve and 
they decided to rescue the colony from the morass of corruption. They 
staged a coupd'etat in 1372/July 1, /1952 and captured power^. 
4.1.6 THE AIMS OF REVOLUTION BY JAMAL ABDU AL-
NASSER: 
The aims were: 
1. extermination of imperialism, 
2. eradication of feudalist; 
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3. termination of monopoly and domination of capital over 
government; 
4. promotion of social justice; 
5. establ ishment of strong national army; 
6. bringing about democratic life'°. 
Though the revolutionary leadership succeeded in achieving some 
of these objectives, it did not make much progress in bringing about 
democratic life to any large extent. Nasser Government basically 
remained a dictatorial government; the leadership did not encourage 
democratic life and thus getting people's participation and building of 
modern civil society . 
4.1.7 ANWAR SADAT ACHIEVEMENTS: 
Anwar Sadat who came to power in 1390/1970, after the Sudden 
demise of president Nasser, had three achievements to his credit from 
the point of view of Egyptian state and society. First, by launching an 
offensive against Israel in 1393/October 1973, he redeemed Egypt honor 
and prestige that was badly damaged in 1388/June 1967 War with Israel. 
As he put it: "we regained our self-confidence and world'.s confidence in 
US". Second, Sadat decision to visit Israel to remove" psychological 
barrier" set the peace process in motion, which ultimately resulted in 
signing the camp David accord in 1399/September 1978.Third, this in 
turn cleared the way for opening the Suez Canal- one of the main 
sources of Egypt's National income. Sadat thus, redeemed Egypt's lost 
prestige, regained its lost territory- Sinai desert, and got the Suez Canal 
opened . 
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Sadat took two other major decisions - one on economic front and 
another on poHtical front -which any other leader would have found it 
difficult to take, Sadat moved away from Arab Socialism and 
Liberalized the political arena in order to get rid of the leftist Nasserist 
wing. On economic front sadat moved away from the policy of 
nationalization and opted for 'Infltah' (Open door policy) - a policy 
which signaled a switch to market economy. He introduced the most 
comprehensive legislation on foreign investment in 1394/1974. This 
liberalization, apart from stabilizing monetary level, had a good effect 
on the economy, which was growing at the rate of 9 per cent per annum-
of course, this growth was also partly due to world oil boom'^ 
4.1.8 HOSNI MUBARAK'S COMING TO POWER; 
When Hosni Mubarak came to power in 1402/ October 1981, 
after the assassination of Sadat by Khalid Istambuli , the country 
experienced perhaps for the first fime since its indepencence in 
1342/1923, a feeling of relative freedom-both physical and 
psychological. Since Mubarak, as a former Air Force, commander, had 
played important part in 1393/October 1973 war, and also, since he had 
already been appointed by Sadat as Vice-President of the country, his 
credibility and legitimacy were never in doubt when he came to power. 
Mubarak followed ail the major policy initiatives of Sadat-Peace with 
Israel, economic liberalization and democratization.Thus, in his first 
policy statement Mubarak, while reiterating his support for the Camp 
David Accord, also stressed the need for peace and justice in the Middle 
East, including justice for the "oppressed and dispossessed Palesfine". 
He further said that Egypt would uphold Palestinian's cause "... in all 
political circles anywhere in the world". Thus, while on the one hand 
consolidating the gains from Sadat's policies, on the other hand, 
Mubarak, wanted to dissociate himself from the unpopular aspect of the 
latter's policies. On domestic front, he opened a dialogue with all 
opposition groups and achieved a measure of consensus on broad 
national goals. He also released political detainees and even permitted 
the still out-lowed Muslim Brotherhood to resume its political activities. 
Opposition groups publicly expressed their willingness to cooperate 
with the government . 
For the time being, things seem to go well, with Mubarak firmly 
in the saddle. But gradually, there developed a gap between the state and 
society. The state agenda became different from society's agenda, and 
the respective priorities of the state and the society appeared heading for 
a clash' . 
4.1.9 MUBARAK'S LEGITIMACY: 
The first item on Mubarak's agenda was to gain legitimacy. 
Though, as pointed out earlier, his succession was legitimate, but mere 
legitimate succession was not enough. Naturally, the best way to get it 
wa to conduct democratic election. Mubarak must have thought that a 
little dose of political liberalization would not seriously threaten the 
stability of his government, but rather would ease tensions caused by his 
predecessor's harsh method of dealing with opposition. There were also 
expectations of diplomatic and economic benefits that the regime could 
achieve through the maintenance of liberal fa9ade. It was hoped that this 
would induce Western governments and investors to be more 
sympathetic towards the country. It was also hoped that democratic 
elections would isolate more radical oppositions groups. 
In this sense the real Mubarak era started only in 1405/1984. The 
first parliamentary election held under the new regime took place in 
May of that year. In this election conducted under the system of 
proportional representation the ruling national Democratic Party 
achieved 72.9 per cent of votes and 87 per cent of seats. The right wing 
wafd party received 15 per cent of votes and 13 per cent of seats. The 
socialist labour party got 7.73 per cent of votes but no seat. The left 
wing progressive Rally Tajaramu's party got 4.1 per cent of votes and 
no seats, and Liberal's party 0.65 per cent of votes and no seats.The 
election made it clear that the ruling party, headed by Mubarak himself, 
was well in control and he had established himself well in power . 
According to human rights groups, human rights are violated and 
jails are packed with more than 16000 prisoners. There had never been 
so many detainees . 
There is, therefore, growing demand and mounting tensions for an 
expansion of democratic process by amending of the civil society 
groups in Egypt is to limit the number of times a head of the state can 
run for office. Thus in spite of his electoral victories, Mubarak did not 
get the expected legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians'^. 
(II) TURKEYS; 
Turkish (Turkiye), 
Capital: Ankara 
Official Name: Republic of Turkey, 
Population: 68,109,469 (July 2003 est.) 
Independence: 29 October 1923 (Successor State to the Ottoman 
Empire). 
Status: Republican Parliamentary Democracy 
Chief of State: President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (Since 16 May 
2000). 
Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Endogan (14 March 2003) 
Languages: Turkish (Turkey) (Official), Kurdish and Arabic; 
Greek, Armenian and Yiddish Minorities 
Religion: Sunni Muslim (98%), Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and 
Of) 
Jewish minorities . 
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4.2.1 HISTORY: 
Seljuk sultanate replaced by the Ottoman in NW Asia Minor in 
13'''-c; Turkish invasion of Europe, first in Balkans, 1375; fall of 
Constantinople, 1453; empire at its peak under Sulaiman the 
Magnificent, 16"^ -c; Young Turks seized power, 1908; Balkan War, 
1912-13; allied with Germany during World War I; Republic followed 
Young Turk revolution, led by Kemal Ataturk, 1923; policy of 
westernization and economic development; neutral throughout most of 
World War 2, then sided with AUies, military coups in 1960 and 1980; 
strained relations with Greece, and invasion of Cyprus, 1974; aided the 
allied forces during the Guld War, 1991; constitution provides for a 
single-chamber National Assembly; a President appoints a Prime 
Minister and a Council of Ministers. 
4.2.2 HEAD OF STATE: 
1982-9 Kenan Evren 
1989-93 TurgutOzal 
1993-2000 Suleyman Demirel 
2000 - Ahmet Necdet Sezer^' 
4.2.3 TURKEY FROM THE CALIPHATE TO NATION STATE: 
The Ottoman state had begun to create a secular framework 
during the nineteenth century . In 1343/1924 the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey, urged on by the triumphant Ataturk, abolished the 
caliphate. The action should hardly have been necessary. As a real focus 
of political power, the caliphate had ceased to exist by the end of the 
tenth century. The ideal of the caliphate continued to live on however, 
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and the later Ottoman sultans. Particularly 'Abd al-Hamid 11 (1293-
1327/1876-1909), had not been shy about claiming the title of universal 
leader of the Muslims. This was a tricky proposition since the family of 
Osman was patently not Arab, let alone descended from the Quraysh. 
The Ottoman hand was forced however, by rivalry with European 
powers. In 1188/1774, when the Empress of Russia claimed to be the 
protector of ail Orthodox Christians everywhere the Ottomans naturally 
could not let the claim go unmatched, and they began calling the Sultan 
"Sovereign Caliph of the Mahometan religion" . 
The post World-War I Ottoman Society was qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively, different from the earlier one mainly because of the 
Arab revolt against the Turks and British occupation of Turkey. The 
Ottoman totality' was now non-existent functionally. To the Turk in the 
Street, the Treaty of Severs seemed a death Warrant, individually and 
nationally . In this background, a new Turkish nationalism took shape 
under the clashing push and pull of imperialism. The Erzurum-Sivas 
Congresses (1338/1919) and the National pact (1339/1920), which 
envisaged a Turkish government on the basis of national will, territorial 
integrity and complete independence, showed the consolidation of the 
ideas of Turkish nationalist consciousness . This national solidarity 
made the war of liberation a great success in 1342/1923. The Turkish 
National Liberation movement represented the collective will of the 
Turks under the leadership of new 'revolutionary elite' which was a 
substitute for the Ottoman ruling elite. During the liberation movement, 
nationalism was the main ideology of the Turks and it prepared them for 
future changes in the Turkish Republic. However, the nature of the 
movement gave rise to covert, ideological conflict . 
4.2.4 LEADERSHIP OF MUSTAFA KEMAL: 
The conservatives representing extreme religiosity and negation 
of westernization and the moderates representing syst^mizatipn of 
tradition and modernity were systematically and completely dominated 
by the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal. After the successful 
war of liberation against Western imperialism, the Turks emerged as a 
new national entity which represented a logical culmination of the 
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nationalist ideas of the young Turks"" . 
The development of Turkish awaking, which had started in the 
Tanzimat, went through the successive steps of Ottomanism, Pan-
Islamism, and Pan-Turanianism. It was left for Mastafa Kemal, The 
soldier-reformer, to reject them all and succeed with the simple Turkism 
of the Turks of Asia Minor . 
Mustafa Kemal had joined the Committee of Union and Progress. 
He did not have an active part in the coup d'etat of 1326/1908 and at no 
time was he identified with the policies or practices of the young Turks 
who had full control over the government. He had his disagreements 
with the triumvirate but he was too good an officer to be pushed aside. 
His defense of Gallipoli won him national acclaim. Perhaps the most 
important ally of Mustafa Kemal was the Soviet Union. Even though 
the doctrinaire Marxists among the Bolsheviks looked to Europe for the 
predicted proletarian revolution, there were enough "Asia Firsters" 
among them to pay some attention to Iran and Turkey. In 1338/1919, the 
Bolsheviks were very friendly to Mustafa Kemal and his revolution. On 
1340/ March 16, 1921, Mustafa Kemal Signed a treaty of friendship and 
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collaboration with Russia against the western powers . 
4.2.5 THE TURKISH REFORMS OPPORTUNITY: 
For Mustafa Kemal, independence from foreign interference was 
not an end but only a means to give the Turks the opportunity to build a 
new Turkey. This could be done by far-reaching reforms in practically 
every aspect of life. Most of the reform programs launched by the 
nationalists under Mustafa Kemal had been proposed and discussed by 
scores of Turkish intellectuals and reformers from Tanzimat on. Some 
of these ideas had been systematized y the famous sociologist Ziya 
Gokalp. All reforms, however, before the proclamation of the six 
principles and after, were based on them. These principles were: 
(I) Republicanism, which asserted the idea that sovereignty was 
rested in the people. 
(II) Nationalism, which claimed Turkey for the Turks and rejected 
jurisdiction over territories with non-Turkish population. 
(III) Populism, which did away with the millet system and 
proclaimed the equality of all classes of all people before the 
law. 
(IV) Statism, which accepted the necessity of the constructive 
intervention of the state in the national economy. 
(V) Secularism, which established the principle of the separation 
of religion and state. 
(VI) Reforms, which emphasized the determination to change and 
bypass tradition and precedent if they do not serve national 
purpose. 
It is important to note that notwithstanding violent vicissitudes, 
the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1357/1938 and world war II, the 
above principles have remained operative without much modification. 
Frthermore, these and all the reforms carried out under them have been 
directed toward one major objective, namely, the replacement of an 
eastern civilization with that of a Western one' . 
4.2.6 KEMAL ATATURKS' ABOLITIONS: 
In addition to the abolition of the 'Sultanate' of Mohammad V 
and the Caliphate which offended all Sunni Muslims everywhere, 
Mustafa Kemal also abolished Islamic law and replaced them with 
Swiss civil and Italian Penal codes, and also changed Islamic Calendar 
to Christian Calendar, and Arabic Alphabet by English Alphabet. Many 
other abolitions included abolition of Friday as the weekly holiday, 
abolition of old titles like Pasha and abolition of Bey and closing down 
of mosque-schools . Several other abolitions were also carried out by 
this regime 
4.2.7 THE SECOND TURKISH REPUBLIC AND ITS POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: 
While the trials were in progress and the constitution was being 
written, new political parties were being formed and they were 
preparing for the promised elections. Some 11 parties registered and 
carried on a lively campaign. In the election held on 1381/October 12, 
1961, only four parties were able to win seats in the assembly. The 
Republican prople's party won 173 seats, the Justice party 158 seats, the 
New Turkey Party 65 Seats, and the Republican Peasants' National 
Party 54 seats. Inasmuch as the Republican People's party did not have 
a majority, it arranged a coalition with the Justice party. The Assembly 
elected General Gursel as President and Ismet Inonu as Prime Minister. 
A year later internal disagreement in the coalition caused the People's 
Party to seek coalition with the other two parties and leave the Justice 
party out of the government. 
No one was surprisede that the Republican People's Party got 
more votes than any other. Beside from being Ataturk's party, it 
spearheaded opposition to the excesses of the Democratic Party. What 
surprised the observers, however, was the strength shown by the Justice 
Party. Generally it was composed of conservatives who believed in 
lower rates of taxes and transfer of sate monopolies to private industry; 
the Party was also for the abolition of governmental controls and against 
all state planning. On the whole, the Justice Paty captured the votes of 
the followers of the Democratic Party. 
The New Turkey Party was made up of economic, liberal, and 
political progressives which someday might pose throat as the chief 
opponent to the Republican People's Party. They were strong secularists 
and advocated the rights of labor to strick. The Republican Peasants' 
National party advocated social conservatism and had anti-secularist 
tendencies. It and the Justice Party generally appealed to the rural areas 
while the Republican and the New Turkey Parties had their followers 
"in 
among the Urban dwellers . 
The secularists wanted to follow Ataturk, which means no 
religious education in school and no use of the Arabic language in 
religious observances. The clericalists, on the other hand, wanted 
religious education in school, demanded the use of Arabic in worship 
and wanted all the religious endowment funds turned over to the 
'ulama'. Between these two were the moderates who believed in the 
"Partial" restoration of Islam.But when it came to translating this 
restoration into action, most of the moderates were afraid that freedom 
of religious instruction will reinstate the use of Arabic letters, veil, 
polygamy, caliphate etc. So the final decision will be made, not by fiat, 
but by the process of education and the rapidity with which the rural 
areas westernize"^'. 
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(Ill) MALAYSIA: 
Local Name: Malaysia 
Population: 25,092,940 (July 2004 est.) 
Status: Constitutional monarchy 
Independence: 31 August 1957 (from UK) 
Capital: Kuala Lumpur 
Chief of State: Paramount Ruler Fuanku Syed Sirajuddin ibni 
Almarhum Tuanku Syed Putra Jamalullail, the Raja of Perlis 
(Since 12 December 2001). 
Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdullah bin Ahmad 
Badawi (Since 31 October 2003). 
Languages: Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) (official), also Chinese, 
English, and Tamil widely spoken 
Ethnic groups: Malay (59%), Chinese (32%), Indian (9%) 
Religions: Muslim (53%), Buddhist (17%), Chinese folk-
religionist (12%). Hindu (7%), Christian (6%). 
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4.3.1 HISTORY: 
th Part of Srivijaya Empire, 9 -13 -c; Hindu and Muslim 
influences, 14*'^ -15"'-c; Portugal the Netherlands, and Britain vied for 
control from the 16" -c; Singapore, Malacca, and Penang formally 
incoiporated into the British Colony of the straits settlements, 1826; 
British protection extended over Perak. Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and 
Pahang, Constituted into the Federated Malay States, 1895; protection 
treaties with several other states (Unfederated Malay States). 1885-
1930; occupied by Japanese in Wodd War 2; Federation of Mala\'a, 
1948, independence, 1957; constitutional monarchy of Malaysia 1963; 
Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965; government by a 
bicameral Federal Parliament; Head of State is Monarch elected for five 
years by his fellow sultans; advised by a Prime Minister and a Cabinet. 
4.3.2 HEAD OF GOVERNMENT: 
1963- 70 Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj 
1970-6 Abdul Razak bin Hussein 
1976-9 Haji Hussein bin Onn 
1979-97 Mahathir bin Mohammad 
1997 Anwar Ibrahim Acting 
1997- Mahathir bin Mohamad'^ 
4.3.3 POLITICAL SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA:CONSTITUTIONAL 
MONARCHY: 
In the traditional Islamic state, it is expected that the ruler be an 
exemplary Muslim, observant of the full "Shariah" law. The favourite 
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Malaysian example of the ideal ruler is embodied in the Four Religious 
Caliphs, especially Omar^^ 
Independent Malaysia combines its parliamentary democracy 
with a legacy of nine sultanates, of which one is elected every five years 
as King of Malaysia. Beyond their role as head of religion in their 
respective states, the Sultans' real strength remains in their symbolic 
representation of Malay identity and power as the original and dominant 
people of the country. The constitutional monarchy, however, retains 
certain arbitrary powers is seen as residues of the 'feudal' age. Loyalty 
to the Person of the King and the elaborate trappings of pre-Islamic 
rituals and titles, lead others to say that 'we fear the King more than 
Allah' which means that rulers are in fact above the law. A number of 
incidents over the past decade involving anti-social, corrupt and even 
criminal behaviour by some of the rulers finally reached crisis point in 
late 1413/1992, culminating in a parliamentary constitutional 
amendment to remove the Sultans' legal immunity. The Prime Minister, 
the first in Malaysia not to come from an aristocratic or royal 
background, was personally strongly committed to this move, although 
critics claim that the measure also strengthens his own powers. Despite 
their formal roles as head of religion, the sultans' newly publicized 
lifestyle and character were quickly targeted as 'Feudal' and 'un-
Islamic', hence unfit for office and for the title Baginda, one also used 
for the Prophet' '. 
The 'mufties' and 'fatwa' councils of several states have issued 
statements to the effect that stripping Sultans of their legal immunity is 
in line with Islamic law and justice, and even the PAS Council of Ulama 
asserted that royals are not above the law; all are equal before Allah . 
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When the final parhamentary vote was taken, however, PAS voted 
against the constitutional amendments to aboHsh royal immunity, once 
again for poHtical reasons. For the federal government, however, the 
issue is clearer: The legitimacy of the Malaysian state is thoroughly 
secular even though many of its policies and characteristics are 
presented in Islamic clothing. In its latest stand-off with royalty, the 
rights of the people are re-defmed in a civil, constitutional sense, with 
Islam as a social and political leveling mechanism . 
4.3.4 THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MALAYSIA; 
Unceasingly since Independence in 1377/1957, Malaya/Malaysia 
has been engaged in a process of state building and consolidation. To 
the extent that the country aspires to be a 'nation-state', the national 
focus has always been on Malay, and the constitution clearly establishes 
the primacy of Malay status in a number of provisions and policies, 
while the constitutionally defined characteristics of Malayness-by 
languages custom and (the Muslim) religion-are essentially cultural, 
thus theoretically permitting assimilation of immigrants and minorities 
(to Malay status) according to the classic ideal, in practice, informal 
social mechanism prevent full acceptance of culturally qualified non-
Malays. From another perspective, the constitution also requires that 
Malays be Muslims, as a condition of ethnic recognition, and a non-
Muslim Malay is thus a legal anomaly. Malays, therefore, are the only 
Malaysian to enjoy no freedom of religious choice or practice, a price 
paid for political re-requisite and ethnic protection. Malaysia thus 
remains a plural state, whose principle political parties are also ethnic 
based. The ruling coalition (Barisan Nasional) which has ruled in 
substantially the same format since independence consists of a core of 
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the United Malays National Organization (UMNO): The Malasian 
Chinese Association (MCA); and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), to 
which are added from time to time other parties. Among the permanent 
opposition parties are the largely Chinese Democratic Action Party 
(DAP): a Splinter party from UMNO, Known as Semangat 46, led by a 
Malay Prince; and an attenuated multiethnic Peoples' party (Party 
Rakyat). The other principle opposition player is the Pan-Malayan 
Islamic party or PAS, which keeps the UMNO constantly on its moral 
and religious toes, and which at present, in alliance with Semangat 46, is 
the ruling party of the heavily Malay north eastern state of Kelantan. In 
its early years, beginning in 1371/1951 as Hisbul Muslimin, PAS was 
more concerned with the promotion of Malay interests, an ethnic party 
legitimated by the moral force of Islam. Now that PAS has been in 
power in Kelantan since 1411/1990"^ .^ 
4.3.5 MALAYSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE 'WEST': 
Malaysia's relations with the 'west' are highly ambivalent and 
sometimes defensive. Beneath the co-operation, it perceives a lurking 
'orinetalist' bias, which may be partly a projection of Malaysia's own 
uncertain identity. Western countries are portrayed alternately as role 
models to be emulated or rejected, as indeed are Muslim ones. In the 
positive mode, the Prime Minister rhetorically asks his countrymen 
(especially the Malays) why the Muslim People of today are less 
developed and enteiprising, unable to co-operate among themselves or 
to gain respect for their achievements, 'like fruits floating haphazardly 
in the sea'? The Malaysian leader ponders how Muslim countries can 
modernize without destroying the faith. The defenders of economic 
development are usually scrupulous in separating the west's technical 
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and scientific contributions from its accompanying social and cultural 
shortcomings. Further compensation is sought from history, and the 
glories of the Islamic civilization in times past. 
4.3.6 MALAYSIA'S RELATIONS WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES: 
As for the present, Malaysia's relations with Muslim countries 
and peoples are selective. Although formally a member of the 
organization of Islamic conference (OIC), Malaysia has a rather low 
opinion of that grouping, for it perceived indecisiveness and lack of co-
ordination amid the compelling events of Bosnia, Somalia and the Gulf 
War. The Malaysian government generally tries to distance itself from 
the immediacy of local Middle Eastern politics, and some of its 
publications are critical of the disposition of Arab Wealth, which does 
not necessarily appear to benefit the world's poorer Muslims. It is 
apparent; too that Iran is not a role model for Malaysia ever since some 
of the 'dakwah' movements openly declared their inspiration from the 
Iranian revolution. The latest exercise in religious politics for Malaysia 
has been in the new Central Asia republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikestan 
and especially Uzbekistan, where it perceives a tempting vacuum. 
Political and trading overtures, followed by a Prime Ministerial visit to 
Uzbekistan mark this new alignment for the region's Muslim population 
and re-incorporation as members of the wider 'Ummah'. Also in the 
name of the Ummah, but outside the purview of the state . 
4.3.7 THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIA IN THE POST-MAHATIR 
MUHAMMAD ERA: 
Mahatir has contributed positively to the economic development 
of his country, and succeeded in building self-confidence and a "can do" 
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attitude among his people. But in his zeal to instill self-discipline and 
accelerate progress, he managed to eradicate the political power of his 
rivals and critics, often resorting to questionable means. In the process 
he has not only weekend the constitutional and legal foundation of 
Malaysia's Political Institutions, but has even succeeded in 
subordinating the judiciary to his office. He forced, for instance, the 
resignation of Malaya Chief Justice Yahya Saleh because the later 
refused to dance to the political tone of Mahatir's government. The 
latest sacking of his deputy was intended to guarantee that no one should 
dare to oppose his decisions and policies. Few People with authentic 
values and independent minds remain in the government today. 
Undoubtedly, this has dire consequences for the post-Mahatir era. 
As for the Islamist, they are likely to continue to be an important 
force to be reckoned with. One important development that came as a 
result of the political crisis in Malaysia was the founding of the National 
Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional). The party is currently led by 
Wan Azizah Ismail, Anwar's wife who serves as the party's president, 
and by Chandra Muzaffar and Tian Chua as Vice Presidents. The 
National Justice Party represents a drastic shift from the communal 
polities that dominated Malaysia's political life since its independence, 
bringing the three major ethnic communities- The Malays, the Chinese, 
and the Indians- into political unison. While the party has a little chance 
to muster political power in the next elections, it reflects a deep political 
transformation currently underway, particularly when one realizes that 
the party is founded by individuals counted among the Islamically 
oriented forces. 
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(IV) TAJIKISTAN: 
Official Name: Republic of Tajikistan, 
Capital: Dushanbe 
Population: 6,863,752 (July 2003 est.) 
Independence: 9 September 1991 (from Soviet Union) 
Chief of State: President Emomali Rahmonov (Since 6 
November 1994) 
Head of Government: Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov (Since 20 
January 1999) 
Date of Independence: 1991 
Languages: Tajik (official), Russian 
Ethnic groups: Tajik (59%), Uzbek (23%), Russian (13%) 
Religion: Sunni Muslim 85%, Shi'a Muslim 5% & Others 10% 
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4.4.1 HISTORY; 
Conquered by Persia, and Alexander the Great; invaded by Arabs 
in 8^ '^  -c; Turkish invasion, lO' -c; until mid 18' -c part of the emirate 
of Bukhara, which in effect became a protectorate of Russia, 1868; 
following the Russian Revolution (1917), became part of Turkestan 
Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, 1918; scene of the Basmachi 
revolt 1922-3; Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic created as 
part of the Uzbek SSR, 1924; became a Soviet socialist Republic, 1929; 
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, 1991; joined 
Commonwealth of independent states, 1991; Republican communist 
party remained in power until civil war, 1992; governed by a president. 
Prime Minister, and Supreme Assembly. 
4.4.2 Head of state: 
1992 - Imamoli Rakhmanov 
4.4.3 Head of government: 
1996 - 9 Yahya Azimov 
1999-OqilOquilov^^ 
4.4.4 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF TAJIKISTAN; 
The extended internal armed conflict precluded the development 
of the Tajikistan political system, which is currently both weak and 
prone to violence. The country is headed by the president, Emomali 
Rahmonov, who will be serving his second term until 1427/2006. In 
1420/1999 the president's term of was extended through referendum 
from 5 years to 7 years. 
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The Tajikistan Parliament comprises two chambers-a63-seat 
lower house, the council of Representatives, and a34-seat upper house, 
the National council. This parliament, elected in 1421/March 2000, 
replaced the Former unicameral Supreme Assembly. The MPs (Member 
of Parliament) are elected for 5 year term. 
Tajikistan has experienced a devastating five years civil war that 
ended in 1418/1997 with the conclusion of an agreement between the 
Tajik Government and major opposition group, the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO). As a result of the agreement the opposition is now 
integrated in the political process, following constitutional amendment 
on the legalization of political parties based on religion. Nevertheless, 
the political situation is complicated by the exclusion of "Third force" 
opposition powers, which include representatives of the northern region 
of Leninabad, the most developed and productive region in the country 
the government's ban on independent political organizations in 
Leninabad could weaken the stability of the country and marginalize a 
reign- with a large ethnic Uzbek population - already susceptible to 
calls for secession'*'^ . 
4.4.5 STATE POWER IN TAJIKISTAN: 
According to the Constitution of Tajikistan, adopted in 
1415/1994, state power is based on the principle of Separation of power 
to legislative, executive and judicial ones. These functions are reformed 
by the majlisi oli (Parliament), Government and Court, respectively. 
However, the constitution separates functions among branches of 
power inaccurately. There are some cases of duplication of functions of 
one branch of power by another one. For example, according to the 
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constitution, the constitutional court is authorized to supervise the 
coordination of the country. At the same time, the president of the 
country is authorized "to abohsh or suspend the resolutions of the 
organs of state government in the case of their contradictions to the laws 
and the constitution of the country". 
The parliament also has the right to interpret the constitution and 
laws. 
According to the Constitution, the president has the right to 
introduce to the parliament the candidatures of Chairmen, their deputies 
and judges of the constitutional. Supreme and supreme economic courts 
for both election and recall the judges of the martial courts as well as 
judges of regional, city and district courts are appointed and dismissed 
by the president of the country on presentation of the Minister of justice. 
Such procedures make the judicial power to be dependent on the 
president of the executive power . 
The state power unofficially, is formed on a regional basis. For 
example, now all key positions are divided between the representatives 
of Kulyab, Leninabad and Gissar regions, who came to power in 
1413/1992 after the victory over the Islamo-democratic coalition. 
Previously the Islamo-democratic coalition, in its turn, represented the 
coalition of Qarategin and Badakhshan Tajks''^ 
4.4.6 A SERIES OF CHANGES TO THE ELECTION CODE BY 
THE TAJIK PARLIAMENT: 
The Taj parliament has approved a series of changes to the 
Election code that should improve the election process. The 
amendments, among other things, call for independent members to be 
appointed to local election commissions and outlaw the presence of 
armed men at polling stations. 
On the negative side, the amendments for the first time impose a 
registration fee on candidates, but a compromise allowed for this fee to 
be lowered to $500 per candidate from an original proposal of $3000. 
Still, some say parties may not be able to afford registering many 
candidates'* .^ 
A spokesman for the Islamic Renaissance party of Tajikistan, 
Nasriddin Saidov, said his party generally welcomed the amendments, 
but added there were two issues the party wished had been included. 
"Two amendments that would have had a huge influence on elections 
were not accepted", "he said. "We proposed a change to article 15 of 
this law, to include representatives of political parties at polling stations 
on voting day. They should be there because experience has shown that 
all violations occur in these places. Also, we proposed changes to 
Article 46, so that all parties should be provided with the tabulation of 
vote results right after counting. All the parties indicated the 
amendments give them a better chance to complete in a vote they hope 
will be more transparent than previous efforts . 
4.4.7 DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: 
We may declare that its political structures, political culture and 
subsystems autonomy have a limited character. According to the 
classification of the polifical system types. The political systems with 
limited political structures are called pre-mobilized modem political 
systems. They are called modem as they have attributes typical for 
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modern societies-a constitution, and political infrastructure, though in 
the limited size. Judging by the ruling regime, pre-mobilized 
authoritative and democratic political systems are differentiated. 
Unlimited power and lack of control of the state by citizens, use of 
force, monopolization of power and politics, prohibition of political 
opposition, non-interference or limited interference of non-political 
spheres is typical for authoritarian regimes. 
The characteristics of authoritative power have been described in 
detail because they are all present in the ruling regime of Tajikistan. In 
addition, the heads of executive power of cities and towns aer not 
elected but appointed and relieved by the president of the country. This 
also is a criterion of a authoritative ruling regime. 
According to the level of its development problems which face 
the country's political system, are typical for this type of the political 
system. Challenges which cause the development of a political system 
come from outside, and inside the society, or from the political elite of 
the society. 
A threat coming from a neighboring state forces a political system 
to strengthen its extractive function, and to mobilize resources to repulse 
a possible attack. The political system adopts its structures and creates 
new structures to fulfill this task. 
Development results when the exiting structure and culture of a 
political system is unable to cope with the problem or challenge which 
confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural 
secularization. Almond differentiates four types of challenge which may 
lead to the development of the political system: 
1) The integration of the society and control of the society-state 
building. 
2) The increase of national self-consciousness national building. 
3) The participation of the citizens in decision-making-process 
participation. 
4) The distribution of weals . 
The peculiarities of the historical and current development of the 
Tajik Society have developed in such a way that these four problems 
simultaneously face the country's political system . 
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L^hapter 3 
Iranian Political System in 
Modern Times 
CHAPTER V 
IRANIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN MODERN TIMES 
5.1 The political background of Iran 
5.2 Government 
5.3 The meaning of political leadership in Shi's system 
5.4 The rank of 'Ulama' in the political arena in Iran from the 
1298/1880sto 1400/1979 
5.5 A political biography of Ayatollah Khomeini 
(a) Imam Khameini and Wilayat I-Faqih 
(b) The Principle of Wilayat 1-Faqih 
5.6 Religious Intellectual Movement in Iran: 
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IRAN: 
Official Name: Islamic Republic of Iran (Theocratic Republic) 
Capital: Tehran 
Population: 68,278,826 (July 2003 est.) 
Independence; 1 April 1979 
Chief of State: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Hosseini - Khamenei 
(Since 4 June, 1989) 
Head of Government: President (Ali) Mohamad Khatami Ardakani 
(Since 3 August, 1997) 
Languages: Persian 58%, Turkic 26%, Kurdish 9%), Luri 2%, Balochi 
1%, Arabic 1% and others 2%. 
Religions: Shi'a Muslim 89%), Sunni Muslim 10%), Zoroastrian, Jewish, 
Christian and Baha'i l%o'. 
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5.1 THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF IRAN: 
Iran, called Persia until 1354/1935, was formerly a monarchy, 
ruled by a Shah (King/Emperor). In 1346/1927 Reza Khan, a Cossak 
Officer, Seized Power in a military coup, and was subsequently elected 
Shah,adopting the title Reza Shah Pahlavi. In 1360/1941 British and 
Soviet forces occupied Iran, and the Shah (who favoured Nazi 
Germany) was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, Muhammad Reza 
Pahlavi. British and USA forces left Iran in 1365/1945, but soviet forces 
remained in the north-west of the Country (Azerbaijan province) until 
1366/1946. The United Kingdom retained considerable influence 
through the Anglo-Iranian oil Company, which controlled much of 
Iran's extensive petroleum reserves. In 1371/ March 1951, however the 
Majlis (National consultative Assembly) approved the nationalization of 
the Petroleum industry, despite British and other Western opposition. 
The leading advocate of nationalization. Dr. Muhammad Mussadeq, 
who became Prime Miniser in 1371 /May 1951, was deposed in 
1373/1953 in a military Coup d'etat, engineered by the USA and British 
intelligence services. 
The Shah gradually increased his personal control of government 
following the coup, assuming dictatorial powers in 1383/1963 with the 
so-called 'white revolution'. By the end of 1408/1987 anti-government 
protests were widespread, involving both left wing and liberal opponents 
of the Shah, as well as Islamist activists. The most effective opposition 
came from supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. The growing unrest 
forced the Shah to leave Iran in 1400/January 1979 . Imam Khomemi 
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arrived in Tehran and effectively took power 10 days later and on 
1400/1 April, 1979 Iran was declared on Islamic Republic . 
The first president of Iran, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was elected in 
1401/1980 and then his Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Rajaei became 
President and Muhammad Javad Bahonar became his Prime Minister 
and both of them were assassinated by a group of Mujahdin-e-Khalq. 
For most of the 1401/1980s Iran's domestic and Foreign policy 
was dominated by the war with Iraq. In September 1980, Iraqi forces 
invaded Iran along a 500-Km front, apparently anticipating a rapid 
military victory. The Iranian military offered strong resistance, and 
began a counter-offensive in early 1403/1982; by June Iraq had been 
forced to withdraw from Iranian territory, and Iranian troops 
subsequently entered Iraq. At last after 8 years conflict between two 
Islamic countries come to an end and on 1409/ 18 July 1988 Iran 
unexpectedly announced its unconditional acceptance of UN Security 
Council Resolution no. 598, adopted one year earlier. In those times 
AyatoUah Sayed Ali Khamenei was president and Mir Husein Mousavi 
was Prime Minister and after Imam Khomeini's death on 1410/3 June 
1989, in an emergency session on 4* June the council of Experts elected 
president Khamenei to succeed Imam Khomeini as Iran's spiritual 
leader (Wall Faqih), and Hashemi Rafsanjani became president for two 
period (8 years). In 1418/ March 1997 Rafsanjani was appointed 
Chairman of the Council to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic 
order (which arbitrates in disputes between the Majlis and the Council 
of Guardians). Sayed Mohammad Khatami (a presidential adviser and 
former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance) was elected as the 
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President as he was a strong contender, just prior to the election, dated 
1418/1997. 
Taking office in August 1997, President Khatami emphasized his 
commitment to fostering sustained and balanced growth in the political, 
economic, cultural and educational spheres, as well as freedom of and 
respect for. The individual and rights of the nation, in the context of the 
rule of law. Khatami has been reelected for second term of presidentship 
till 1426/2005. 
5.2 GOVERNMENT: 
Legislative power is vested in the Islamic consultative Assembly 
(Majlis), with 290 members, the Chief executive of the administration is 
the President. The Majlis and the president are both elected by universal 
adult suffrage for a term of four years. A 12- membercouncil of 
Guardians Supervises elections and ensures that legislation is in 
accordance with the constitution and with Islamic Precepts. The council 
to Determine the Expediency of the Islamic order, created in 
1409/February 1988 and fonnally incorporated into the Constitution in 
1410/July 1989, rules on legal and theological disputes, between the 
Majlis and council of Guardians. The executive, legislative and judicial 
wings of state power are subjected to the authority of the Wall Faqih 
(Supreme religious leader). 
Iran is divided into 28 provinces, each with an appointed 
Governor. population (official estimate at mid-year) 2003 was 
66,479.838 and population of province capital, Tehran 11,912,221, 
estimated^. 
5.3 THE MEANING OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SHIA 
SYSTEM: 
There is a very deliberate endeavor to rejuvenate shi'ism in 
politics. In this regard they underscore the importance of 'Maria;yyat' 
(source of emulation) and Wilayat (deputyship). There are two essays on 
the issue of the legitimacy of clerical involvement in politics that are 
particularly noteworthy. Morteza Motashari makes a polemical critique 
of the Akhbari School, using a very reformist and non-traditionalist 
language. He contends that Akhbarism was a movement against reason 
and that a very peculiar fanaticism and dogmatism dominated this 
school of thought. He even goes so far as to draw a parallel between the 
rise of Akhbaris in Iran and the sensationalist philosophy of the west. 
Motahhari here is setting the stage for a more unconventional 
interpretation of shi'ism and the concept of religious leadership . 
Tabataba'i's discussion of "Walayat va Zaamat" (Deputyship and 
leadership"), however, is a far more articulatd philosophical argument 
on the nature of Political theory and the rule of clerical leadership in 
Shi'ism. In this regard, Tabataba'i was the most prominent 
contemporary shi'i cleric to introduced the concept of Islamic 
government and the leadership of the faqih (jurisconsult)''. Therefore, in 
contrast to the view that he was opposed to the concept of the Wilayat-i-
Faqih and the Islamic state is not correct, in fact, he is one of the earlier 
proponents of clerical rule. Tabataba'i's discussion on "Walayat va 
Za'amaf is based on his belief in the natural and intrinsic need of every 
human being for guidance and supervision. 
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Each society, in order to endure, relies on a person or an official 
whose intelligence and will-power is superior to those who are ruled and 
who can control the will and mind of others and will safeguard and 
preserve the system that exists in the society... in a manner that a 
guardian is responsible for an orphan and the head of the family is 
responsible for the minor children of that family and the ministry of 
endowment administers the public endowment and the king or the 
president is presumed to rule among the people ... this position 
according to which a person is appointed to take care of the affairs of 
o 
others, as a real person administers his life, we call Wilayat . 
The intervention of the Shi'i cleri's in politics is rationalized on 
the basis of the belief that Islamic teaching is a comprehensive system of 
beliefs covering all aspects of life, promoting the spiritual and material 
well-being of the individual and society. Hence, there can not be a 
separation of religion from other aspects of life in Islam^. 
5.4 THE RANK OF 'ULAMA' IN THE POLITICAL ARENA IN 
IRAN FROM THE 1298/1880S TO 1400/1979: 
The 'ulama' played a prominent part in the political arena in Iran 
from the 1880s, with renewed concern over their status and power in 
relation to the mounting intrusion into the Iranian economy and politics 
of the European powers and their banks and merchants. The first major 
episode in which the ulama realized their power was that of the Tobacco 
Regie in 1299/1881. The agitation which followed culminated in a 
'fatwa' from the most senior 'mujtahid', Mirza Hassan Shirazi, resident 
in Najaf (Iraq), forbidding the consumption of tobacco on pain of eternal 
damnation. The successful boycott which followed ensured the 
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cancellation of the monopoly. Worries over the corrosion of the ulama's 
influence and control over law and education by the incursion of modem 
forms associated with the European penetration may also have been a 
background factor at that point. Few in these constituencies understood 
what the constitution was about, except as a limitation on royal power 
and the transfer of powers to some kind of assembly in which, they 
assumed correctly, they would have representation. This instrumental 
attitude did not, however, apply to all the ulama: some understood the 
issues and were moved to find religious justifications and arguments to 
theorize and sustain the constitution. Prominent among those was Mirza 
Mohammad Husayn Na'ini, who wrote a book, Tanbih al-umma wa 
Tanzih al-Milla, published in 1327/1909. Theorizing the constitution. In 
the absence of Imam-ul-zaman, the Hidden hnam, he argued, it was 
incumbent on the community and its leaders to devise the means of just 
government. Government in accordance with law and by the 
representatives of the peoples was far superior, and more favourable to 
the rule of Islamic law than arbitrary tyranny. The main opponent of the 
constitution among the Ulama was Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri who argued 
that there is no room for legislation or legislatures in Islam, for whom 
divine law is the only law, with the ulama as its privileged guardians 
and interpreters. Although initially sympathetic to the Majlis and to 
legal limits on the powers of the monarch, he soon turned against the 
constitution and eventually became its principal clerical opponent and 
supporter of the shah's attempt to restore absolutism, Nouri expressed 
strong doubts about the liberties and equalities specified in the 
constitution, such as freedom of expression which would include anti-
religious expressions, compulsory education for girls and equality of 
non-Muslims with Muslims, all judged to be contrary to the Shari'a'". 
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In 1347/1928 the Queen of Reza Shah, on a visit to the Shrine in 
Qom, unveiled her face during the proceedings, to general 
consternation. Ayatollah Bafqi, present at the shrine, sent a message to 
the Queen: 'If you are not Muslim why did you come to the Shrine? If 
you are then why are you not veiled? When his message was ignored, 
Bafqi delivered a sernion denouncing the shah and inciting the crowd. In 
response, Reza shah personally went to Qom, entered the Shrine in his 
1 O 
boots, horse whipped Bafqi and had him arrested . 
Then Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in 1360/1941, when 
British and Russian forces occupied Iran and put an end to Reza's 
attempted neutrality. He was succeeded by his young son, Mohammad 
Reza. 
Any resistance or opposition from the clerics was forcibly 
repressed, with arrests and exile for recalcitrant clerks and the majority 
of the religious classes retired to passivity, watching developments with 
mounting alarm, but helpless to resist. In the end, it was AyotoUah 
Borujerdi who emerged in 1365/1946 after Reza Shah's abdication as 
undisputed Chief Marja of Shi'i world,, who worked out a Modus 
Vivendi with the state, based on the clergy keeping out of politics and 
opposition, but being assigned their niche in the religious institutions 
and general respect and dignity. In effect, the clergy under Ayatollah 
Borujerdi accepted the modem and secularized state and its culture, and 
the confinement of the religious sphere. Some, however, and certainly 
the then junior [Imam] Khomeini, were seething with resentment against 
secularization and the subordination of religion and the clergy, but 
biding their time and keeping within the confines of the Ayatollah 
Borujerdi regime'^ 
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The shrine cities in Iran and their 'madrasa' and religious culture 
continued to provide centers of autonomy for the 'ulama' and a means 
of perpetuating their institutions and discourses. The 'ulama' also found 
ready allies in the bazars (Markets), continued to pose challenges to the 
Pahlvis throughout their reign, despite repeated efforts to control and 
Subordinate them. They were to be the major forces in the Revolution 
that ended that reign in 1400/ 1979'^ 
5.5 A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI: 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was bom on 20 Jumada 
al- Thaniyah 1320/24 September 1902 in Khomein near Qom. He 
obtained religious education at Khamein. In early 1340/1921 he went to 
Arak for higher studies, and the following year the latter was invited to 
Qom to take charge of Madrasa-e-Fayziya. He completed his education 
by 1346/1927 and starded teaching in the same madrasa. 
Imam Khameini's life can broadly be divided into two distinct 
phases: 
(I) The first face starts with his stay at Qom upto the early 
1380/1960S, 
(II) the second dates from early 1960s until his death in 
1410/1989. 
In the first phase of his life he looks like a scholarly person whereas 
in the second phase he emerged as a political leader. His stay at Qom 
coincided with the rise of Reza Shah to the power which was not liked 
by the clergy. Reza Shah was viewed by the clergy as an enemy who 
wanted to curb the power and prestige of the clergy. Imam Khomeini's 
family belonged to that section of the clergy who did not like the 
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modernization of policies by Reza Shah. The anti-clergy measures of 
Reza Shah further increased grievances of the clergical class. However, 
Imam Khomeini followed politically a quietist line and associated 
himself with Shaykh Abdol Karim Ha'eri-Yazdi who disapproved 
ulama's active participation in political affairs and emphasized the need 
of clerical involvement in educational and religious reforms. It is said 
that Imam Khomeini campaigned for the candidacy of Ayatollah 
Borujerdi for the post of 'marja'e taqlid'. Around this period, Imam 
Khomeini wrote Kashf al-Asrar which first appeared in 1360/1941. This 
book gives a clear picture of his thought of his period. In this book he 
attacked both the monarch and the modernist in strong terms. 
Imam Khomeini was arrested on 1383/5 June 1963'^ This led to 
the most violent confrontation between the regime and the people. This 
is regarded as the turning point and the foundations tone of the 
revolution of 1400/1979. He was again arrested in 1384/1964 and exiled 
in Turkey and after one year came to Najaf (Iraq) where he stayed upto 
1399/1978. He continued his opposition to the Mohammad Reza Shah 
Pahlavi from Najaf. During this period he came to be known as a 
leading marja-e taqlid. His most important work published under the 
title of Hokumat-e-Islami or Wilayat-i-Faqih. Then the Iraqi regime 
forced him to leave the country, so he went to Paris in 1399/October 
1978 where he stayed till his triumphant return to Ian on 1 February 
1979 to establish the first "Government of god on Earth". 
(a) IMAM KHOMEINI AND WILAYATI-FAQIH: 
The concept of Wilayat i-faqhih (guardianship of jurisconsult) as 
conceived by Imam Khomeini constitutes an important aspect of 
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contemporary shi'i religio-political thought. It served as a major 
ideological justification for the legitimacy of the attempt of clergy to 
overthrow the Pahlavi regime and capture power and thus establish a 
theoretic state. In his theory of Wilayat i-faqih Imam Khomeini 
discusses the sources of the fuqaha's authority, their right and duties and 
their status and role in the society. The basic points of Imam Khomeini's 
inteipretation in this regard is as follows: The 'fagaha' of Islam are the 
rightful successors of the Hidden Imam; they are designated as the 
deputies and successors of the prophet and Imams; they are the proofs 
(hujja) of Islam: Therefore they are responsible for those acts and duties 
for which the Prophet and Imams were sent. As the Prophet and Imams 
were appointed by God's will and to execute it on earth, the fuqaha are 
also entrusted with the same two-fold task. The fuqaha' inherit 
everything from the Imams except, of course, the supernatural qualities. 
The government of a faqih-e-'adel ("just faqih") is the only legitimate 
government on earth and the ulama should strive to establish such a 
government by overthrowing all other tyrant and unjust governments. 
The doctrine of Wilayat i-faqih is only plausible and thinkable in 
the nation-state when the community of believers can be conceptualized 
as the 'nation'. The concept of the nation is tied to the concept of 
citizenship which, unlike the passive 'subject' of dynastic Kingdom, is 
active in deciding and shaping the destiny of the nation, through 
political action of reform and even revolution. Imam Khomeini believed 
that 'The People' were the natural allies of the clergy in the defence of 
Islam and the establishment of the law. If only they could be awakened 
by the clergy and their agents and alerted to the dangers posed to Islam 
by imperialists and tyrants, they would rise to its defence. Islamic 
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'revolution' would inaugurate an Islamic 'republic', all these concepts 
are clearly borrowed from modem political vocabularies'^. 
(b) THE PRINCIPLE OF WILAYAT I-FAQIH: 
The principle of Wilayat i-faqih and its application in government 
has important implications for the relationship of the 'ulama' to 
government. It gives almost absolute power to the ruling 'faqih' and 
clerical associates. Indeed, in the case of Islamic Republic, clerics have 
assumed power positions in all the institutions of the state and the 
society. What are the implications, however, for the autonomy of the 
Senior 'Mujtabid' or marja's? We have seen that in the traditional 
system, each 'mujtahid' enjoyed undisputed authority over his followers 
who were free to choose which 'marja' to follow the assumption of one 
senior cleric of state power, including that of legislation and ultimate 
ruling on any issue, puts the autonomy of what should be his peers in 
question. This was clearly perceived by the 'ulama', and many of them 
rejected the principle of Wilayat i-faqih, some, such as AyatoUah 
shari'atmadari, openly in the political arena, others quietly in their 
writing and teaching. Ayatollah Golpaygani (d. 1414/1993) apparently 
wrote to Imam Khomeini to say that what had happened between him 
and Shari'atmadari was up to God and history to Judge, but that, that 
was no way to treat a renewable cleric and was a threat to the sanctity of 
religion. This is clearly the view of many senior clerics in Iran, Iraq and 
Lebanon, most of whom keep their traditional authority over their 
followers, collect the religious dues from them, and run their own 
schools and institutions, but mostly keep quiet about the polities of the 
Islamic Republic . 
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5.6 RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN IRAN; 
The newly emerging trend of religious intellectualism led by 
Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari and Abdolkarim Soroush, the pen-
name for Hossein Dabbagh. 
Between 1988-1990, Soroush published a series of articles on his 
Theory of "Contraction and expansion of Religious Knowledge" (Qabd 
va Bast-e-Te'urik-e Shari'at). 
Arguing in this theory that any understanding of religious is 
human and thus time-bound, Soroush's theory successfully launched the 
thesis that no understanding of religion is ever sacred, absolute or final. 
Shabestari also has like this opinion. It laid the foundation of an 
epistemological pluralism that is the basis of any democratic pluralism. 
This theory and many related ideas written about and elaborated upon, 
became the turning point in the current religious discourse and 
nourished the mind and the language of the generation that was to bring 
about the political reform movement in the late 1990s. Religious 
intellectualism offers a non-ideological understanding of Islam that 
when translated into political discourse will only supported democracy 
and political pluralism. 
The ideological discourse has a maximalist understanding of 
religion. It insists that the Shariah offers the comprehensive plan for 
felicity both in this life and the other including providing economic and 
political plans. The new discourse, however, has a minimalist 
understanding of religious laws pertaining to social life and questions 
the efficacy of the Shariah for governing the society. The new religious 
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discourse emphasizes the role of reason and rationality versus 
revolutionary emotionalism and blind imitation. 
In the politically and ideologically charged atmosphere of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, no one could put forward these during 
questions in a better and more effective manner than Soroush and 
Shabestari did. 
The boost the religious reform movement received after 
Khatami's election was much expected. Khatami himself is among very 
few contemporary clerics who have shown an active interest in 
reconstructing religious though, and have contributed to the new 
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religious intellectual movement . 
Soroush argues that while Islam is based upon unchangeable 
principles, our interpretations of those principles can and must change 
from time to time. Therefore, no one can claim a monopoly over the 
"true" Islam. Thus, he has explicitly challenged the claim by the 'ulama' 
that they are in fact the guardians of the faith. Soroush advocates 
opening up the political process, maintaining that a true religious state is 
based on democracy. He insists that Islam can not and should not 
become an ideology serving the interest of a governing elite. Again, his 
proposition implicitly rejects the very notion of the Wilayat i-faqih, 
which is the foundation of the political system in Iran'^. Mohammad 
Mojtahid Shabestari as a reformist is a cleric with a theological training 
background from the seminaries who gradually separated himself from 
the traditionalists and joined the religious modernists camp in the second 
half of the 1990s. Engaging in rational theological debates. He also 
published articles in "Kiyan" and "Aftab" on topics such as reason and 
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revelation. His hermeneutical ideas also supported the possibility of 
multiple understandings of Islam. Advocating rationalization of the 
political order as a necessary step towards modernity, he questioned the 
jurisprudential reading of Islam and making it the base of government. 
Although Shabestari has more or less followed the same line of 
arguments as Soroush and has become a popular figure of the religious 
intellectual movement the hard liners have not harassed him . 
He has criticize "Wilayat-e-Faqih" theory really considerable. He 
believes that Faqih's can govern people like others due to the needs of 
society. But it is not appropriate for them to think that they can do 
whatever they believe or like and consider themselves Godlike. His 
opinion is based on the fact that it is people rights to make decisions. He 
believes that "Wilayat-e-Faqih" theory is debatable religious judgment 
(Fatva) that is formed its political validity with people's opinions. While 
the advocates of Wilayat-e-Faqih consider it as a religious theory which 
is not interpretative. They consider political Fiqh as a legislative and 
management beliefs without considering its in completeness in this age. 
They try to interpret Islamic constitutions on the base of Fiqh. They 
have set aside people's political, social rights. They have also abandoned 
9 1 
the votes of the people . 
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PAKISTAN; 
Official Name: Federal Republic 
Capital: Islamabad 
Population: 150,694,740 (July 2003 est.) 
Independence: 14 August 1947 (from UK) 
Chief of State: President Pervez Musharraf (since 20 June 2001) 
Head of Government: Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz (since 2004) 
Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindi 12%, Siraik 10%, Pashto 8%, Urdu 
(official (8%), Baluchi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1% Burushaki and 
others 8% 
Religions: Sunni Muslim (77%), Shi'a Muslim 20%, Christian, Hindu 
and others 3%. 
IndiaYearbook2005, p. 383 
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6.1 PAKISTAN; 
This Muslim Country has 149,030,000 population according to 
official estimates at mid-year of 1424/2003". Its president is the head of 
state and acts on the advice of the Prime Minister in Council of 
Ministers. He is elected by an electoral college, comprising the two 
chambers of the Federal Legislature and the four Provincial Assemblies, 
to serve for a term of five years. He must be a Muslim. The president 
may be impeached for violating the constitution or gross misconduct . 
The Federal Legislature consists of the president, a lower and an upper 
house. The lower house, called the National Assembly, has 207 
members elected directly for a term of five years, on the basis of 
universal suffrage (for adults over the age of 21 years), plus 10 members 
representing minorities. The upper house, called the Senate, has 87 
members who serve for six years, with one-third retiring every two 
years. Each provincial assembly is to elect 19 Senators. The tribal areas 
are to return eight members and the remaining three are to be elected 
from the Federal Capital Territory by members of the Provincial 
Assemblies. 
Two sessions of the National Assembly and the Senate are 
prescribed for each year with not more than 120 days between the last 
sitting of a session and first sitting of the next session. 
The role of the Senate in an overwhelming majority of the 
subjects shall be merely advisory. Disagreeing with any legislation of 
the National Assembly, it shall have the right to send it back only once 
for reconsideration. In case of disagreement in other subjects, the Senate 
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and National Assembly shall sit in a joint session to decide the matter 
by a simple majority . Pakistan comprises the four provinces of Sindh, 
Baluchistan, Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, plus the 
federal capital and Federally Administered Tribal Areas'*. Right now 
(February 2005) the Head of state is General Pervez Musharraf who was 
sworn in 20 June 2001 and his Prime Minister is Mr. Shaukat Aziz 
(since 2004). 
6.1.1 POLITICAL BACKGROUND: 
The oldest history of Pakistan is traced back to Indus Valley 
civilization which existed 4000 years ago, while Muslim rule began 
with the arrival of Mohammad Qasim Thaqafi in the year 712AD, 
followed by Umayyad and Abbasid Rule which gave in to the petty 
dynasties and ultimately Delhi Sultanate (1206 - 1526 AD). It come 
under the Mughal Empire and remained a part of it till the end. Then the 
British ruled over most areas from 1256/1840s; it was separated from 
India to form a state for the Muslim majority in, 1367/1947; consisted of 
west Pakistan (Baluchistan, North-West frontier, west Punjab, Sindh) 
and East Pakistan (East Bengal), physically separated by 1610 Kms and 
it occupied Jammu and Kashmir, 1369/1949 and proclaimed an Islamic 
republic in 1376/1956; the differences arose between the East and the 
West, and Pakistan was engulfed into a civil war in 1391/1971; East 
Pakistan became an independent state (Bangladesh); the West Pakistan 
was ruled by - Z.A. Bhutto who dethroned by military coup by General 
Zia ul- Haq in 1398/1977, with execution of former Prime Minister 
Bhutto in 1400/1979; New Constitution (1378/1985) strengthened Zia's 
powers; Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime Minister in 1409/1988 but 
deposed in 1410/1990; Ethnic (Muslim/Sindh) violence, especially in 
Karachi took place in 1414/1994 and still going on once again a military 
coup occurred in 1999 and the coup leader, General Pervez Musharraf, 
was declared president in 1422/2001; Sensitive border area with 
Afghanistan, following the US-led anti-Taliban compaign, 2001, 
focusing on Afgan refugees. Pakistan pro-Taliban fighters, and Taliban 
escapees; ongoing tension with India over Kashmir, with some fighting, 
2001, escalating into a major crisis, mid 1423/2002; governed by an 
elected president and a bicameral Federal Parliament^ 
6.1.2 MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH, (QUAID-I-AZAM), FATHER 
OF PAKISTAN: 
The British ruled over the Indian subcontinent for nearly 200 
years from 1170/1756 to 1367/1947. After the Indian Mutiny of 
1247/1857, the British government abolished the powers of British East 
India Company, which had ruled the subcontinent on behalf of the 
British Crown, and took on direct powers of governance. Political 
reforms were initiated, allowing the formation of political parties. The 
Indian National Congress, representing the overwhelming majority of 
the people, was created in 1303/1885. The Muslim League was formed 
in 1324/1906 to represent and protect the position of the Muslim 
Minority in India when the British introduced constitutional reforms in 
1327/1909, the Muslims demanded and required separate electoral rolls. 
This granted Muslims representation in the provincial as well as national 
legislatures until the down of independence in 1367/1947. 
The idea of a separate Muslim state in South Asia was put 
forward in 1349/1930 by the poet and philosopher Sir Mohammad Iqbal. 
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He suggested that the North-Western provinces of British India and the 
native state of Jammu and Kashmir should be joined into such a state. 
The name "Pakistan, coined by the Rahmat AU a great leader of Muslim 
League which came to be used to describe this grouping, is thought to 
have originated as a compound abbreviation made up of letters of the 
names of the provinces involved, as fallows: Punjab, Afghania (North 
West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Indus-Sindh, and Baluchistan. An 
alternative explanation says the name means "Land of the pure". By the 
end of the 1349/1930s, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Leader of the Muslim 
League and considered the founding father of Pakistan had also decided 
that the only way to preserve Indian Muslims from Hindu domination 
was to establish a separate Muslim state.In 1359/1940 the Muslim 
League formally endorsed the partitioning of British India and the 
creation of Pakistan as a separate Muslim state. The British decided on 
1367/August 15, 1947, transferred power dividedly to India and 
Pakistan*". 
6.1.3 PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR: 
This power has given higher degree of Militarian powerful to 
Pakistan and it has became as a more powerful Muslim country. With 
Bhutto in office, relations between India and Pakistan became more 
tense. Bhutto openly supported the Muslim rebels in Indian-held Jammu 
and Kashmir, who were involved in sporadic fighting against the Indian 
army. He also announced that Pakistan would continue with its nuclear 
weapons development programme, raising concerns that a nuclear arms 
race could start between Pakistan and India, which is believed to have 
had nuclear weapons since the 1390/1970s. In 1417/1996 the united 
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state of America returned to a policy of delaying delivery of military 
equipment to Pakistan owing to China having supplied nuclear-
weapons-related materials in 1416/1995. In 1419/April 1998 Pakistan 
openly tested a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1500 Km (930 
mi). Following five underground nuclear tests by India in 1419/May 
1998, Pakistan responded within days with six nuclear tests. The events 
further heightened tensions between the two countries . 
6.1.4 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LEADERS OF PAKISTAN: 
General Pervez Musharraf dissolved the Parliament following the 
military take over of 1420/ 12 October 1999, however, political parties 
have been allowed to operate; list of main political parties of Pakistan is 
given below: 
1. Awami National Party (ANP) [Wall Khan] 
2. Balochistan National Movement (BNM) [Dr. Hayee Baluch] 
3. Baluch National Party (BNP) [Sardar Akhtar Mengal] 
4. Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) [Akbar Khan] 
5. Jamiat-al-Hadith (JAH) [Sajid Mir] 
6. Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, Fazlur Rehman Faction (JUI) 
7. Jamaiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) [Niazi Faction] 
8. Millat party [Farooq Leghari] 
9. Milli Yakjheti Council (MYC) is an organization which 
includes Jamaat-i-Islam or (JI) [Qazi Hussain Ahmed] 
10. Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) [Sami ul-Haq] 
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11. Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakiatan (TJP), [Allama Sajid Naqvi] 
12. Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakiatan (JUP) [Noorani Faction] 
13. Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), [Altaf Faction] 
14. National People's Party (NPP) [Ghulam Mustapha] 
15. Pakhtun Khwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) [Mohammad 
Khan Achakzal]. 
16. Pakistan Quami Party (PQP) [Mohammad Afzal Khan] 
17. Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) [Tahir ul Qadri] 
18. Pakistan Muslim Leage' Junejo, Function group (PML/J) 
[Hamid Nasir] 
19. Pakistan Muslim League (PML/N) [Nawaz Sharif Faction] 
20. Pakistan National Party (PNP), [Hasil Bizenjo] 
21. Pakistan people's Party (PPP) [Benazir Bhutto], The PPP's 
contribution to politicization of the country's politics will 
always be regarded as a notable achievement-Particularly in 
o 
the Punjab . 
22. Pakistan People's Party/ Shaheed Bhutto (PPP/SB) [Ghinva 
Bhutto] 
23. Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf(PTl) [Imran Khan] 
Political alliances in Pakistan can shift frequently. 
However, the political parties in Pakistan may profess to believe 
in democratic politics or in democracy as form of government, their 
leadership has offered no proof of the truth of their claim . 
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6.1.5 ISLAMIC POWER GROUPS IN PAKISTAN; 
General Musharraf has had to withdraw his proposed amendments 
to the blasphemy law and modify the provisional constitutional order of 
1420/1999, deleting Islamic provisions, due to sever opposition from 
such groups. His instructions to Madrassas to file detailed information 
about themselves are being observed in the breach and are as good as 
not being there. There is also an effort to control exhibition of weapons 
at meetings organized by extremist groups but it is also not making 
much headway. In the eyes of some such groups, Pakistan is not even an 
Islamic State since it does not conform to the government at Medina that 
existed under Prophet Muhammad and, therefore, it has no right to 
regulate activities dear to Islam such as Jihad (holy-war). The JL Chief, 
Qazi Hussain scaled new heights of opposition and bravado when he 
recently asked the corps commanders to overthrow Musharraf for 
having permitted Nawaz Sharif to go into exile "^ . 
There is pressure from western countries including USA, Russia 
and China upon Pakistan to control the Jehadi outfits in the country, as 
operatives trained at these institutions have been active against the 
interests of those countries. Evidence is yet to be available that the 
Pakistani establishment feels confident about responding to these 
approaches effectively. However, many Islamic groups are against the 
increasing pressures of foreign countries, especially USA. 
Without the agreement of Islamic groups in Pakistan it will be 
difficult for any government there to work for an accommodation with 
India. The call for bilateral talks for the purpose under Tashkent and 
Simla agreements had failed to yield any results when the Islamic lobby 
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was not as powerful as today. In today's environment shall be even 
more difficult". 
6.1.6 FUTURE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN; 
A Lahore newspaper published a brief report from Washington in 
January 2001 saying that a United State of America commission on 
National Security had made certain predictions about South Asia for the 
next quarter century, which saw Pakistan split as a result of war in 
Afghanistan. The commission saw India fighting a war with Afghanistan 
over the Taliban Policies, over Afghanistan's Shia-Hazara population, 
drugs, the Wahabi interpretation of Islam, and over 'sheer geo-strategic 
rivahy'. This Indo Afghan War is supposed to include Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, each seeking to absorb the Uzbek and Tajik minorities of 
Afghanistan. 
According to the Commission, the collapse of nuclear Pakistan 
will start a competition between Iran and India over the territories of 
Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan. There is a possibility of a 'major' Indo-
Pakistan war after a military 'miscalculation'. But India is seen as the 
new world power by the end of 25 years by reason of economic 
recovery and growth. Pakhtun is seen as dwindling economically till its 
various nationalities, the Pakistan, the Baluch, and the Muhajirs, being 
to seek their own separate states. Then the commission delivers the 
caveat that the conflicts predicted by it may not happen at all. 
Iran's economic and human indicators are also projected into the 
future. It is double the territorial size of Pakistan with only half as much 
population, which has been 'capped' effectively by official 'Islamic' 
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contraception. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons capability in the years to 
come it will emerge as a regional power friendly to the Western World 
after its Islamic intensity, already on the wane in 1421/2000 is replaced 
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by a reversion to its great 'civilization' ". 
The next 25 years may see a 'globalised' South Asia with 
'provinces' competing with one another economically in conditions of 
peace. The politics of Assam in India and Baluchistan in Pakistan are 
propelled by an awareness of resources, which can be 'sold' to the 
'federation'. As a reaction to these tendencies, both India and Pakistan 
are moving towards the view that provinces must be paid a fair price for 
resources used by the other provinces \ 
But developments dreaded by many may not come to pass. 
'Nuclear powers' who collapsed economically in the past (USSR, South 
Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, North Korea, etc.) all 
accepted 'reform' of behaviour instead of 'imploding' and unleashing 
proliferation on scared world. After economic collapse, most nations 
concentrated their energies on the national economy and many emerged 
as powerftil states 'without' nuclear weapons. The Japanese-German 
model of supremacy without arms seems to take hold in the beginning of 
2000. But internal wars is also a pattern to emerge in Asia and Africa at 
the same time. The world is on the threshold of change. It is to be seem 
what direction it takes . 
6.1.7 THE PUBLIC OPINION AND STATUS OF PRESS IN PAKISTAN: 
The Urdu press comprises almost 800 news papers, with 'Daily 
Jang', 'Daily Khabrain', 'Nawai-Waqt', 'Jasarat' and 'Mashriq' among 
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the most influential. The daily newspaer with the largest circulation is 
'Daily Jang'. Although the English-language press reaches only a small 
percentage of the population, it is influential in political academic and 
professional circles. The four main press groups in Pakistan are 'Jang 
Publications' (The daily Jang, The News, The Daily News and the 
Weekly Akhbar-e-Jehan) the Dawn or Herald Group, the Nawa-i-Waqt 
group and the National Press Trust (Mashriq). The establishment of an 
independent press council was under consideration in 1425/2004'^. 
In is important to note that despite military regimes the news 
papers of Pakistan have been largely free and outspoken. Of course 
sometimes they have to obey orders of the rulers, but they succeeded in 
forming or at least influencing the pubic opinion. The ruling classes also 
realized the power and prestige of big newspaper and tried to appear 
than of their leaders in various ways. A free press is, of course, a weaker 
of public opinion. 
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INDONESIA: 
Official Name: Republic 
Capital: Jakarta 
Population: 234,893,453 (July 2003 est.) 
Independence: 17 August 1945 
Chief of State: Presidetn Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Since October 
2004) 
Head of Government: The president in both the chief of State and head 
of government. 
Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (official), English, Dutch 
Religions: Muslim 88%, Protestan 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, 
Buddhist 1%, others 1%. 
* Yearbook 2005, p, 317 
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6.2 INDONESIA: 
6.2.1 INDONESIA; RECENT POLITICAL HISTORY; 
The Republic of Indonesia consists of group of about 18,108 
islands and its population according UN estimates at mid year of 
1423/2002, was 217,131,000'^ 
Indonesia was formerly the Netherlands East Indies. Dutch 
occupation began in the 17'^  century and gradually extended over the 
whole archipelago. Nationalist opposition to colonial rule began in the 
early 20'^  century. During the second World War the territory was 
occupied by Japanese forces (3 years). In 1365/1945 a group of 
nationalists proclaimed independence of Indonesia. The first president 
of the self-proclaimed republic was Dr. Sukarno (1901-1970), a leader 
of the nationalist movement since 1339/1920. The declaration of 
independence was not recognized by the Netherlands, which attempted 
to restore its per-war control of the Islands. After four years of 
intermittent warfare and negotiations between the Dutch authorities and 
the nationalists, agreement was reached on a formal transfer of power. 
On 27* December 1949 the United States of Indonesia became legally 
independent, with Sukarno continuing as president. Initially, the country 
had a federal Constitution, which gave limited self-government to the 16 
constituent regions. In 1370/August 1950, however, the federation was 
dissolved, and the country became a unitary Republic of Indonesia. The 
1369/1949 independence agreement excluded West New Guinea 
(Subsequently Irian Java and known as Papua from 1 January 2002), 
which remained under Dutch control until 1382/ October 1962*''. 
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6.2.2 POLITICAL VIEWS OF SUKARNO AND HIS 
SUCCESSOR SUHARTO: 
The State's first president, Sukarno (1949-70), who called himself 
'a convinced nationalist, a convinced Muslim, a staunch Marxist', 
urged, like Ataturk, that Islam should remain a private religion. Both 
Sukarno and his successor Suharto regarded Islam with considerable 
apprehension and caution, and tried to maintain Indonesia as a secular 
state in which the political activities of religious groups were strictly 
regulated. As a result the state managed to check Muslim political 
ambitions while rural Ulama, reformers, and modernists continued to 
present a variety of Islamic opinion and practice to Indonesia's 
Muslims'^ 
Sukarno followed a policy of extreme nationalism, and his regime 
became increasingly dictatorial. His foreign policy was sympathetic to 
the people's Republic of China but under his rule, Indonesia also played 
a leading role in the Non-aligned Movement' . 
In 1387/February 1967 Sukarno transferred full power to Suharto, 
and he became Prime Minister in October 1967 and in 1968 he became 
president and re-elected to the presidency in 1393/ March 1973. 
During 1405/1984 Suharto's attempt to introduce legislation 
requiring all political, social and religious organizations to adopt 
Tancasila', the five-points state Philosophy (belief in a Supreme 
humanitarianism; national unity; democracy by consensus and social 
justice) as their only ideology encountered opposition^°. 
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6.2.3 POLITICAL TRANSITION IN POST-SUHARTO PERIOD: 
The downfall of Suharto in 1419/ May 1998 was celeberated as 
heralding the birth of a 'new Indonesia', and a 'second independence' 
from the oppressive rule of their own ruler and its worst manifestation in 
the form of "Cronyism, corruption and collusion" (KKN). The change 
brought a rising expectation and a hope that it would usher in a new era 
of democracy in Indonesia, as well as good governance, transparency 
and accountability of its new leaders . 
Mark Malloch Brown, head of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) considers Indonesia's current problems as a 
'democratic birth-pains problem' when he says that one can not expect" 
... this government to solve all the problems. A first government elected 
under these circumstances has a double crisis. It lacks the legitimacy and 
the consensus within its own rank to take certain bold decisions, yet, on 
the other hand, because it is the first democratic government there is a 
huge crisis of expectations ... it is caught between those weak capacities 
and those huge aspirations for it . 
The government that took over in 1420/October 1999 under the 
leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri as 
president and Vice-president respectively, was a legitimate one, the 
result of a fair election and Parliamentary process and was committed to 
an inclusive style of policy-making, economic recovery and national 
unity.Under their leadership, Indonesia was becoming more liberal and 
humane in many ways as the harsh policies of the Suharto's 32 years of 
rule were overturned . 
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Until 1421/August 2000, Wahid;s government was based on 
compromises and included a hodge - podge (Indonesian gado-gado) of 
reformers, holdovers from Suharto's ruling Golkar, and representatives 
of the military. After sidelining the military and consolidating 
democracy, Wahid's government was under increasing pressure to speed 
up economic reforms or risk losing the fragile gains in stability it had 
achieved. Political parties that have been formed in the post-Suharto era 
have not been able to overcome the Shortcomings of the old party 
system characterized by narrow sectarian interest and lack of 
organizational capacity. They still rely for the societal support on their 
leaders rather than on collective action based on party-building, elite 
recruitment and constructive programme and action at the grassroots 
level. All three new major political parties - Partai Demokracy 
Indonesia (PDI) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat 
Nasional (PAN) are known not by their disciplined organizational party 
machinery which is able to mediate the interests of their supporters, but 
their charismatic leaders- Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien 
Rais, respectively. The process of 'reinvention' and democratization, 
therefore, was going to be long and difficult- until the time when the 
political parties of Indonesia will be able to transform themselves from 
'Partai takoh' (Parties of Prominent individuals) to parties with 
disciplined cadres and committed members based on organized 
collective behaviour' . 
In the broader picture of Indonesia politics, they might not have 
made a major imprint as yet because of the miniscule size of such 
groups. Seen from a longer perspective, however, the emergence of such 
citizens watch groups will go a long way not only in the creation of 
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healthy civil society, but also in laying the foundations for grass root 
democracy in Indonesia . 
6.2.4 STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: 
Indonesia has a considerable geo-strategic importance and a 
significant economic potential. Its stability and prosperity are in 
Germany and Europe's interest. With a population more than 210 
million people it is the fourth most populous country and after Suharto's 
downfall-also the third-largest democracy in the world after India and 
United state of America. As more than 80% of Indonesian are Muslims, 
that makes it the biggest Muslim country worldwide. Undoubtedly, 
Indonesia's democratization has made progress after Suharto's 
departure. There were free elections, Parliament has become more active 
then before, decentralization legislation was passed, and freedom of the 
press exists. However, Indonesia is still being considered to be in a 
lengthy period of high instability and prone to crisis. Conflicts are 
caused on ethnic. Social, religious, and political grounds. They are often 
instrumentalized by political interest and justified on a religious basis . 
6.2.5 THE PRESS AND ITS ROLE; 
In 1411/August 1990 the government announced that censorship 
of both the local and foreign press was to be relaxed and that the 
authorities would refi-ain from revoking the licences of newspapers that 
violated legislation governing the press. In practice, however, there was 
little change in the Government's policy towards the press. Following 
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the resignation of president Suharto in 1419/May 1998, the new 
Government undertook to allow freedom of expression . 
6.2.6 THE ROLE OF TELEVISION: 
In 1410/March 1989 Indonesia's first private commercial 
television station began broadcasting to the Jakarta area. In 1417/1996 
there were five privately-owned television stations in operation . 
6.2.7 PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS 
AND REFORM NEEDS: 
It became obvious through the Asian economic crisis that it is the 
political, legal and economic order, which, in the long term, decides on 
the prosperity of nations. 
After 32 years of authoritarian regime, however, Indonesia lacks 
almost entirely functioning, stable institutions. It is a potentially rich 
country, but without institutions that generate prosperity. Its natural 
wealth disappears through inefficiencies and other problems. Therefore, 
the country needs at the same time stabilization and the determined 
building up of a political system characterized by freedom, democracy 
and rule of law. Conflict prevention and internal peace, continuation of 
the democratization efforts especially on the local level (provinces, 
regions), legal reform, economic recovery within a social market 
economy based on competition which makes prosperity for all possible-
these are core elements of the reform needs, in Indonesia. For this 
reason the country needs a competent, democratically minded political 
leadership. 
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The development of a workable political system is an 
institutional, collective and individual learning process that needs time. 
Additionally, an ethical and moral transformation process is necessary in 
Indonesia in order to come to terms with the burdens of the past and to 
prevent possible future conflicts . 
6.2.8 Head of State Government of Indonesia: 
1. 1949 - 5 6 (Ahmed) Sukarno 
2. 1966-98 Suharto 
3. 1998-99 Habibie 
4. 1999 - 2001 Abdurrahman Wahid 
5. 2001 -2004 Miss Megawati Sakamoputri 
6. 2004-SusiIo Bambang Yudhoyono 
o.QS) Versatile 'S-B-Y' Inaugurated as Country's First Directly Elected 
President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - known to his countrymen simply 
as S-B-Y took office on 4 October 2004. He is a man of contrasts. A 
general and his country's one-time security chief, Yudhoyono is 
respected for his intellectual bent and cautious decision-making style. 
He made a name for himself with his antiterrorism efforts and then 
established himself as a popular leader in a country whose 238 million 
(2004 est.). People make it the world's largest Islamic-majority state. 
Yudhoyono has singled out. The economy, corruption and terrorism as 
his first priorities. 
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Yudhoyono can be expected to be as friendly toward the united 
state as political prudence permits in a country where tens of thousands 
have demonstrated against the U.S.-led war in Iraq. He studied in 
American Universities and received training from the U.S. Military . 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as a new President of Indonesia and 
his stance regarding political reformation. 
We will reinforce our security services, police and immigration in 
recognition of terrorist activity. We should demolish corruption fully in 
both structural and cultural ways. I have mentioned the police and public 
prosecutor to scrutinize all the corrupted files as quickly as possible. We 
have forbidden to use the army for our political or other purposes, 
because it disturbs the trend of the improvement of democracy. 
Nowadays, in Indonesia, the violence of human rights has been 
decreased by the army. If it is seen in some parts like "Acheh" or "West 
Popna, at attempt will be made to held military courts. We have the 
opportunity to make the new policy to end the struggle in "Acheh". 
He remarks in response to the question of: Do you enjoy being a 
President? 
Yes, why not, it is a responsibility for me, not an entertainment, it 
is a mission, a challenge and also a learning. There is a lot of problems 
that I should face them . 
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6.3 THE ARAB WORLD: 
What is the exact commutation of 'The Arab World' ? 
The Arabic-speaking peoples are searching for identity. Even 
since World War II, they have talked of unity while remaining as 
separated as ever; they have spoken of one "Arab Nation", while acting 
as a dozen different nations. The only things which they have in 
common are language, religion and culture. 
One of the factors which separate; the Arabic-speaking countries 
is the form of government. There are monarchies, republics, 
dictatorships. Para-democracies, and small sheikhdoms on the Persian 
Gulf, which defy classification. Other, the degree of education and 
general attitude toward the modem world. Countries like Lebanon and 
Egypt, which have numerous universities and attitudes within 
comparative to Yaman and Iraq and also in the area of economic the 
United Arab of Emarates to compare with Bahrain and Iraq. 
After World War II, two factors kept the possibility of unity alive 
among the Arab countries: 
1. Israel, that its establishment enraged all of the Arabic 
Speaking people and countries. 
2. The appearance of a popular and charismatic leader in the 
person of Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Photographs of Nasser could 
be seen in practically in every Arab Market place, home, and 
tent from Yaman to Moracco. 
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6.3.1 Syria and Arab World: 
The history of Arabic-speaking countries of the Fertile crescent 
during the quarters of a century after war II is in part the story of the 
reaction of each country to Israel and to the leadership of Nasser, carried 
on in a context of an inter-Arab cold war. Syria is one of the best 
examples of the Arabs' desire for unity and their difficulties in 
achieving it. Syria can rightly claim to be the home of modern Arab 
nationalism. The division of Ottoman "Syria" into four independent 
contries (Syria, Labanon, Jordan, and Palestine), with the latter of them 
an alien implant, has never been accepted by ardent Syrian 
nationalists^^. 
In the relatively free elections which took place after the coup of 
1374/1954, the Ba'th (Resurrection) party gained 15 Seats. This was not 
very impressive, but in the light of the role the party played in Syria it 
was quite significant. The Ba'th party was created (by Michel Aflaq) in 
1373/1953 from a fusion of two parties which had been Pan-Arab and 
socialist in their orientation; the party was led by Michel Aflaq, a 
Christian and Salah al-Bitar, a Muslim. Ba'thistis became influential and 
organized branches in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. The main rival of the 
Ba'th in Syria, in organization, ideology, and influence, was the 
communist Party'^ "^ . 
Right now the policy of Syria in the inside country, is like the 
period of Hafiz Asad, the father of Bashar Asad, present president, both 
being elected as a single candidate for life. On other hand their foreign 
policy had not undergone any change, as it opposed Israel and has good 
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relationship with USA and very good relationship with Iran and other 
MusHm Countries. But during the war between Iran and Iraq, the 
relationship between Syria and Iraq became strained because the Syrians 
took the side of Iran. 
6.3.2 Iraq and Arab World: 
Arab nationalist rhetoric certainly formed part of their official 
credo and was adhered to as an ideal by a considerable number of 
Ba'thists and others in Iraq. However, the men in command showed 
themselves to be as jealous of Iraqi sovereignty and thus preoccupied 
with the organization of power within the tenitorial state, as had any of 
their predecessors. With the great increase in the government's revenues 
after the oil price rises of the 1390/1970's the trend of placing Iraq first 
was ever move marked. The Arab world came to be seen by the regime 
as a stage on which Iraq could assert its own primacy and thereby the 
supremacy of the leader of Iraq, adding to the stature of the dominant 
figure of Saddam Husain. 
The emergence of Saddam Husain and his construction of a 
dictatorship demanding obedience and using violence on a scale 
unmatched in Iraq's history are the dominant themes of the politics of 
this period. The factors, which made it possible, as well as its 
consequences for Iraqi's political life, do not suggest a radical break 
with the past. On the contrary, the methods Saddam Husain has used, 
some of the values he espouses and the political logic of the system that 
he has established in Iraq have all been prefigured in previous regimes 
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to varying degrees . 
The dictatorship of the more then past thirty years has been in part 
the result of just such competitive and ruthless struggles, conducted with 
a view to excluding and suppressing alternatives in the shaping of the 
history of Iraq^ .^ 
In 1401/ 1980, Saddam had countered the potential threat of an 
expansionist revolutionary Islam by invading Iran. With the support of 
moderate Arab States, the United States, and Europe, and heavily 
financed by the Gulf States, Saddam Husain become the defender of 
Gulf Arabs against Iran. Thus, Iraq received economic and military 
support from its allies, who conveniently overlooked Saddam's use of 
chemical warfare against the Kurds and the Iranians and Iraq's efforts to 
develop nuclear weapons. 
6.3.3 SADDAM^S AGGRESSIVE ARAB NATIONALISM: 
Two years after the Iran -Iraq truce of 1409/1988, The politics of 
the Gulf and of the Middle East had been reversed. Saddam Hussain did 
what his Gulf patrons had earlier paid him to prevent. Having turned 
back the threat to the Gulf from Iran, he overran Kuwait and confronted 
his Gulf^^neighbors in the name of Arab nationalism and Islam. 
Ironically, he accomplished this with a military machine paid for in 
large part by the tens of billions of dollars Kuwait and the Gulf States 
had poured into Iraq and the weapons and Technology provided by the 
Soviet Union, Germany, and France. Even more ironically, Saddam 
attempted to legitimate his "naked aggression" not only in the name of 
Iraqi nationalism, but also in the name of Arab nationalism and Islam. 
Saddam simultaneously sought to appropriate or claim the historic roles 
of 'Nebuchadnezzar', Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and Salahuddin Ayyubi . 
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While Saddam Husain failed to win the support of the leadership in the 
Arab world, he enjoyed a degree of popular support often not fully 
appreciated in the west, where the tendency was to focus on those 
governments that supported the USA initiative and to equate the 
position of these Arab rulers with that of their people. As a result, little 
distinction was made between the differing perspectives of Western 
nations supported by their Arab allies and the views of a significant 
portion of the populace whose deep-seated grievances and frustrations 
were given a new voice and champion in Saddam Husain . 
At last the wrong policy of Saddam opened the political space and 
military oportunate for the west especial America and England that 
attacked Iraq and occupied it and so became dangerous to Islamic 
countries especially Iran that has border with Iraq. 
6.3.4 The Israeli - Arab wars: 
Wars between Arabs and Israelis have taken place from the day 
the state of Israel was implanted by the West on the land of Palestine in 
1368/May 1948, dominating the headlines and featuring prominently in 
books about Israel. The balance sheet, after more than fifty years of 
Israeli-Arab conflict, indicates that on the battlefield there has been no 
clear victor-neither Arab nor Israel. 
For the Middle East in general, and for the people of Palestine in 
particular, 1368/1948 was clearly a turning point. It was the year in 
which the British Mandate for Palesdne terminated, a Jewish state called 
Israel was established. Thousands of Arab Palestinians became refiigees 
in their own home, and regular armed forces of Transjordan, Egypt, 
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Syria and other Arab countries entered Palestine-Israel and clashed with 
Israel forces. Thus began the first all-out Arab-Israel war which-like the 
civil war which preceded it-revolved around land"' . In that war Israel 
held ground and even defeated Egypt and Lebanon. But the Jordanians 
and Syrians did well and in the War 1377/1967defeated Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria. In the 1393/ October 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egypt 
and Syria managed to win an important battle in the initial phase of the 
conflict but were later forced to yield their gains to the victorous 
Israelis. Then, during the years of the "Intifada", Israel failed to contain 
the disturbances, and the Palestinians uprising which began in 
1408/1987 was ended temporarily after the singing of Oslo agreement in 
1414/1993, only to start again with much more ferocity in 1421/2000. 
Wars, however,, are a clash not only of arms but of words, and if, as we 
have just stated, there was no victor on the battlefield. There was indeed 
a clear victor in the war of words-israel'*'^ . 
During the first decades of the state, Israel was the gathering 
place of Jewish immigrants from the four corners of the earth, and rather 
than a homogeneous society it was an assembly of communities and 
diverse people, some of whom were still 'adding up the grocery bill in 
Arabic; others dreaming in Yiddish and singing to their children 
lullabies in English or Russian' '. 
In 1408/1987, two thirds of Israelis stated that they would not 
support social services cuts in order to increase the defence budget, and 
in 1413/1992 only 24 per cent of Israelis said they would be willing to 
finance increased defense spending. These changes in the environment 
and within Israeli society were significant in that they had a strong effect 
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on the attitudes and behaviour of IsraeUs and their wilhngness to fight in 
wars and pay for them. Indeed, the perception of a decreasing external 
threat, the disappearance of the Holocaust generation and a shift from 
collective ideals and priorities to individual ones, meant that a more 
confident Israeli nation, less fearful for its very existence and less 
traumatized and haunted by its past, was also showing itself to be less 
single - minded and more reluctant to take up arms and sacrifice, as was 
clearly demonstrated in Lebanon in 1403/1982 and during the years of 
the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories between 1408/1987 
and 1414/1993; and as of 2000,^ ^ and now (2004). 
Unfortunately Israel's government essentially lives with fight and 
does not know any right for Muslim society and continues to its 
criminals with supporting from the western countries especially America 
and united European also fear of her in her policy. 
6.3.5 SAUDI ARABIA; 
In 1420/ January 1999, Saudi Arabia celebrated a hundred years 
of 'unification, stability and renaissance' under the leadership of the 
Al-Sa'ud. Having successfially weathered a major attack in the early 
1411/1990s, this leadership invited the population and the outside world 
to celebrate its success. The religious foundation of the state was 
seriously undermind by the propagation of and emphasis on state 
narratives that glorified the role of Ibn Sa'ud in creating Saudi Arabia. 
The centennial celebrations emphasized discontinuity with the past, as 
the foundation of Saudi Arabia was given the continuous date of 
1320/1902. 
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According to official narratives, Saudi Arabia was bom with the 
capture of Riyadh. In reahty, the formation of the Sa'udi state cannot be 
attributed to any single event or date. Rather, it has been the function of 
social and political developments throughout the last century. It is 
tempting to view the formation of this state as a continuous and 
progressive process. The state has been an evolving structure, something 
that is destined to continue in the future'*"^ . 
6.3.6 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND 
RELATION WITH THE USA: 
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with no legislature or 
political parties. Constitutionally, the King rules in accordance with the 
'Shari'a', the sacred law of Islam. He appoints and leads a council of 
Ministers, which serves as the instrument of royal authority in both 
legislative and executive matters. Therefore, the foreign policy and 
relationship with countries belong to this authority. Relations between 
Saudi Arabia and the USA were placed under renewed strain in 1423/ 
August 2002 after a group representing 900 relatives of victims of the 
September 2001 attacks filed a civil suit in Washington, DC, against 
Senior Saudi Ministers and institutions seeking compensation 
amounting to US$ 1,000,000 m. for their alleged funding of al-Qa'ida 
activities. Saudi investors reacted angrily to the suit, Threatening in 
response to withdraw from the USA some $750,000m, in Saudi 
investments. In late 2002 Saudi Arabia was criticized by the USA for 
ignoring the funding of alleged terrorist organizations by Saudi 
nationals, and in November USA media reports claimed that a charitable 
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donation from the Saudi royal family had assisted two 'hijachers' 
responsible for the Suicid attacks on the USA. 
Despite the tensions between Saudi Arabia and the USA, in 
September 2002, following intense pressure from the USA and the 
United Kingdom, the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs indicated that 
Saudi Arabia might be prepared to approve the use of military bases in 
Saudi Arabia for a future US-led attack on Arab and Muslims 
Countries. In 1424/January 2003 Saudia Arabia attempted to secure 
support for a plan to persuade Saddam Hussain to relinquish power and 
go into exile in order to avert a US-led war to oust his regime. On 1425/ 
21 April 2004 a car bomb exploded near one of the headquarters of 
Riadh's security services, killing four people and wounding up to 150. A 
militant Islamist group called the 'al-Haramain Brigades' (and alleged to 
have links to al-Qa'ida) claimed responsibility for the attack. Earlier in 
the month all non-essential US diplomatic personnel, had been ordered 
to leave the Kingdom after another spate of terrorist attacks and several 
foiled suicide-bombing attempts . In these days USA shifted her 
military base from Saudi Arabia to Qatar as a Muslim country in Persian 
Gulf. 
6.3.7 THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE): 
In 1382/1962, in an address given before the Royal Central Asian 
Society in London, J.E.H. Boustead remarked that life in Abu-Dhabi had 
changed very little during the past two centuries'*^ While this 
observation might have applied in 13 82/1962,it would never hold 
ground today. The radical transformation of Abu Dhabi can only be 
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classified as one of the Phenomena of the modem era, so rapid and 
fundamental has it been. 
This alternation would not, of course, have been possible without 
the discovery of vast oil reserves, underground and offshore, which are 
currently bringing thousands of millions of dollars a year into the 
Sheykhdom. Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial states remained in the 
background of international affairs, still under the aegis of Britain. Since 
the end of World War II, Their internal development had come under 
greater scrutiny from the British Government, as oil exploration began 
to be taken seriously again. 
With this new policy of participation in local affairs came a re-
organization of British administration'^''. In keeping with the pre-War 
decision, the political residency for the Gulf was moved from Bushire to 
Bahrain, In 1366/1946. The office of Residency agent in Sharjah was 
abohshed in 1369/1949, and from 1348/1929 to 1373/1953, when a 
political agency for the Trucial Coast was set up, a permanently resident 
political Officer was appointed from the Foreign Office in London . 
The Political Agent, with headquarters in the burgeoning town of Dubai, 
assumed much greater responsibility and authority than any former 
British representative on coast had done, and acceptance of his role 
became a precondition for British recognition of the rulers . 
In 1388/ January 1968 the United Kingdom announced its 
intention to withdraw British military forces from the area by 
1391/1971. In 1388/ March 1968 the Trucial states joined nearby 
Bahrain and Qatar (which were also under British protection) in what 
was named the Federation of Arab Emirates. It was intended that the 
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Federation should become fully independent, but the interests of Bahrain 
and Qatar proved to be incompatible with those of the smaller 
Sheykhdoms, and both seceded from the Federation in 1391/August 
1971 to become Separate independent states. In July six of the Trucial 
states (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ummal-Qaiwain, Ajman and 
Fujairah) had agreed on a federal constitution for achieving independece 
as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ras al-Khaymah joined the union 
in 1392/February 1972 . The provisional constitution was extended for 
five-years periods in 1397/1976, 1402/1981, 1407/1986, and 1412/ 
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6.3.8 GOVERNMENT OF UAE; 
The highest Federal authority is the Supreme Council of Rulers, 
comprising the hereditary rulers of the seven emirates, each of whom is 
virtually an absolute monarch in his own domain. Decision of the 
Supreme Council require the approval of at least five members, 
including the rulers of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai. From its seven 
members, the Supreme Council elects a president and a Vice-President. 
The president appoints the Prime Minister and The Federal Council of 
Ministers, responsible to the Supreme Council, to hold executive 
authority; the legislature is the Federal National Council, a consultative 
assembly (comprising 40 membes appointed for two years by the 
emirates) which considers laws proposed by the council of Ministers. 
There are no political parties . Once, the Head of state was president 
Sheykh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan (ruler of Abu Dhabi) had taken 
office as president of the UAE on 2 December 1971; re-elected 1976; 
1981, 1991, 1996 and 2 December 2001^^ upto 2004 and he died on 3 
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November 2004 and his successor is Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-
Nahyan. 
6.3.9 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND RULING FAMILIES 
OF UAE: 
In 1414/1993 the most important political figures in the UAE 
were the senior members of the ruling families of the individual 
amirates. The Al-Nuyayyan family of Abu Dhabi, the Al-Nuaimi of 
Ajman, the Al-Sharqi of AI-Fujayrah, the Al-Maktum of Dubai, the AI-
Qasimi of Ras al-Khaymah and Sharjah, and the AI-Mualla of umm al-
Qaywayn. The most powerful amir is Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al-
Nuhayyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the president of the UAE. He has 
ruled Abu Dhabi since 1386/1966, when his elder brother, Shaykh 
Shakhbut was deposed by the British. Sheykh Zayid designated his son, 
Shaykh Khalifa as crown prince,^ '^  one son was a colonel in the Union 
defence force air force, and several of his cousins were prominent in 
government, especially the sons of his cousin Mohammad ibn Khalifa '^'. 
The relative political and financial of each emirate is reflected in 
the allocation of positions in the federal government. The ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, whose emirate is the UAE's major oil producer, is president of 
the UAE. The ruler of Dubai, which is the UAE's commercial center 
and a significant oil producer, is Vice - President and Prime Minister. 
Since achieving independence in 1391/1971, the UAE has worked to 
strengthen its federal institutions. Nonetheless, each emirates still retains 
substantial autonomy, and progress toward greater federal integration 
has slowed in recent years. A basic concept in the UAE Government's 
development as a federal system is that a significant percentage of each 
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emirate's revenues should be devoted to the UAE Central budget. The 
UAE has no political parties, there is talk of steps toward democratic 
government, but nothing concrete has emerged. The rulers hold power 
on the basis of their dynastic position and their legitimacy in a system of 
tribal consensus. Rapid modernization, enormous strides in education, 
and the influx of a large foreign population have changed the face of the 
society but have not fundamentally altered this traditional political 
system^^ As of 2004, UAE have been accused by several human rights 
organizations of acting in contravention of the Universal Development 
of Human Rights in the country's failure to allow freedom of 
expression. 
The Barnabas Fund organization cites that the Dubai emirate 
removed the right of appeal against deportation by expatriates accused 
of 'religious crimes'; such as trying to convert a Muslim to another 
religion. Amnesty International lists further problems relating to human 
rights on its website, such as the mass detainment of 250 persons related 
to the United States - led war on Terror, the ill-treatment of prisoners in 
prison, and the continued use of flogging and the death penalty . 
6.3.10 YASSER ARAFAT AS A ARAB PALESTINIAN 
POLITICIAN; 
He was born in 1348/1929 in Jerusalem, and helped to form the 
al-Fath movement, emerging as its leader in 1388/1968. The Chairman 
of the 'Palestine Liberation Organization' in 1389/1969 and Commander 
-in-Chief of the Palestine Revolutionary Forces in 1391/1971. He 
attended all-Arab Sammit Conferences, and in 1394/1974 was invited to 
address the United Nation General Assembly. When he rejected military 
violence, recognized the existence of the state of Israel, and called for a 
political solution to the Palestine problem. Although excluded from the 
'peace-process' initiated by the USA in 1413/1992, he remained a key-
figure behind the negotiations between Israel, Syria, and Palestinians. In 
1414/1993 he signed a peace accord with Israel, in which Israel agreed 
to withdraw its troops from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas, and 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to give up terrorism. 
He, along with Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of 
Israel, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1415/1994. He was elected 
President of the newly formed Palestinian National authority in 
1417/1996 and still he hold the office'^ He died on 11 November, 2004 
and succeeded him Mahmood Abbass (Abu Mazen) in recent election. 
6.3.11 LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (ARAB LEAGUE): 
It is an organization of Arab states, founded in Cairo, Egypt in 
1365/1945 and its members in 1412/1991 were: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Comoros, Djiboti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. An annexe to 
the League's Charter stipulates that Palestine is considered as an 
independent state and as a full member of the Arab League. The 
principal aims of the League are to protect the independence and 
sovereignty of its members, and to strengthen the ties between them by 
encouraging co-operation in different fields. In 1411/1990 the league 
narrowly approved a proposal to dispatch Arab forces to support the US-
led coalition against Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, but the conflict 
exposed serious divisions among members. The League supported the 
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peace accord between Israel and the PLO in 1414/1993 but decided to 
uphold the boycott of Israel until it withdraws from all the occupied 
territories . 
6.3.12 GULF CO-OPERATION CONCIL (GCC) AND ITS 
RANKS: 
It is an organization of Arab Gulf States, established in 1402/1981 
to promote regional co-operation. The GCC has six members: Abu 
Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudia Arabia with its 
headquarters in Saudi Arabia. Initially seeking to encourage 
collaboration in economic, social, and cultural affairs, the GCC later 
extended its scope to cover common security problems, and in 
1405/1984 set up a joint defence force. It supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-88). The organization's failure to offer any decisive response 
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1411/1990 led to suggestions that it be 
strengthened and expanded. After the Gulf-War ceasefire in February 
1991, the GCC countries joined with Egypt and Syria in agreeing to set 
up an Arab peace force as part of a broader plan to strengthen regional 
•. 59 
security . 
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L^hapter 7 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTINQS 
The teaching of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) abohshed the 
inequalities of races and classes and brought to human beings a modern 
teachings specially political system and moreover, the Prophet himself 
exercised all powers, spiritual as well as temporal and others, in the 
community which he had organized into a state and endowed with all its 
organisms. Thus cumulation of powers was passed in heritage, after his 
death, to his successors in the state, with this difference that these 
successors were not Prophets, and so did not receive the Divine 
revelations. The Prophet Muhammad had always insisted on the 
necessity of community life, and he went so far as to declare that, 
"Whoever died without knowing his imam (Caliph) dies in Paganism". 
In the time of prophet, there were individuals and even groups of 
Muslims, who lived voluntarily or under constraint, outside the frontiers 
of the Islamic state, for example in Abyssinia, and in Mecca (before its 
conquest by the prophet). Some of the non-Muslim regions did not 
know religious tolerance, and prosecuted the Muslims (as in the City-
State of Mecca and the Byzantine empire). Others, like in Christian 
Abyssinia, practiced a liberal policy in matters of conscience. The 
Caliph inherited from the Prophet the exercise of the double power, 
spiritual-temporal, and he presided over the celebration of the service of 
worship in the mosque, and he was the head of the state in temporal 
affairs (chapter one). 
The Quran speaks of kings, both good and bad, and never refers 
to other fonns of government, such as a republic. The form of 
government thus established was intermediary between hereditary 
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monarchy and a republic- the Cahph was elected for life. If the fact of 
election makes it resemble a republic, the duration of the power was like 
that of monarchy. From the very beginning, there have been dissidents 
to the elected caliphs; later there have been even rival claimants and 
these caused bloodshed in the community from time to time. 
Later, power was held by some dynasty, thus came the 
Umayyads, who in their turn were replaced by the 'Abbasids'; these 
latter did not succeed in obtaining the homage of the far-off province of 
Spain, where independent dynasties of Muslim rulers exercised 
sovereign powers, without, however, daring to assume the title of 
"Caliph" and by name of Islam (Chapter one). 
Political experimentation and practices of the Prophet and his 
successor paved the way of theorization and the scholars of later 
countries developed on their basis a whole political system of Islam. 
Most prominent of the theoretical traditions of Philosophy and politics 
by Al- Farabi and Avicenna and later by Ibn Khaldun and Khawja Nasir 
al-Din al-Tusi and soon with their challenges on the political theory that 
borrowed from Philosopher king of plato and Republic from Aristotle 
and then established their political theory of "Madina Fadilah" and did 
good researches on political system of Islam. Specially the details of 
Ibn-Khaldun of "group feeling" and many other things were also very 
useful. Moreover some of them like Avicenna and Nizamul Mulk Tusi: 
entered in polity and they did practical experimentations and wrote their 
experiences of political activities. 
Farabi in his political philosophy looking at the ideal republic of 
Plato merges into 'The Philosopher as ruler', and he endows his 'prince' 
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with all the virtues of humanity and philosophy: he is plato in the metal 
of the Prophet. Farabi divides the regimes into three broad types, the 
"ignorant" regimes (Medina al-jahilah), "Wicked" or "immoral' regimes 
and the regimes whose citizens have acquired certain opinions about 
these things but false or corrupt opinions. Then he concentrated on 
virtuous city (Medinah al-Fadilah). The political Philosophy of 
Aviccenna also and essentially Farabian and rests on the theory of 
Prophet hood and revelation. Al-Ghazzali proposed a sincere loyalty to 
the caliphate, recognizing the legitimacy of Abbasid rule. He argued that 
caliphs and Sultans had to -co-operate to bring peace and safety to the 
Muslim empire. Ibn Bajjah accepted al-Farabi's division of the state into 
perfect and imperfect and Ibn Tufail's point of view is individualistic. 
Ibn Khaldun's socio-political theory based upon the concepts of 
ai-'asabiyah (group-feeling) and al-mulk (royal authority) and the idea 
of al-mustabid (despot); and he says the group feeling is necessary and 
good if to be used in the case of Allah. He also says; that royal authority 
is the natural goal of group feeling. Of the later Islamic philosophers, 
Khwajah Nasir details his political Philosophy in his book (Akhlaq-i-
Nasiri) which belong the politics of cities. He also discusses the 
institution of philosopher/ Vazir. At last Nizam al-Mulk Tusi shows his 
political philosophy in his book (Siasat Nameh). (Chapter two). 
The Turks, when converted to Islam, brought a new element. First 
they furnished soldiers and commanders who became the real governing 
power in the state. Side by side with the caliphs, there appeared a 
"commander of the commanders", and later a "sultan", and the state 
authority became divided and administration went into the hands of the 
Sultan who governed in the name of the Caliph. This period was at 
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medieval experiment of the Ottoman dynasty in the name of Islam, the 
same Ottoman dynasty had also two medieval counterparts, namely, the 
Safavids of Iran as a Shia state and the Mughals of India. Anyway, these 
three daynasties were most powerful and took their powers from Islam 
and ruled in the name of Islam by different methods in their areas 
(Chapter three). The Fatimid Caliphate of Cairo disappeared first, and 
this Kingdom was acquired by a dynasty of Turkish-Kurdish governors, 
who recognized the caliphate of Bghdad. When the later was devastated 
by the Pagan Tartars, the Seat of the caliphate was moved to Cairo. 
Later the Ottoman Turks conquered Egypt, and abolished the neo-
'Abasid dynasty of Caliphs there. The Turkish Istanbul (The city of 
Islam) and the Mughal Delhi (India) also pretended to be champions of 
the caliphate and the Safavids of the Imamat: but, however big their 
empires might have been, their claims were recognized only inside their 
respective jurisdictions. The Mughals were removed from their Indian 
power by the British; the Turkish Ottoman also by the British and 
Safavids by Qajar (with the support of the British). 
The modern experiments in Muslim World are available in more 
than 55 countries like Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Indonesia and Arab World that we have explained about their 
perspective in chapters four, five and six give us a clear understanding 
of political authority and leadership, therefore we can say; Islam 
attaches no importance to the external form of government. It is 
Satisfied if the well-being of man in both the worlds is aimed for, and 
the Divine law applied. Thus the constitutional questions take a 
secondary place. Thus, a republic, like Egypt and Turkish and Tajikistan 
and Iran, a monarchy like Malaysia, Saudia Arabia, Qatar, a joint-rule. 
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among other forms, are all valid in the Muslim community. But what is 
important, that is the duties of the state. The duties and functions of a 
Muslim state seem to be four: 
1. Executive (for the civil and military administration) 
2. Legislative 
3. Judicial 
4. Cultural 
The sum up, Islam seeks to establish a world community, with 
complete equality among people and without distinction of race, class, 
or country. It seeks to convert by persuasion, allowing no compulsion in 
religious beliefs, every individual being personally responsible to God. 
To Islam, government signifies a trust, a service, in which the 
functionaries are the servants of the people. According to Islam, it is the 
duty of every individual to make a constant effort to spread good and 
prevent evil. 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, much of the Muslim 
world, having attained independence as nation-states, now faces a 
second revolution or transformation: That of national identity and 
religious/intellectual reform. Issues of authority, legitimacy, identity, 
authenticity, political participation, and human rights are prominent. 
This occurs within a context in which secular forms of liberal 
nationalism. 
Political Islam has proved a formidable force even though Islamic 
movements or organizations often constitute a minority of the 
community. It has proved attractive and effective in response to the 
political and socio-economic failures of governments and elites: 
sectarian, tribal, and class grievances: Second-class citizenship in terms 
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of access to education and employment; mal-distribution of wealth, and 
official corruption. In societies when opposition is absent, repressed, or 
muted by governments. Islamists have often proved effective both in 
mobilizing their own following and, as the only viable outlet or "game 
in town", in attracting those who wish to register their frustration or 
opposition to the prevailing order. Islam has increasingly reemerged in 
Muslim political discourse and politics and has been effective in 
providing or reinforcing national identity and political legitimacy; it has 
also been a source of mass mobilization. Governments and opposition 
movements have appealed to Islamic symbols and slogans. Islamic 
movements and organization have proliferated across the Muslim world. 
However, the appeal to religion is a two-edged Sword, as demonstrated 
by the experience of some Muslim countries. 
Some Muslim countries like Malaysia is powerful in economy 
and industrial technology despite monarchial political system and could 
be a pattern and Indonesia in democracy and Pakistan as a nuclear 
energy and military, and Iran as an independent country also could be a 
pattern. But if possible they gather all those patterns together or not? 
This is another thing. 
Egyptians from the ancient upto present time have experiences in 
political activities (about 5000 years) and two times in modem times the 
president of United Nation (UN) was Egyptian (Petross Ghali). For the 
time being, in 20 years later, things seem to go well, but gradually, there 
developed a gap between the state and society. The state agenda became 
different from society's agenda, and the respective priorities of the state 
and the society appeared heading for a clash. 
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Turkey Ottomans became Nation-State after world-war I and in 
the hand of Kemal Ataturk became a secular state, then he abohshed 
many symbols (Sha'air) of Islam in modem Turkey, like abolishing of 
'Adhan' and changing weak end holiday Friday and also the alphabets 
and legislative law to European law. The Malaysian also developed in 
many areas of polity and in the Shadow of polity, economy, especially 
in the period of Mahatir Mohammad its Prime Minister. This country 
had a good relationship with the west and also with Muslim countries in 
foreign policy. Despite it has monarchical system of governance but it is 
constitutional in nature and real power is vested in the parliamentary 
system based on election in that country that has good status, and the 
king is elected for 5 years and the political parties have total freedom. 
Thus welfare of the people is the hollwork of the political system. 
Finally in the chapter four we have discussed about a new Muslim 
country. Tajikistan, that it obtained independence in 1991 from the 
Soviet Union. Parties in this republic have also been grated freedom 
although it experienced civil war for five years. Many challenges which 
cause the development of political system come from outside of 
Tajikistan, and inside the society, or from the political elite of the 
society. 
The case of modern Iran, considered in Chapter five illustrates the 
difficulties encountered by a modern government in a complex society. 
After revolution (in 1979), the theory of the Wilayat-i-Faqih became the 
theory of government, and after sometimes Imam Khameini turned from 
Wilayat-i-ifiqih to Wilayat-i-Motlaqeh-i-faqih (The absolute 
guardianship of the jurist) for the solution of the problems of country. 
Imam Khameini's doctrine was in operation in the 1970s, hence 
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constitution was also changed. The position of the 'ulama' in Iran is 
very strong. Nowadays Iran has challenged the USA about nuclear 
energy therefore the foreign policy of Iran was oriented or inclined in 
favour of European Union. Elections in Iran were held frequently and in 
the 25 years after revolution almost 25 elections took place for 
Assembly and consultation and president. 
Pakistan which was dominated by military dictatorship for a long 
time after independence and also as a nuclear armor country is the most 
powerful Muslim country in the military matters its relationship with 
USA after September 11, 2001, got a high rank in her foreign policy 
with USA, because it allowed the USA entrance to Pakistan and through 
Pakistan fighting Taliban. The logistic base of US army in Jacobabad in 
Pakistan in the state of Baluchistan supported American's in fighting the 
Taliban. Status of Parties and Press and private channels of Television 
otherwise is good. 
Indonesia's status of parties and press and private televisions also 
good and it is said that the third best democracy obtained in Indonesia in 
the world after USA and India. Finally we have discussed Arab political 
experimentations and systems especially of Syria, Iraq, UAE and their 
challenges to the Israel and the west. Part of the Arab World is 
dominated by absolute monarchy and another part by republic systems. 
Monarchical states prohibited the establishment of political parties but 
private television and press have been allowed to work in some 
countries like Qatar and UAE. There are some republics like Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq where political parties are allowed to operate but in all 
these countries one party system dominates there is free party-system 
like India, Pakistan or even Indonesia and Malaysia where multiple 
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party system strengthens the polity of the countries. In fact, freedom and 
liberty are two touchstones of the political health of a country, which are 
not found, generally speaking in west of the Muslim World. But 
t may be admitted that their political experimentations have quite 
enriched the Muslim legacy, and it is hoped that one day a truly Muslim, 
if not Islamic, polity would be brought into being which may be based 
on human dignity, love and affection, or at least on peaceful 
coexistence. 
Being a Muslim in the contemporary world needs the fact that all 
Muslims try to base their social systems on the human rights ideals. It is 
accepted that human rights doctrines are not included in the Kitab 
(Qur'an) and the tradition but it is accepted belief that the modern 
societies which have established their base on huinan rights are 
successful in providing justice, togetherness and kindness. And it is the 
best way in facilitating faithfulness and morality to the morals of the 
society. 
The avoid of establishing the totalitarian regimes and accepting 
seriously the human rights and democracy which is the reality of our age 
is one of the basic needs of being a Muslim in this period. In modern 
Muslim societies like other modern societies taking into the 
consideration of human rights is the only correct and acceptable way for 
improving human relationships on the base of justice and morality. In 
this modem age, establishing the systems on the base of human rights is 
the only way that Muslims can be faithful to Islam, faith, justice 
morality, togetherness and kindness. 
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Glossary 
GLOSSARY 
Adhan 
adl 
al-asabiyah 
al-mulk 
ataturk 
ansar 
bay'a 
Caliph/Khalifa 
daral-Islam 
dawla 
derbey 
Faqih 
Fatwa 
Fiqh 
Ghazi 
Hadith 
The call to salat (prayer) pronounced 
loudly to indicate that the time of 
praying is due. 
justice 
group feeling 
royal authority 
The Father of Turks 
helpers; Those men of Medina who 
supported the prophet 
declaration of allegiance to a ruler 
deputy, used for the ruler as 'Deputy of 
the prophet Muhammad 
land of Islam 
'dynasty' in historical usage; 'state' in 
modern usage 
local chief/landlord, in Ottoman usage 
jurist, legal theorist 
Ruling on matter of law or worship, 
usually issued in response to a question 
jurisprudence, legal theory 
warrior for the faith 
Sayings attributed to the prophet 
Muhammad, prefaced by a pain of 
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Ijma 
Ijtihad 
Imam 
Imam-ul-Zaman 
Jahiliya 
Jihad 
Jiwar 
Jizya 
Kharadj 
Khawarij 
Kitab 
authorities throng whom the tradition is 
said to have been transmitted. 
Consensus 
The exercise of reason in the derivation 
of legal judgments from the canonical 
sources. 
generic usage as religious leader; shi'ite 
special usage to designate charismatic 
descendantsin the line of the prophet 
through Ali and Fatima (A.S.) 
'The imam of all time', referring to the 
Hidden Imam in Shi'ite belief 
ignorance or barbarism, designating the 
time preceding the coming of Islam, but 
used to denigrate disapproved groups 
and societies, deemed irreligious, 
holy - war 
Protection 
Poll-tax levied on protected non-
Muslims 
Tax, more specifically, land tax in 
medieval Persian usage and in the 
Ottoman empire 
The people who dissented from the 
religion and disagreed with the rest of 
the Muslims 
documents 
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Marja'al - taqlid 
Madinat al-Fadilah 
Madinat al-jahilah 
Mamluke 
Marzuban 
Mecelle/Majalla 
Mu'akhat 
Mufti 
Muj tabid 
Muhadgir 
The 'source of emulation' a title applied 
to the highest authority among the 
shi'ite clergy 
Principles of the Opinion of the people 
of the virtuous city 
Madinah-I-ghyr-I-fadilah, anti-utopia 
literally 'slave', designates the slave 
dynasties which ruled in different parts 
ofthe Middle East. 
border-chiefs of early Persia 
Ottoman legal statutes codifying the 
civil law elements of the Shari'a in 
modern forms, published in 1293/1876. 
First clear manifestation of the 
organization of Islam. 
a man trained in the shari'a, or Muslim 
divine law, and who can give a legal 
opinion (Fatwa) on questions 
concerning Islamic practice 
a high ranking member of the clergy 
qualified to practice ijtihad 
in early Islam, Those Meccan Muslims 
who emigrated from mecca to Medina 
either just before the prophet himself or 
in the period up to the conquest of 
Mecca in 8/630. 
222 
Qadiaskar 
Qizil-bash 
Rashidun 
Shari'a 
Shykhulislam 
Shi'i/shi'a 
Shura 
Siasa 
Siasah madaniyyah 
Sunni 
Two high religious dignitaries in the 
Ottoman court; literarally, military 
judge 
Red heads, who had penchant for 
turbans in the safavids period 
rightly guided applied to the first four 
caliphs succeeding the Prophet 
Muhammad 
The sacred law of Islam, law based on 
the Quran and Sunna 
The highest ranking cleric in the 
Ottoman court. Mufti of Istanbul 
'Shi'i' is a singular noun as well as an 
adjectives 'Shi'a is the generic plural, as 
in the Shi'a they refer to a section of 
Islam that championed Ali, the fourth 
caliph and his descendants as the 
rightftil rulers of Muslims. 
Consultation, usually applied to the 
ruler consulting the ruled 
Administration, applied to tribunals, 
judgments and punishments effected by 
the ruler and his deputies, as distinct 
from Shari'a, in modem usage, politics 
Political utopianism 
Adjective, referring to the mainstream 
congregation of Muslims. 
77' 
Tamaddun 
Taqlid 
Tadbir al-motawahid 
ulema/ulama 
ummah 
Unimah wahidah 
Wilayat-I-faqih 
Wali-e-amr 
Wila 
Wilayat-I-motlaqa-e-faqih: 
Zimmis 
civilization 
simulation; lay believers are said to 
emulate learned scholars, and later 
generations of Scholars to emulate 
learned illustrations predecessors. 
Hermit's guide 
Scholars of Islam, cleric 
The community formed by those who 
accept the messenger and his message 
Islamic community, brother hood 
One Community 
The guardianship of the jurist, Ayatollah 
Khomeini's doctrine of Government, 
assigning authority to a ruling faqih 
guardian, a term applied to one in 
authority 
client ship 
absolute guardianship of faqih as a latest 
doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
modern Iran. 
Protected people like Christians, jews 
and Zoroastrians in Islamic society 
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